Battle of Ia Drang
It has been more than five decades since the battle of Ia Dang in Vietnam. The battle of Ia Drang is regarded as one of the most tactical and victorious wars that America ever engaged in in the eastern hemisphere. In particular, the war engaged the U.S and Vietnamese (northern) forces. In the beginning, it is reported that America took the most significant casualties between the two armies. It was reported, according to Galloway (2020), that the battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division ventured into territories that even the French and the South Vietnamese forces had never ventured. Due to this ambitious forward, the military within days had lost the battles with reports back to the pentagon, citing that hundreds of men had been killed with others being injured (Galloway, 2020). The media did not report on anything, and due to this set-back information crucial to assisting the American troops did not come in time. The Vietnamese forces were able to relinquish the American soldiers within the shortest period. However, General Moore and his forces were able to provide the necessary air support and ground support, which tilted the war to America’s favor (Encyclopedia, 2020). The tactics that the American army used during the Ia Dang is an exciting concept from operational art and design concepts. In place of this, the following paper aims to discuss in depth the functional art and design concepts that the American army had used concerning the Ia Dang battle.
Operational Art
Operational art is defined as the concept of dealing with the military’s direction concerning conceiving and executing operations to attain strategic objectives. Further conceptualization of the ideology is that operational art involves the use of joint and combined forces and the apportion of resources to tactical units (Encyclopedia, 2020). The central concept in operational art is strategy. The strategy is reliant on the commander or the General of an army. The decisions undertaken during any battle are reliant on how efficient and the efficacy of running the battle (Olsen & van Creveld, 2010).
Operational design theory dictates that the conceptualized levels include strategic, operational, and tactical tiers. They often overlap or sometimes do not. Nevertheless, the perspectives can be different from the perspective of the leader or military strategist. According to Cash (1983), it is reported that the Northern Vietnamese General Chu Huy Man’s field front was convinced that he could take out the special forces from the regions around the Republic of Vietnam. The idea was to contain the destruction of the Special Forces in camps of Plei Me, Duc Co, and Dakut Sut (Cash, 1983).
Nonetheless, the attempts were futile, given that the 1st cavalry under Colonel Brown was able to reduce any threats from General Chu’s armies. To further exasperate the efforts from the enemies, Maj. General Kinnard ordered Col. Brown to search outward toward the Cambodia border for the enemies (Cash, 1983).
With the fear of approaching the enemy from within their territory, Col. Brown advanced to the Ia Dang River’s lower region at the base of the Chu Pong region. It is known as the most rugged foothill mass spanning the South Vietnamese-Cambodian border (Cash, 1983). The need for Col Brown to look for General Chu and his troops at the valley was necessary due to the historical battle with the French in Indochina. According to the intelligence by Col. Brown using the G-2 situation map, there was the possibility of Gen. Chun and his soldiers infiltrating the Ia Drang valley on the southern and northern regions (Cash, 1983). After three days of patrolling on the Northern end, General Kinnard ordered Col. Brown to move further outward into the Cambodian region.
From an analysis point of view, it is evident that the historical decision to advance into Cambodian territory rendered the 1st cavalry susceptible to a guerrilla warfare ambush. The operational design indicates that tactical decision-making is pivotal for any military invasion. Col. Brown’s orders from the General were the main events leading to the ambush that led hundreds of American soldiers injured (History, 2020). The primary control of any operational, tactical decision-making process is proper command and oversight regarding the anticipation of enemy attacks. But, with the historical events undertaken by the American infantry was evidential of limited critical thinking. If Col. Brown had taken the instinctive reasoning regarding advancement, fewer casualties would have resulted. But, with the insurgency that the soldiers experienced at the Ia Drang valley led to further strategizing, the decision-making process that was tactical in ensuring that the American forces were able to combat the Vietnamese troops.
The consequential operational design theory dictates that perspectives in defining the appropriate tasks to undertake during military warfare can differentiate between the success of loss. The process involves the allotting of resources to ensure that the strategic commander has enough resources to safeguard the territories being invaded. In this case, the Ia Drang battle had its own challenges from the initial events under Col. Brown (Cash, 1983). However, under Col. Moore’s invasion, there was light at the end of the tunnel regarding the victory that awaited America.
The U.S army under the battalion on the 1st Cavalry was ambushed in their position along with the deep sanctuary of the forested jungle in the Central Highlands of Vietnam near the Ia Drang valley. The Vietnamese soldiers heavily surrounded the battalion of the 1st Cavalry due to the ambitious venture into the jungle. As a result, the American soldiers suffered heavy causalities, including 234 men who died and more than 250 men wounded within four days and nights of the battle in November 14-17th (Galloway, 2020). According to the account of Captain Tony Nadal of the 1st cavalry battalion, he confesses that the platoon never knew about the tactics that the Vietnamese soldiers were using. “Unknown to them was that the first platoon was surrounded by the Vietnamese soldiers who were crawling through the grass, and all of a sudden, all broke loose” (Tharp, 2016).
News regarding the ambush the first platoon they endured at the Ia Drang valley was sent back to Washington. As a result, Lt. Col. Harold G. Moore 1st battalion, 7th Cavalry, was sent to relieve the 1st cavalry (History, 2020). The first operational strategy was heliborne assault into the Landing Zone X-Ray near the Chu Pong Hills (History, 2020). The approach was soundproof at the beginning, but soon after the North Vietnamese soldiers, 33rd Regiment attacked the battalion. Soon after, the North Vietnamese 66th regiment joined the 33rd Regiment, and the war became tough on the American soldiers (Little, 2012). It was evident even with the airstrikes, Americans were losing the battle. Analysis of the Vietnamese front shows that the soldiers were smart enough to surround the American soldiers in a tactical manner of ensuring that there would be no airstrikes (Little, 2012). Such an operational tactic is determined as critical in the design of their operation against the American troops (Little, 2012).
Due to the loss that Americans had endured, a new tactical concept was used. According to the theory of operational art and design, the idea of a system of logic. A system of logic encompasses the use of empirical reasoning and logical thinking (Little, 2012). It includes the interaction between the complex realities of military operations. It involves drawing ideologies of tactical, operational, and strategic principles of war (Little, 2012). They include knowledge about the enemy, geography, technology, population, and reductionism. Within the Ia Drang case, it is evident that America’s strategic loss during the first retaliatory ambush against the Vietnamese. As a result, the battalion was losing more men than it could afford to lose due to geographical distance for any other aid (History, 2020), according to the accounts of Capt. Tony Nadal of the first cavalry battalion, the anticipation of assistance was crucial to tracing back the victory of the American soldiers (Tharp, 2016).
Col. Moore identified that the American troops were experiencing difficulties, given the geographical advantage the Vietnamese soldiers possessed against the American soldiers. Reinforcements were needed to safeguard the battle for Americans. In this regard, at around noon, according to History (2020) accounts, two reinforcement companies arrived. Under Colonel Moore, the two companies were immediately put into use to assist the soldiers. Within three days of the battle, Americans had gained the upper hand in the war. Consequently, History (2020) reports that more than 800 North Vietnamese soldiers were confirmed dead with another 1 000 causalities in the Vietnamese end.
Simultaneously, the 2nd battalion, 7th cavalry, was ambushed by the Northern Vietnamese soldiers. They are reported to have been ambushed at the Landing Zone Albany (History, 2020). The 500 men in the original column suffered a great loss, including 150 men confirmed dead, with nearly 100 being able to return for active duty (History, 2020).
From an operational design perspective, it is clear that the American soldiers were able to battle the Vietnamese soldiers regardless of the numerous disadvantages they faced. It includes the geographical issue. Having ventured into the jungle, it was evident from a historical perspective that the troops were doomed (Tharp, 2016). With reports from soldiers such as Capt. Nadal stating that they were ambushed from within, it is clear that the American soldiers were not tactical in their military approach. Nevertheless, mistakes lead to lessons from which the American end was able to learn.
Operational art entails the conceptualization of the strategies in operations and tactics in perspectives of war, which is more accepted than the levels of war. The casualties that the American frontier had faced rendered a lot of worry for the Americans back home. According to the presidential address by President Johnson, there was a need to increase the number of troops to at least 50 000 (Prats, 2006). Among them were the 15 000 men who belonged to the First Air Cavalry Division. The downside to the war was that it is reported that President Johnson committed to adding more troops if there was a need to do so (Prats, 2006). It was determined that the proverbial pride that the American citizens had on Col. Moore’s unit was based on the history of its war victories. As a result, they were labeled as the most flexible fighting force (Prats, 2006).
They were also labeled as being the young battalion that could be deployed at a moment’s notice using the helicopter-based doctrine of warfare, especially in the northern Vietnam frontier. However, this was easier said than done. It is crucial to recall that the jungle in Cambodia and adjacent Vietnam was a terrain that the young soldiers were not familiar with regarding battles. The first instance of war required the young battalion to engage with the northern Vietnamese soldiers (Prats, 2006). As noted through the accounts of Capt. Nadal, the infantry, was met with numerous attacks from all sides during their further ventures into Ia Drang Valley. According to Galloway, what the American soldiers never considered was the advanced operational concept that the Vietnamese troops have undergone (2020). It was an indication in the change of war, especially, with emphasis on the character of war.
In conclusion, the Ia Dang battle exemplifies how operational art and design can be pivotal in securing victory from a military perspective. However, the victory was accompanied by serious casualties on both ends, for the American and the Vietnamese forces. The tactics that the American forces undertook in improving the first mistakes made during the invasion warfare ensured that the battle tipped to the American advantage.
References
Cash, J. A. (1983). Fight at Ia Drang. Weapons and Warfare Press.
Encyclopedia. (2020). Operational Art | Encyclopedia.com. https://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/operational-art
Galloway, J. (2020). Ia Drang—The Battle That Convinced Ho Chi Minh He Could Win. https://www.historynet.com/ia-drang-where-battlefield-losses-convinced-ho-giap-and-mcnamara-the-u-s-could-never-win.htm
History, H. com. (2020). Major battle erupts in the Ia Drang Valley. HISTORY. https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/major-battle-erupts-in-the-ia-drang-valley
Little, V. (2012). Ia Drang Valley veterans attend Ranger reunion. Www.Army.Mil. https://www.army.mil/article/79140/ia_drang_valley_veterans_attend_ranger_reunion
Olsen, J. A., & van Creveld, M. (2010). The Evolution of Operational Art. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199599486.001.0001
Tharp, M. (2016). The Battle I’ll Never Forget Battle of Ia Drang. AARP. Retrieved June 1, 2020, from http://www.aarp.org/home-family/voices/veterans/info-2016/battle-of-ia-drang.html