A summary of case facts
A 12th-grade high school student, Alfonzo carried with him a concealed weapon into Texas High School, located in San Antonio (Kanovitz, p. 34). The suspect was charged under Texas Law for possessing a firearm while in a school compound. The State’s charges were dismissed the following day after the federal agents charged him for violating a federal criminal statute, which is the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The law forbids a person to possess a gun knowingly at a place that has been declared as a school zone (Kanovitz, p. 36). The Court found him guilty and was sentenced to six months in addition to a supervised period of two years after release.
A brief statement of questions
Is Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, which forbids a person to possess a gun knowingly at a place which has been declared as a school zone, unconstitutional since it surpasses the power of Congress to legislate under Commerce Clause (Kanovitz, p. 36)?
Brief statement of ruling
Yes. Possession of a concealed firearm in a school compound is not an economic activity that might have a substantial impact on interstate Commerce (Kanovitz, p. 34). The Act is a criminal statute which has no direct association with any economic activity.
In-depth discussion
The case brought much concerns and controversies after the federal agents dismissed government charges with respect to Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The major concern of the case between Lopez and the U.S. was about Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause (Kanovitz, p. 21). Most of those who were concerned wanted to know whether it is unconstitutional for the federal government to pass legislation for public schools. According to the Constitution enforced by James Madison, the powers of the federal government (central) are defined and few (The U.S. Courts, p.23). The remaining is channeled to the state governments, which include many indefinite powers (The U.S. Courts, p.12).
The circulating controversies opines that the Court’s decision might have extended Congress’s powers. The narratives further suggested that the main aim of the Court’s decision was to keep a close eye on congress powers (Kanovitz, p. 27). In my view, the ruling was somewhat an increase in power, but for the good of citizens because the Supreme Court utilized the Commerce Clause as justification for the Gun-Free School Zone Act to be a constitutional rule. The reason as to why the Act was seen as constitutional is because a considerable number of person would agree that gun violence at any school would result to economic distress (Segall, 443). Its adverse impacts may include increased insurance need for insurance covers, property damage, and personal injuries, which might lead to death (The U.S. Courts, p.28). Notably, economic distress due to possibility of gun violence was the main reason why Lopez case was associated with the Commerce Clause.
There was an incursion into state sovereignty, although it is not that significant because a total number of 40 states had already put in place their own criminal laws for possessing a firearm on or near a school (The U.S. Courts, p.2). It seems that there was a constitutional-based clash between the government and the Court. According to CNN news published in 2005, the government claimed that possession of gun in school might triggers mass shootings leads to less commercially, dangerous neighborhood and unproductivity among the kids (Segall, 443). On its part, the Court responded by suggesting that gun regulation in schools cannot be solely relied by Congress Commerce Clause in passing constitutional muster.
The Court further supported its point of view by affirming that Congress could only control three aspects under the Commerce Clause. Kanovitz highlighted the three aspects as follows, channels of Commerce, instrumentalities of Commerce and actions that impact interstate commerce substantially. Kanovitz further opined that Lopez case can be justified under the third category, however, it could definitely fail since gun regulation in local schools have no direct association with commerce law (Kanovitz, p. 24). It was lawfully right to reverse the charges against Lopez since the Act has no provision which renders unlawful possession of gun to have any impact on interstate Commerce. Besides, the Congress did not provide a reliable evidence to prove that gun ownership in school may leads to chaos among the students as well as injuring the economy (Segall, 443). Overall, the Congress had acted beyond its legal jurisdiction by overworking the provisions of Commerce Clause, and neglected the State’s role on policing crimes
From 1937 up to the time when Lopez case was ruled, the Supreme Court had been expanding and upholding the provisions of Congress powers under Commerce Clause. Before the controversies, Supreme Court did not take much emphasis on Commerce clause, and similar cases were handled literary and narrowly. According to The U.S. Courts, the Clause only permitted buying, transportation, and selling of goods between states, as opposed to manufactured goods even if they had a direct relationship with interstate Commerce. During the error of Lopez case, there was a great change on the way Supreme Court executed its duties. For instance, it came up with a federal rule which regulated the production of local goods dictating that such practices affected interstate Commerce substantially (Kanovitz, p. 28). Equally, such federal rules were rendered constitutional.
The above highlighted changes were evidenced for the first time after 50 years following the controversies that surrounded Lopez case. It was during this period when the Court limited the powers of Commerce Clause, which had constantly been growing (Segall, 443). According to CNN news published in 2005, the Lopez case was a significant mark for transitioning the scope of the commerce power as a result of the Rehnquist Court decision. Importantly, those who were involved in similar cases did not find it tough as Lopez did, and the move can act as a trigger of a constitutional revolution in federalism.
Conclusion
In light of the above discussion, it is evident that Congress’s powers were elevated; however, it was not that significant, and the increase has been justified (Segall, 443). Since the federal government was emphasizing the use of Commerce Clause to protect the people in these schools, no harm would be imparted to them or experience regarding deteriorated economics of schooling (Kanovitz, p. 28). Importantly, a considerable number of states had put in place sanctions to prevent firearms in school. Therefore, there was a need for federal legislation to make it illegal everywhere since a gun is not necessary on school grounds.
Work cited
The U.S. Courts. “The Federal Judiciary.” Geographic boundaries of United States Court of Appeals and United States District Courts. Available online at http://www. uscourts. gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap. pdf, last accessed July 26 (2017).
CNN. Conservatism, judicial restraint mark Rehnquist legacy (2005). Available at
https://edition.cnn.com/2005/LAW/09/03/rehnquist.legacy/index.html
Kanovitz, Jacqueline R., Constitutional Law for Criminal Justice, Chapter 2, pp. 3-42
Segall, Eric J. “Constitutional Change and the Supreme Court: The Article V Problem.” U. Pa. J.
Const. L. 16 (2013): 443.
Lawrence vs. Texas
A brief summary of case facts
Houston police entered John Lawrence’s private apartment in response to reported weapon disturbance. The police found Lawrence together with his male counterpart, Tyron Garner, engaging in private, consensual sexual acts (Kanovitz, p.4). Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of engaging in deviant sexual intercourse in violation of the Texas statute. The statute forbids two persons with the same sex to participate in a specific intimate sexual act (Kanovitz, p.4). The Court of Appeal ruled out that the statute was constitutional based on the Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment under the control of Bowers v. Hardwick (1986).
A brief statement of questions
Did the criminal conviction of Lawrence and Garner for adult, consensual sexual intimacy violate their primary right in privacy and liberty by the Due Process Clause of the 14th amendment (Kanovitz, p.7)? Do the criminal convictions of the two victims, under the Texas Homosexual legislature, which forbids sex by couples of similar sex violate the Fourteenth Amendment assurance of equal protection of laws (Kanovitz, p.7)? Can the decision which was made by Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) be overruled?
A brief statement of the ruling
Yes, no, and yes. According to the opinion given out by Justice Kennedy Antony, the Court’s main interest in the case was to ascertain whether Lawrence and Garner were adults with the right to engage in whatever consensual adult sexual activity of their wish (Kanovitz, p.14). The Court ruled out that conviction of the two was a violation of liberty and privacy rights of the accused. It is a violation of the Texas Homosexual legislature of the Fourteenth Amendment assurance of equal protection of laws to convict adult individuals who engage in consensual sexual intimacy act (Kanovitz, p.20). The Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, (1986) control case.
In-depth discussion
According to the Due Process Clause, the Constitution protects liberty, which grants homosexual persons the right to enter or choose a relationship in the confines of their houses. Again the Clause protects the private lives of citizens in addition to allowing them to handle their dignity as free persons (Strader and Lindsey, p. 465). No prostitution, minors, parties should not be injured and should involve people offering consent. Also, a state is not allowed to discriminate against any group of persons.
In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 168 (1986), the Court upheld a statute in Georgia which criminalize private, consensual and sodomy amongst both hetero and homosexuals. Bower’s Court mistakenly came up with the issue of whether homosexuals have a right to engage in sexual activity under the Constitution (Bachhofer, p. 257). This Court concluded that a ruling with a view that the right is not protected would necessarily have the same consequence during the determination of whether or not homosexual relationships, in general, are lawful (Kanovitz, p.15). This determination would intrude on the fundamental right of homosexuals to participate in familial relationships as well as intimate and personal relationships.
The above analysis should have guided Bowers, and have a control on similar cases today. Bowers was wrong when it was decided, and his case is even not correct today, hence being overruled (Strader and Lindsey, p. 465). This case does not involve persons who might be injured or coerced, minors, those who might not easily refuse consent, or public conduct or prostitution. It entails two adults who, with full and mutual consent, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. Petitioners’ right to liberty under the Due Process Clause accords them the full mandate to engage in private conduct without government intervention (Fox News, p.1). The Texas statute dictates that there is no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the individual’s personal and private life.