POLICY BRIEF ON FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

POLICY BRIEF ON FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

Background of the Issue

The UK (United Kingdom) struggles with returning foreign fighters after the collapse of IS (Islamic State). It is worth noting that this is a problem spanning the entire Europe, as 5000-6000 individuals expect to return after fighting abroad (Pickett 2019, p. 2). The UK has the second-highest number, with an estimated 500-600 individuals who departed to Syria and Iraq during the conflict (Paulussen & Entenmann 2016, p. 414). Correspondingly, the UK has refused and is contemplating new laws to strip them of their citizenship (Pickett 2019, p.6). This might result in stateless people and integration challenges for many others. Further, the country and Europe at large want to limit the return of women and children of the foreign fighters over security concerns. If they want to come back, they must go through countries with consular representation, such as Turkey (Pickett 2019, p. 5). Further, leaders assert they have no obligation to take back those imprisoned in the IS or the USA. Returning foreign fighters is a concern to the UK government, which is unwilling to reabsorb them into society.

Exposition of the Problem and Actors Involved

Exposition

Legal issues. Stripping the returnees of their citizenship can create statelessness and is a breach of human rights. This adversely affects individuals with no other nationality, although dual citizens are also at risk (Pickett et al. 2019, p. 6). This brings legal complications given that a country is responsible for preventing statelessness, and failure is a breach of Section 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which creates a right to a nationality (Jayaraman 2016, p. 192). Comparatively, Section 2 implicitly outlines a situation that can warrant revocation but does not address statelessness (Jayaraman 2016, p. 192). Similarly, Masters and Regilme (2020, p. 3) find that revoking citizenship infringes on human rights and invokes discrimination against those deemed not ‘British’ enough. It is racist and suggests hierarchical notions of humanity, which are embedded in British culture (Masters & Regilme 2020, p. 4). Worse still, security concerns justify the revocation, which marginalizes the minorities and causes ethnic, racial, and religious tension. Citizenship is a legal challenge that is linked to human rights abuse.

Additionally, prosecuting individuals is a legal problem. Assessing the crimes committed in a foreign country requires evidence that is difficult to transport to the country and, eventually, the courtroom (Hoffman & Furlan 2020, p. 11). It is also dangerous to travel to a war-torn country to find evidence. Even if there is evidence, without cooperation from the other government, it will be difficult to obtain it (Hoffman & Furlan 2020, p. 11). Consequently, the insufficient evidence leads to few prosecutions, and the returnees hardly pay for their crime. Evidence-related issues reduce the chances of delivering justice against criminals.

Security challenges. The returnees could commit acts of domestic terrorism. The head of MI6, Alex Young, explains that they have acquired skills and connections that make them dangerous. They are potential terrorists waiting to be activated by external forces to begin their rampage (Hoffman & Furlan 2020, p. 6). Moreover, since they are battle-hardened, trained, and internationally connected, they can efficiently execute attacks and revive another wave of terrorism (Hoffman & Furlan 2020, p. 7). Returnees have enough experience to instigate domestic terrorism in the country.

Additionally, they are prone to recruitment into terrorist groups. With their connections and contacts outside the country, they can quickly be recruited even though they are retired (Byman 2015, p. 584). Worse still, they can also influence the locals to join radical groups with their charisma and radical ideas. In trying to protect their people and furthering their beliefs, returnees lure citizens to fight against the government to protect their cause (Byman 2015, p. 584). Foreign fighters are easy to recruit into terrorism, and they also admit citizens, which poses security threats.

Actors Involved

The foreign fighters are the chief participants in the issue. They include men, women, and children who have varying characteristics. Although relegated to a subordinate role, women have also been involved in coordinating attacks and committed violence against their own (Hoffman & Furlan, 2020, p. 13). Equally, they are viewed as victims who leave the country to seek their husbands and are forced to give birth to many children for the ‘state’ (Christensen & Bjørgo 2017, p. 30). They have also lost children and husbands, endured sexual abuse, and are mentally unstable (Christensen & Bjørgo 2017, p. 31). Comparatively, the children are traditionally viewed as victims and must be treated as innocents under the law (Hoffman & Furlan, 2020, p. 13). However, they are strategically recruited into terrorism groups and trained to kill. They also have identity issues because they have no passports, and their parents come from diverse countries. Women and children are seen as victims and perpetrators of terrorism.

Conversely, men constitute the largest number of foreign fighters. They undertake combat and suicide missions and are trusted to commit terrorist attacks in Europe (Christensen & Bjørgo 2017, p. 29). In addition, they are heavily involved in war crimes and uphold terrorist ideologies. Correspondingly, their return is viewed as a threat to security and a contributor to violence to families (Christensen & Bjørgo 2017, p. 29). Men are considered the greatest threat to society should they return to the UK.

Again, the UK government is equally a stakeholder. It creates policies that affect foreign fighters and decides how they will be persecuted. It is also tasked with reintegration efforts to minimize any security threat (Pickett 2019, p. 7). Any actions not only affect the foreigners but the citizens. Currently, the government’s citizenship revocation strategy is fraught with legal and social challenges. The government’s policies affect the return of the fighters.

Similarly, the intelligence and security forces are important players. Preparedness helps them arrest, monitor, and disable the foreigners from continuing any terrorist activities (Bryman 2015, p. 589). They are responsible for monitoring the returnees and devising strategies to protect the citizens. Without vigilance, they jeopardize national security. Intelligence and security forces have an integral role in protecting the UK.

What is at Stake in the UK

The Population and National Interest

Legal challenge. The UK has rejected the returnees and has created supporting legislation, which creates controversy. It contravenes Article 8(1) of the 1961 convention that declares it illegal for states to deprive nationalities if it would make the individual stateless (Masters & Regilme 2020, p. 7). Henceforth, revoking their citizenship, contravenes the law and could trigger counteractions. Additionally, the other concern relates to prosecuting foreigners and sending them to prison. Lack of admissible evidence, which is obtained from the war zone, is challenging to find (Pakalova 2020, p. 142). Prosecutors also struggle to demonstrate the intent of visiting a foreign country. They must prove that the foreigner went to IS to join the militia groups, which is difficult to ascertain. Without any prosecutions, the returnees are free to interact with the public, which poses security challenges. Even when in prison, there is no guarantee that extremism ceases, as evidenced by existing prison gangs. The Ministry of Justice (MoJ) estimates there are 250 terrorist inmates and 200 terrorist risk offenders in prisons in England and Wales (Basra 2020, p. 22). As the sentencing laws and guidelines become tough, there is worry that radicalization will increase in prisons and spread to the public once the criminals are released. The UK contends with several legal problems that undermine national security interests.

Henceforth, to address these issues, the country can implement some strategies. The prosecution should leverage social media, which has proven instrumental in understanding the intent of the accused (Obe & Silverman 2014, p. 21). Again, they should critically examine the words and motives to determine intent. Again, the government can liaise with the Syrian government to persecute returnees from there. Article 15 of the Syrian Criminal Code states that all crimes committed in Syria should be investigated and persecuted by the Syrian authority (Jomaa 2020, p. 25). While in prison, the authorities should increasingly use Separation Centers (SC) and isolate potential recruiters and extremists (Basra 2020, p. 25). The government can implement some options to minimize security issues and justify any legal activities.

Security challenge. Comparatively, the main security challenge is the possibility of internal terrorism. The government fears returnees will continue with their radicalization and use their skills and experience to recruit others. Additionally, they have overseas connections who can ask them to carry out attacks (Reed et al. 2015, p. 5).  Correspondingly, as a counter-measure, the government should arrest the returnees and separate them from other regular criminals (Pakalova 2020, p. 144). It should also continue mixing and isolating the prisoners to limit radicalization. Equally, the extremist should be denied citizenship, despite the controversies in this decision. The government can implement some strategies to ensure that radicalization does not spread in the country.

Intelligence Services

Legal issue. The legal issue facing intelligence is finding enough information to persecute the returnees. They are unaware of how many people have returned to the UK, which affects the prosecution rates (Braun 2018, p. 326). Again, they have struggled to find enough evidence to help in the persecution of the criminals. Henceforth, they should use government-owned and civil-society-run hotlines, where people report any terrorism-related issues (Obe & Silverman 2014, p. 40). Alternatively, they can liaise with other intelligence agencies to get information. Intelligence services have inadequate information, which can change through partnerships.

Security issue. The foreigners might return to the UK without the intelligence services knowing. They have already succeeded in resettling in Europe under the radar of the European intelligence and security community (Babanoski 2020, p. 22). As such, it is difficult to account for how many of them have returned and what they are doing. This worries the MI6 and MI5 as the terrorist are skilled and connected, making them susceptible to terrorist attacks (Babanoski 2020, p. 22). Worse still, they know English and use it to reach wider audiences through propaganda on the internet. Intelligence services have been unable to track the returnees, who threaten national security.

Accordingly, to counter the threat, they can utilize social media and existing networks. Social media is a popular tool that extremists use to disseminate their propaganda (Obe & Silverman 2014, p. 21). Again, they should partner with other European Union (EU) intelligence services to improve their monitoring. The intelligence services should rely on partnerships and social media to keep track of the returnees.

Trends, Recommendations, and Predictions

Trends

Legal challenges. Persecuting the returning fighters is still a challenge. The rate of persecution is one in ten, and so far, only 44 criminals have been convicted (Pokalova 2020, p. 138). Among the challenges include difficulty in finding evidence that can be used in courts. Converting intelligence into admissible evidence is difficult, given that courts refrain from using evidence whose collection and source are unknown (Pakalova 2020, p. 141). Worse still, the relatives and friends of the returnees fear coming forward with information because the prosecution gives harsh punishments. Further, the foreigners fear returning to the country because of the sentencing and prefer to remain overseas (Reed et al., 2015, p. 12). Promoting justice against fighters is a difficult task because of the lack of cooperation and insufficient evidence.

Additionally, revoking citizenship has been more progressive than persecution. Mainly, it has applied to citizens with dual citizenship (Reed et al. 2015, p. 10). The UK government is reluctant to impose the same on citizens with single citizenship over ethical concerns. Further, international laws like the UDHR that protect their rights (Jayaraman 2016, p. 192). The government is unable to implement citizenship policies fully.

Security challenges. There is widespread fear that the returnees can resort to terrorism. This is despite completing integration programs and serving time for their crime (Reed et al. 2015, p. 14). They can easily regroup and continue their terrorist activities, which threaten national security. As noted previously, the government fears that the returnees will promote domestic terrorism.

Additionally, the ease of returning to the country is a concern. Previously, the fighters managed to resettle into the UK and other European countries without intelligence knowing (Braun, 2018, p. 326). The number of returnees remains inaccurate, which complicates any monitoring or prosecution activities. The continued sneaking into the country is a security threat whose magnitude is unknown.

Recommendations

Legal recommendations. The UK should retain the harsh sentences. This deters the foreigners from returning, which reduces legal challenges (Reed et al. 2015, p. 10). Furthermore, the penalty also deters others from engaging in terrorism activities. To illustrate, any preparatory acts to commit acts of terrorism can result in life sentences (Braun 2018, p. 305). This prevents the spread of terrorism as no one would want to face such a sentence. The harsh punishment spares the government a lot of legal resources in prosecution activities.

Equally, the government should encourage cooperation with the relatives of the returnees. Prosecutors rely on circumstantial evidence when the family members do not come forward with crucial information, which affects their prosecution (Braun 2018, p. 305). As such, they should be honest and transparent with families. For example, if they promise the family that the returnee will not get a harsh sentence, they should follow up to encourage more people to come forward. The prosecution should cooperate with the families to increase prosecution rates.

Again, the government should use integration programs before revoking citizenship. It lessens the recurrence of terrorism attacks and increases the participation of returnees in society (Reed 2015, p. 41). They can also be prohibited from using computers or other gadgets that could connect them to other terrorist groups. Only returnees who have failed to reform should be stripped of their citizenship. The fighters should be allowed to reform before being denied their nationality.

Security recommendations. The government should continue with targeted killings to limit their return. Although controversial, it should uphold its airstrikes and other military interventions to reduce their number (Reed et al. 2015, p. 14). Intelligence, in this case, is crucial to identifying the targets and stopping them in time. However, the unintended consequence is that it will encourage others to join extremist groups. The government should apply this recommendation cautiously to prevent adverse effects.

Cooperation with other agencies is important in identifying the security threat. The UK can liaise with Europol, the US, and even third-world countries to monitor the foreigners. This is because they can easily enter the UK or perpetrate attacks from other countries (Cook & Vale 2018, p. 36). Sharing intelligence can help the government identify the radicals even before they reach the state.

Prediction

The legal challenges are likely to become more complicated. The legal processes, combined with human rights issues, can make apprehending the returnees an arduous activity. Furthermore, the families are unlikely to cooperate because the sentencing has become harsher, and the authorities cannot be trusted. However, the problem will reduce with more involvement of the international court or overseas trials. The UK should partner with the IS nations to have the foreigners prosecuted in those countries.

Comparatively, the security challenges will also increase. Since the number of returnees is high, and many are unknown, terrorism may happen. However, it will be prompted by a lack of social and political acceptance, which isolates the group. They will be motivated to enact terrorism on the population out of frustration and different ideologies. This will be averted through social, religious, and political engagement, which will make reintegration easy.

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Reference List

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