What does Kripke think about the following two sentences?
Q1. What does Kripke think about the following two sentences? Do they express necessary truths? Are they knowable a priori? Explain what he thinks about each sentence and explain why he thinks what he does.
(1) Gold has atomic number 79. The writer is puzzled with the increased use of theoretical terms to define substance such as gold which in this case is identified with its atomic number. According to him, this has created a notion in people to perceive gold in a phenomenological sense and scientifically as if they were different metals. Once again, the writer is challenging the use of definitive characteristics in a descriptivist sense by posing a situation where another substance is found with atomic number 79 and yellow colour. He makes us realize that we would not change the concept of gold but adjust the contingency characteristics such as the atomic number.
(2) Gold is yellow. According to the writer, yellow is simply the colour that we see as one of the defining properties of gold. However, this colour does not affect the overall concept of gold. If the colour of gold could change for whatever reason, we would still conceive the new material like gold and not something else. Likewise, if something else like iron pyrite assumed the colour of gold, we would not call it gold. The writer creates a distinction between the concept of something and the specific defining properties that we think to constitute the ‘something’.
Q2. Could we discover that cats are demons? On the one hand, Kripke thinks that cats are a species and presumably this species is inherently biological, and let’s assume that demons are not biological. So it seems that it should not be possible for us to discover that cats are demons. On the other hand, surely it is possible in some sense that a very elaborate hoax has radically deceived us and that cats, as we know them, are in fact demons. Explain what is going on here. At a minimum, this is an opportunity to showcase that you understand various issues that Kripke discusses in Lecture 3.
Kripke is trying to explain the conception of different things apart from their qualitative characteristics. In the cat example, he gives the paradigmatic shifts in the concept of the cat and shows that they don’t affect our conception of the cats but could merely make us shift the definitive characteristics of the cat. He says, no matter the new components we would attribute to certain things, and how often such features may change, they don’t affect our concept of such things which in his words are “that particular thing”.
Q3. Kripke makes several so-called essentialist claims in Lecture 3. One is about a table (which, presumably, he is standing in front of as he delivers the lecture). This is sometimes described as an example of a more general thesis called Origin Essentialism. First, what is the claim? Second, Kripke acknowledges that we could discover, contrary to what we think about the table, that it is made of ice—let’s say cleverly disguised ice. How is this consistent with the essentialist claim that he makes about the table? (Note: this last part of this question may overlap with some of what you will need to sort out to answer the previous question).
Kripke claims that making a table similar to the one in front of him with almost the same characteristics, would not be accepting that it was made of that kind of material, e.g. ice or wood. Such is to say, if it was made from a particular substance, it’s if as to say it was not made from any non-overlapping matter. The fact that we could rediscover the composition of the table is consistent with the essentialist claim in that, even if the material that made the table would change, it does not affect the concept of the table.
Q4. Compare Kripke’s views about proper names and kind terms with the views of Mill about “singular” names and “general” names.
Kripke opines that proper names are similar to kind terms such as cow and gold. Mill, on the other hand, posits that singular names are connotative if they define a set of characteristics and non-connotative if they are used as proper names. Mill adds that general names are automatically connotative, e.g. a human being is a definition of features that make up the human being.
Q5. Related to the above, how does Kripke support the various essentialist claims he makes in Lecture 3? To put the question another way, on what basis does he argue for these claims? Does he assert the allegations based on independently plausible metaphysical principles? Does he appeal to some logical proof? Focus on the way that Kripke supports these claims in the main body of the text. There are a few footnotes where he discusses essentialism and one in particular where he discusses an argument for specific essentialist claims. But presumably, it is not an accident that these discussions are relegated to footnote. Note: I don’t think this is an easy question, but do your best with it. The point of this question is to give you a reason to think about Kripke’s underlying methodology.
Kripke adopts a metaphysical analysis of concepts to drive his claims. He analyzes the fundamental beliefs we have on the idea of basic things around us. He dissects the question of characteristics and body of knowledge, forming the definition of objects to support the conclusion that characteristics could change. Still, the basic concept of things won’t change as a result. In his metaphysical analysis, he uses logical arguments to develop his claims structurally.
Q6. What do you think of Kripke’s argument against Identity-Theory? This is a fairly open-ended question but think of it as an opportunity to show both that you have understood the argument and that you have put some time into thinking about it. So you should make sure that in the process of answering this question, you spend some time laying out the argument as well as saying something about it.
Kripke develops a strong case against the identity theory in his arguments that challenge the basic concepts of abstract things such as heat and light. For example, he questions how we could readily define light by the effect it has on our eyes, yet blind people don’t have this sensation. He dismisses the supposition of contingency characteristics for things like pain which he notes is put forth as a feeling of pain and nothing else.