Failed State: Literature Review
Failed and Fragile States
Following the Sept 11 attacks, global policy rhetoric turned its attention to ‘failed,’ or weak states as the major security challenge in the contemporary world. It has emerged that the greatest security threats developed nations like the U.S. and the United Kingdom are currently facing is the transnational threats from poorly governed states. Traditionally, the greatest security threat that these countries faced was primarily military threats from rival superpowers, something that has changed since the cold war came to an end. Ahram (2011), defined a failed nation as a government body that does not function and the public has taken over the provision of the necessary services like security with an ineffective economic system. The major security concerns from failed states to global security include terrorism, organized crime, and global pandemics.
Andersen (2007), identifies several factors that encourage the emergence of weak states in the 21st century. The first of these is the decolonization process. The postcolonalization states are assumed to survive into perpetuity regardless of their capacities and ability to uphold their sovereignty. This presents a significant deviation from the early days in which stronger states would ensure the strength of weak and fragile states through the use of any applicable strategy without being restricted with fixed borderlines. The second of these is the new performance measurement strategy in which the effectiveness of individual states is gauged. The use of freedom of expression, right to life, and the general wellbeing of an individual nation’s population has been continuously utilized. Through all these, the level of democracy and observation of human rights among nations form the standard measurement criteria of the effectiveness of a state. These provide restrictions on building a state in the 21st century as compared to the process that built the majority of well-established western nations. The third factor involves the diverse forces presented by globalization, which has transformed the role of states and altered the process of international relations and how world politics is carried out. Lastly, the increase in donor attention towards failed or weak states are always channeled to enhance the war on terror, which may not be compatible with the local conflicts that result in the destabilization of these states.
Andersen, Møller & Stepputat (2007), identifies that the process of state failure involves a circle that results from a conflict trap created by a negative feedback mechanism. Conflict is highly volatile in such cases since the local communities involved always change adapt with time. Through this, the self-perpetuating crisis created among such states can result in the creation of a new social order with no conflict even without the existence of the government. In consideration of this Bates (2008), asserts that the absence of a state does not necessarily produce conflict but reveals an alternative to a centralized ruling system.
Ayoob (2007), advances different approaches to handling state failure including peacebuilding, liberal imperialism, and realism. The peacebuilding aspect involves well-structured negotiation or mediation process. The process takes into account all the elements involved in such a conflict including the grievances of all parties involved. Bøas & Jennings (2005), presents two arguments that relate to effective peacebuilding efforts. The first of these is that the solutions that can spur the country from war to peace must be homegrown though external actors can be involved. The second argument for an effective peacebuilding effort is that the root cause for such strife must be properly addressed to ensure long-lasting peace. Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu (2014), assert that liberal imperialism operates like the peacebuilding concept only that it is maintained by three core functions which include markets and economy, human rights, and democracy. Three factors are always essential for the success of liberal imperialism. These factors include the commitment of the developed western states, a strong military presence that can ensure effective reforms, and new international institutional arrangements that combine legitimacy and efficiency. The realism approach calls for the international community to refrain from offering humanitarian aids to fragile states until the situation within such states becomes a threat to stability and national interest. At such points, forceful actions that overlook the sovereignty of such nations should be taken.
Lindborg (2017), asserts that nations are implementing different institutional and policy frameworks aimed at addressing the security concerns presented by failed states. In recent times the national defense strategy utilized by the U.S. has departed from the traditional focus on interstate wars to strengthening the sovereign capacity of weak, or failed states. Therefore, the U.S. empowers weak, or failed states to internally fight the insurgence of organized crime and terror-related activities. The different programs initiated by the country in realizing this goal include expansion of training offered to foreign security forces and identification of ungoverned areas.
The expansion of training offered to foreign security forces entails enhancing the capacities and capabilities of the security forces of individual nations who are considered weak or failed states. The specific activities involved in this program include the introduction of these security forces to emerging weapons and tactical maneuvers utilized in the contemporary world to ensure effective security operations (Lindborg, 2018). It also involves sponsoring the acquisition of emerging military equipment that can further enhance a country’s security operations. In relation to ungoverned areas, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has identified 50 zones that are considered as vulnerable to civil wars. It has also enhanced the information collection and handling within these areas to ensure to prevent the growth of terror-related activities as well as organized crime in these areas (Malejacq, 2016). Similarly, the national intelligence service is also working closely with the office the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the identification of vulnerable areas that are at risk of collapse and initiate conflict prevention and mitigation efforts.
Several other states have also been involved in similar initiatives to contain the threat presented by weak, or fragile states in the form of security challenges as well as a pandemic outbreak. Some of these states include Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany. On the same note, global institutions are also involved in the rush for enhancing the capacity of failed, or weak states to deal with the security threats presented by these nations (Mampilly, 2011). The United Nations identified that a threat to one nation is a threat to all nations whether the threat is terror-related or not.
Other impacts of weak, or failed states to the global order like a pandemic outbreak. In light of this, the UN established the Development Assistant Committee (DAC). It cooperates with the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) program at the World Bank in identifying fragile states and formulate viable strategies that can help these states purge the growth of terror-related activities and global pandemics (Mandel, 2013).
Nature and scope of failed States
Definitions vary, but there is consensus among scholars and policymakers on the features and challenges posed by conflict-affected, or post-conflict states. Features of failed, or weak states focus on (a) development: poverty reduction, social inclusion, and equity; (b) governance: service delivery and government efficacy; (c) security: human security. Bøas & Jennings (2005), highlight it as the nation’s ability, or willingness to function, or operate in a conducive way for the welfare, or benefit for the majority of its residents. Failed states continue to have security risks such as armed groups, organized crime, weak governance, high rates of unemployment, and poor development (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017).
Marc, Willman, Aslam, Rebosio & Balasuriya (2013), identified four fundamental political goods from which a failed state can be measured. These include physical security, legitimate political, organizations, or institutions, the social welfare, and also economic management. Several states have capacity gaps that hinder them from effectively providing these political goods as required. As a result of the existing gaps in the provision of these goods, such nations always exhibit legal sovereignty, and not empirical sovereignty.
In relation to the provision of security, such nations fail to defend themselves from both internal and external threats. They are also incapable of using force effectively to avoid oppression and infringement of basic human rights (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). Similarly, these nations can also struggle to ensure their populations are safe from crime as well as maintain the required public order for the effectiveness and efficiency of its institutional framework and policies. Lastly, they also have challenges, in relation to, ensuring effective border control measures. On the same note, in regards to political capacity, these nations lack well-recognized institutions that govern political institutions and provide a reality check on political decisions and political power use (McLoughlin, 2015). They also lack legitimate institutions that can ensure effective protection of basic human rights as well as freedom, and in most cases, there is no proper accountability of political leaders. There exists also a lack of proper and efficient administration that can encourage diverse citizen participation in different government-related activities.
In relation to the economic realm, such countries cannot properly conduct the required macroeconomic and fiscal policies that result in poor performance of the economy, which consequently triggers an uproar from the citizens (McLoughlin, 2015). Such counties also lack a well-structured regulatory and legal climate that can foster entrepreneurship, open trade, and effective management of the available scarce natural resources to create value to its population. These deter foreign investment, which is necessary for job creation and source of revenues for the proper operation of government activities. Lastly, these states cannot meet the basic requirements, in relation to, the provision of necessary social amenities and infrastructures like schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities. These further, initiate an uproar from the citizens, which is a recipe for civil war. McLoughlin (2015), concluded that failed states are far from participating in the millennium challenge, which involves investment in people, promoting economic growth, and commitment to ruling justly.
Call (2011), also identifies state weakness to be more than just the question of capacity but also encompasses the aspect of will. Over the years, history has presented incompetent regimes marred with corruption that have hampered the development capacities among promising countries like Zimbabwe. Through differentiation of capacity and will Chandler (2009), advanced four categories of states. These include a) good performing states with well-enhanced capacity and will like the case of Senegal and Honduras; b) weak states who have the will like the case of Mozambique and East Timor; c) states with the required capacity, but lack commitment like in the case of Zimbabwe and Burma; d) states with neither the capacity or the commitment like Haiti and Sudan.
Weak and failing states have also been identified to be far from realizing the agreed millennium development goals. Therefore, a significant number of their population is malnourished and poor with evidently poor living conditions except among the elite individuals who own the majority of the factors of production and structure the institutions and policy frameworks to suit their needs (Call, 2011). The country’s healthcare system is also quite ineffective, which results in low life expectancy and high morbidity and mortality rate. Similarly, given the lack of necessary social amenities like schools, a significant number of the country’s population to a high number of illiteracy and vulnerability to the humanitarian crisis in the form of man-made, or natural crises.
The scope of analysis predominately focuses on the state and its institutions emphasizing state legitimacy (Brooks 2005). However, more recently scholars have criticized the failed state label and instead emphasize fragility risks, or drivers that limit a state’s ability to properly create value to its citizens. From this perspective, fragility is a source of instability and has to do with the ability of the state to manage risks, absorb shocks, and deliver services (Ikpe 2007). Many indices such as the Failed Stated Index, Fragility Index, comprise both the low and the middle-income nations with comprehension for the scale in vulnerability.
The fragile state index has been an essential tool in identifying and highlighting the normal pressure different states face while they try to offer public goods as expected. It also helps in identifying when such pressures are pushing states towards the brink of failure. For over 60 years the fragile state index has been an essential tool in reducing conflicts around the globe. It utilizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of public goods among nations as the criteria for ranking nations. It has elicited several criticisms of the fragility index from different studies. Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall (2017), observed that there are several nations, which are more prone to a coup and revolution like Bahrain ranked number 125 and Albania ranked number 118. The low rankings given to these states make them secure as developed countries. Similarly, there are some states that appear to be in danger of failing, but have well-structured systems that ensure their security, but are ranked to be among the nations with a high risk of failing. Examples of such nations include Uzbekistan ranked number 39 and Iran ranked number 34. Additionally, Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall (2017), identified that the majority of African states from the most fragile list in accordance to the fragility index, which illustrates that almost the whole continent is on the verge of collapsing. Therefore, the study suggested a need to restructure this fragility index to track states that lack capabilities and not rogue states.
The Democratic Republic of Congo as a Failed State
Roitman contests the characterization for African states as ‘weak states,’ arguing that even within ‘illicit’ markets, the presence and power of the state are present. While the state may not appear to be a party to such illicit activities, it still manages to enforce a significant level of order and security to the participants within such markets. It illustrates that there exists a different political approach to state functionality in practice among African states. The primary reason why the majority of African states are considered as a failed, or weak state because of the silent approach utilized by African nations in exercising their control to illicit markets and groups (Boege, Brown & Clements, 2009). The approach does not match the well-decorated open approach utilized by the western nations and has ever since been adopted as the standard approach in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the provision of public goods.
The western approach utilizes democracy, rule of law, separation of powers, and strong civil service in gauging the efficiency of a state. Orientalism also plays an essential role in categorizing nations to be failed states. Since the majority of the world population have adopted the western approach of gauging a failed state. The silent approach utilized by the majority of the African nations in controlling illicit markets and groups within the continent through the use of considerable force that instills fear among the participants in such markets (Boege, Brown & Clements, 2009; Lemarchand, 2003). Additionally, African culture also helps in the proper functionality of individual nations in regard to the control of natural resources. For example, access to natural resources like land has been on a communal, or customary basis mediated by the chief. However, there is still a well-structured organization in regard to the use of natural resources like mining and lumbering. Participants in these activities are required to seek permission from the government. The government grants permission for participants in such activities in exchange for royalties (Englebert & Tull, 2013).
On the same note, the majority of African states have well-recognized learning institutions that further illustrates the effectiveness of African governments in providing the necessary social amenities like schools necessary for empowering their population. Therefore, Boege, Brown & Clements (2009), concludes that African leadership regimes ensure government stability in their style that has never been recognized by the other scholars around the globe. There exists a need for all institutional frameworks around the globe to recognize the improvised mechanism utilized by the African states in ensuring stability given their lack of necessary capacity required by the western culture (Eriksen, 2009).
In the case of DR Congo labels of ‘weak,’ or ‘coercive’ state fails to capture the varied dynamics of local, provincial, and national state practices. Throughout the country, the government has maintained the provision of necessary public goods like education and healthcare. For example, in Kivu province, which is one of the war-torn areas in the country, the government provides necessary social amenities like schools and healthcare (Larmer, Laudati & Clark, 2013). Though the financing systems for such services are hampered, there is still a mechanism in place in which stakeholders like non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches and donors participate in ensuring effective service delivery in collaboration with relevant government authorities. Moshonas (2013), observes that though public funding for the education sector in some parts of the country stopped in the mid-1980s the level of school enrolment in the majority of these regions is still above average.
Rackley (2006), also observes that the Democratic Republic of Congo is not a botched state, but a nation with a legitimate government structure in which its leaders enjoy the political strife in the country, which helps them maintain power while amassing personal profits from the countries lucrative natural resources. Reno (2006), terms this as a Violent Kleptocracy system that has been in existence for over 130 years since the reign, or control of King Leopold II to Mobutu Sese Seko and the Kabila’s. The violent kleptocracy system is a system in which commercial and ruling networks partner to hijack the country’s institutions and maintain the impunity to help them carry out their commercial enterprises at the expense of the safety and general well-being of the population.
There are several strategies applied to ensure this system works, one among these is to allow the armed forces to pay themselves while they ensure law and order in the country (Rackley, 2006). Secondly, the country’s leaders ensure they personally benefit from the existing natural resources in the country and hijack reforms that may endanger their ill-gotten wealth. The third strategy is to stay in power at all costs by repressing pro-democracy movements.
However, Trefon (2009), observed that DRC is a failed state given the existing conditions in the country. The majority of the country’s population is living below poverty line with poor service delivery from the government. The government is also incapable of providing essential services like education and healthcare. Similarly, two-thirds of the country’s geographical location is a battleground. Reyntjens (2005), asserts that the country’s security is in a dire state primarily from the upspring of several rebel groups, which sometimes stage wars among themselves, or with the government forces. Some of the rebel groups in the country include Mai Mai rebels, M23 rebels, ADF-NALU, and FDLR (Reyntjens, 2005). The M23 rebels are primarily the Tutsi community while the FDLR are mostly Hutu both with their origin from Rwanda (Young, 2006). On the other hand, the Mai Mai rebels are primarily local forces claiming to act in self-defense while the ADF-NALU is an Islamic led group from Uganda.
The majority of the rebel groups within DRC are taking advantage of a lack of strong state to assume control of the mineral riches within the region. The country has over 70% of the world’s Coltan that is used in making components of mobile phones (Reyntjens, 2005). It also has over 30% of the total diamond reserves around the globe (Reyntjens, 2005). The level of infrastructural development within the country is still quite low, which also subjects the majority of the country’s population to poor living standards. Though the country has more than 153,000 km of roads only 2,794 km have been paved (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen & Smis, 2002). Similarly, the country has 4000km of a railway line, which is quite ineffective given its poor condition through inadequacy of proper maintenance. DRC also has a population of 70 million with a life expectancy of 47.8 years, which is quite low compared to the world’s life expectancy of 69.4 years (Smith, 2009). Similarly, the country also has a gross national income of $320, which is significantly low compared to $11,081 in the world (Smith, 2009). Additionally, the world’s infant mortality rate is 41 while DRC’s infant mortality rate is 111.9. Further, the world’s literacy rate is 83.7% while the country has a literacy rate of 67% (Smith, 2009).
Therefore, Reyntjens (2005) and Trefon (2009), conclude that the country is a failed state by the virtue that it cannot offer the necessary public services as required. The lack of proper healthcare system and well-structured infrastructure network in the country demonstrates the inefficiency of the government apparatus. Trefon (2009), states that all these should not be the case in a country with immense natural resources like DRC. The state should be considered as the cradle for Africa given its positioning in the continent and the level of natural resources it enjoys. However, since its government structures and institutions are ineffective, the country cannot rise and claim its superiority in the continent, which further classifies it as a failed state.
Non-State Provision of Goods
Thoughtfulness has gone into how processes of neo-liberalization have led to the proliferation of non-state actors offering goods and services. At the heart for neo-liberalization is the conciliation of state failure and fragility. Neoliberals’ primary concern are institutions that are associated with the operations of the market like the rule of law, property rights, and central banks and the emergence of the 21st century has seen the neoliberals expand this scope to social capital, social safety, and social institutions (Wietzke, 2014). Similarly, the neoliberals assume an asymmetrical relationship between domestic and global risks. Therefore, domestic conflicts are perceived to have global implications. However, domestic conflicts cannot change the patterns of capitalistic economic development both at the local and international levels (Singh, 2016). Rather it is viewed, in regards to, its impacts on the capacity of domestic institutions to provide favorable conditions that can ensure seamless integration into the global economy.
There are several institutions at the international level like the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID), which are concerned about ensuring proper development of institutions among vulnerable states (Tsai, 2011). The world bank utilizes the term low-income countries under stress (LICUS) while DFID highlights the fragile nations as those whose governments lack the capacity to offer essential services towards the individual majority for the country’s population. The spectrum of countries covered by LICUS includes those that are vulnerable to conflicts, countries with conflict history with unstable institutions, and those with poor governance records (Beisheim et al., 2014). These international institutions are concerned about boosting the capacities and capabilities of individual governments, in relation to, proper delivery for essential products and services.
Similarly, there are also other non-governmental institutions that have a keen interest, in regards to, the effective provision of essential products and services to the required standards. These consists of churches and individual donors (Cammett & MacLean, 2011). Compared to the international institutions, these operate at the local level and their impacts are felt in considerably less geographical locations compared with the efforts made by international institutions like DFID and LICUS.
Lesley Gill (2000) explains in her book how after more than a decade of neoliberal economic structuring, life is increasingly precarious for the majority in the developing world, having limited means to support themselves and diminishing the provision of social welfare services by individual nations. Such countries struggle to provide effective public goods relating to security, an effective economy, proper healthcare, and enhanced education. Gough, Wood, Barrientos, Bevan, Davis & Room (2004), also observes that the failure of governments among failed states to provide these essential services and products have invited the involvement of non-state institutions at different levels to provide them to the struggling citizens.
Effective economy
The concept of the free market that forms one of the building blocks within the neoliberal economy promotes capitalism in which a significant amount of the factors of production end up in the hands of a few individuals in the economy. As a result of this, the majority of the citizens depend on the few elites in the country who owns a significant portion of the factors of production (Cammett and MacLean, 2014). Since in most cases the state institutions among the developing nations are not capable do of managing the pressure from these elites they hijack and assume control of these institutions (Gough et al., 2004). The institutions end up serving their interest and not that of the majority of the country. Similarly, these institutions also end up overlooking their state roles. The elites have a massive amount of resources at their disposal and it is through the financing strategy that they gain control of public institutions within developing countries (Krasner and Risse, 2014). They also gain control of these institutions by acquiring and retaining power. Therefore, the elites implement policies and development strategies that only serve their interest and that of the significant majority within the country (Krasner and Risse, 2014). Through all these, the majority of developing nations heavily rely on donor funds for the operation of different government-related activities like the provision of infrastructure and other public goods that can enhance economic operations among them.
Healthcare
Kruks-Wisner & Gabrielle (2018), asserts that the majority of failed or weak states cannot master the provision of proper healthcare to their citizens. These results from the lack of proper infrastructural facilities like roads that can enhance access to necessary healthcare (Lustig, 2001). Similarly, the lack of roads also present a challenge in relation to the budgetary resources required to provide such essential services since there will be the need to include the cost of opening up such roads, which increases the cost involved in such projects yet these nations can barely raise the necessary cost for constructing these facilities (MacLean & Lauren, 2011). As a result of this, the majority of citizens among these states are deprived of quality healthcare.
Moran & Batley (2004), also observed that failed states cannot even meet the standard requirements involved in primary care frameworks like formulating relevant healthcare policies that can help in ensuring the safety and general wellbeing of their populations. This makes such nations a breeding ground for global pandemics. The ineffective institutional framework results in late identification of an existing pandemic within the region as well as the poor formulation of viable strategies that can be utilized in mitigating such pandemics from affecting a significant number of the country’s population (Rose, 2007). The underlying factor in this is the inadequate capacity and capability of these institutions relating to the required resources for ensuring timely identification and response mechanism (Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014). Consequently, the world can only realize this after the pandemic has affected a considerable portion of the world’s population and has caused significant disruption of the existing systems and procedures around the globe (Singh, 2016). However, the interventions offered by non-state institutions in relation to the effective provision of healthcare services always help in timely interventions before such pandemics affect a significant portion of the world population
Security
Tshiyoyo & Koma (2011) and Krasner & Risse (2014), identified that failed or weak states struggle to ensure effective security mechanism within its borders. Failed states become the hotbed for activities involving the transnational terrorist network. As stated by Krasner & Risse (2014), there are two factors that make failed, or weak states a breeding ground for such activities. First, such states are incapable of handling these groups given their limited capacity, in relation to, information collection and handling. Secondly, the sovereignty of individual nations prevents other powerful nations from taking necessary countermeasures that can help in the containment of such activities. Some relevant examples in light of this include the Al-Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and Al-Shabab operation in Somalia (Tshiyoyo & Koma, 2011). Therefore, failed states provide a safe haven for activities involved in these groups like training and necessary economic activities that can help them finance their ill-fated operations. Emerging information reveals that Al-Qaeda is involved in trade in gemstone and minerals from war-torn countries, for example, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leon (Krasner & Risse, 2014).
There exists a clear connection between failed, or weak state and drug trafficking. It can be seen in Afghanistan, which has emerged as the principal opium supply around the globe. A similar case can be seen in Colombia with its harboring of cocaine plantation and processing plants (Krishna, 2011). The plantations and processing units are all located in areas beyond the reach of the Colombian government. Kruks-Wisner & Gabrielle (2018), advances two reasons for the concentration of hard drugs operations in war-torn countries. The first of these is that civil war creates a territory out of reach of a recognized government in which such activities can be carried. Similarly, civil war also creates loopholes for opportunistic behaviors as a result of the ineffectiveness of policing institutions. Secondly, the convention economic activities are reduced in a well, or failed state, which encourages the population to engage in illegal activities. This can be seen in Haiti in which the country has become a stopover for cocaine transportation into the U.S.
Education
Moran & Batley (2004), observes that the level of literacy among failed and weak states are always considered low to almost half of the literacy levels among developed nations. Moran & Batley (2004), further asserts that these levels could be considerably lower if not for the support accorded to these nations by non-state institutions. Non-state institutions always penetrate to local villages and form a close partnership with the community in which they offer necessary basic education infrastructure to help increase the literacy levels among individual communities. They also form a partnership with the relevant government institutions and provide the necessary higher education infrastructure. Post et al. (2017) and MacLean (2017), also agreed with Moran & Batley (2004), observation in relation to the high involvement of non-state actors in providing education services. They also observed that the education sector among weak and fragile states primarily relies on funding from NGOs and other non-state actors for effectiveness.
Welfare
As observed by Rose (2007), a significant number of individuals within failed states cannot master proper living standards in regards to a healthy diet system and shelter as well as basic commodities like water. Krishna (2011), also asserts that the constant war witnessed among several fragile and weak states have resulted in a large number of refugees as local communities flee their homes in search of a stable life with proper security. This further subjects these individuals to harsh conditions like unfriendly weather, diseases as a result of congestion within a small secure area. These further subject these nations to poor provision of necessary public goods. Tsai (2011), also concurred with Rose (2007), observations and adds that the provision of proper welfare goods and services forms the primary reason as to why governments are existence; hence when the state cannot provide such essential services citizens are within their right to forcefully demand them. Tsai (2011), notes that the efforts directed by different donors to enhance the social welfare neglected by failed states cannot be assumed since it is one of the sources for sanity in the contemporary world.
Non-State Provision of Goods in Africa
Structural adjustment policies on African states have extensively been cited as destructive, weakening state capacity, and reinforcing neocolonial and patrimonial tendencies. Reform and austerity measures taken to make room for free market systems have led to “a noted increase in corruption and rent-seeking” (Van de Walle, 2001) as well as what Hibou (2004) has termed the 1980s’ structural adjustment program (SAP) as “the privatization of the state.” The majority of the African population during this time still depended on the state for employment opportunities, provision for the public goods, and the maintenance for the law and order. It was as a result of the poor development status that existed among the African states. However, compared to the majority of western nations, there existed well-structured institutional frameworks and development that encourage effective and responsible interaction among citizens and with the state.
Reducing the government’s role in the economy as a result of the SAP strategies dumped African nations into poverty gorge. These together with the privatization of public goods ensured the few privileged individuals in these countries restructured the existing weak institutions to serve their interests (Krishna, 2011). On the same note, they also ensured they privately owned the majority of public goods and controlled the level of services offered to the citizens. It ensured they only served their personal interest through various activities and programs.
For example, price liberation as a result of SAPs has significantly impacted the agricultural sector, which is one of the mainstays of several African economies. The price liberation concept has resulted in private entities controlling the prices of several products among the African countries (Kruks-Wisner & Gabrielle, 2018). The prices these private entities are offering to farmers are relatively low and since the government does not have significant authority, in relation to, controlling prices in the market. Thus, farmers are ever stuck in poverty as a result of their low level of income. Trade policy reforms have also lowered tariffs, which form one of the primary sources of revenue for the majority of African nations (Tsai, 2011). The move ensured a significant reduction in revenue for the African countries; hence, it has been hampering the effectiveness of state operations and the capacity for its institutions to deliver quality public goods and services.
Similarly, the structural adjustment program primarily concentrated on enhancing the economic growth of African countries in which it emphasized generating a lean budgetary framework among African states. The result of this was the neglect of other essential institutions like the judicial system. The judicial structures among several African states experienced a significant cut on their budgets to allow economic development policies and programs (MacLean, 2010). The result of this was the stalling of judicial development policies and programs. Almost forty years since the implementation of SAP, the majority of African states have ended up with weak judicial systems that cannot ensure the protection of rights and freedom of citizens.
The healthcare sector has also been affected by these programs. Though it is relatively developed among some African states, still the level of access to healthcare within Africa remains inferior compared to other regions like the Latin America (Van de Walle, 2001; MacLean, 2011). The ineffectiveness of government systems and procedures among renders the majority of African states ill-prepared to deal with pandemics like Ebola and HIV/AIDS. Therefore, the existing inefficiency exhibited by the majority of African states that has rendered most of them weak, fragile, or failed states have resulted from the donor conditions that were laid out to strengthen their economic capacities while forgetting the essence of other government institutions (Singh, 2016). The majority of African states need to revise their institutional framework to generate viable and long term solutions to the problems their populations are facing as a result of ineffective government systems.
Some scholars have deemed the role of external donors and NGOs in Africa as “surrogate demos,” resulting in a “depoliticized mode of technocratic governance” (Gould and Ojanen 2003). The impacts of donor-related influence on African states are still being felt from the structural alteration programs implemented, or adopted by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. MacLean, L (2017), observed that wealthy nations primarily western countries were heavily involved in pushing for such disastrous programs to justify their financial aid to these institutions. The result was that the majority of African nations were dumped into a debt crisis that has left most of the developed nations skeptical of the efficacy of African governments.
The emergence of the 21st century has seen a change, in regards to, donor funding style among developed nations to African countries. It ties rather than utilizing international institutions donor nations, for example, NGOs and personal donations to African nations. Thus, they seek to help the struggling African nations offer essential services to their citizens with proper accountability since they view the majority of African states as corrupt and fragile states. Post, Bronsoler & Salman (2017), asserts that this move is a covert operation primarily channeled to help them have significant control on several proceedings among African nations through the use of their diplomatic envoys. The level of interference by the developed western nations to the activities among fragile African nations have not gone unnoticed. Some African states are restructuring their institutions and systems to limit the level of interference that western nations have to their operations through NGOs. For example, the government of Zimbabwe, one of the fragile nations in the continent initiated a change of regulatory framework to limit the activities of NGOs within the country. MacLean, L (2017), also observed that though NGOs remain essential institutions in alleviating poverty and hunger among the majority of the African population, they are still part and parcel of western powers and an avenue utilized by the majority of African nations in colonizing the African states.
However, some scholars have insisted on the significance of non-state actors in providing public goods and services among African nations. Post, Bronsoler & Salman, (2017), advances an existing hybrid regime that accommodates both state and non-state actors in providing necessary public goods among African states. Through this, the non-state actors always identify and supplement the existing areas in which the government provides ineffective or poor quality products and services. The specific sector can include education, garbage collection, and provision of water and healthcare services, among others. (Singh, 2016). asserts that the united states agency for international development (USAID) has played a significant effort among several African nations ranging from the provision of relief food for refugees affected by war and conflicts to the provision of healthcare services and products to these individuals and others considered as vulnerable. Beisheim et al. (2014), also notes the contribution that USAID has maintained in regards ensuring the general wellbeing of many African populations in regards to sponsoring vital projects relating to food security through well-enhanced agriculture, which is always the mainstay of the majority of African nations. the level of the organization’s contribution towards enhancing the human right framework among the majority of African states has also enabled individual states to realize considerable stability.
MacLean (2011), also observes similar efforts directed by several other NGOs among African states to help in enhancing the social welfare of individual citizens, provide education necessary for increasing literacy level among the continent’s population, and ensure proper healthcare for individuals. … also observes that these organizations also have their mechanisms to enhance security, which primarily involves befriending the warring parties and providing them essential supplies in exchange for agreement pact. Some of the organizations identified by the study include World Vision, CARE international, Medicins San Frontieres, and international rescue committee among several others. On the same note, NGOs are involved in all corners of the African continent from the northern part to the western to central, east, and south of the continent (MacLean, 2011; Cammett, & MacLean, 2014).
Cammett, & MacLean (2014), also agreed with MacLean (2011), in relation to NGOs involved in providing public goods but also noted that there are individual donors acting at their personal capacities to enhance the quality of public goods and services received by the majority of the African population. Given that the efforts of these individual donors is always limited and so the results can only be realized in the long term. They participate through educating the public on better healthcare management that can be used to prevent outbreak of diseases like malaria and cholera and other essential education relating to human rights. They also identified bright students in need of education and sponsor them to the next level of education. Through all these, the majority of African nations always receive public goods and services from non-state actors in different forms and capacities as well as in different levels and circumstances.
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