Natural Resource: Materials and components that can be found within the environment and refers to all the land, forests, energy sources and minerals existing naturally in a place that can be used by people (Van der Ploeg, 2011).

Natural Resource Governance: Norms, institutions and processes that determine how power and responsibilities over natural resources are exercised, how decisions are taken, and how citizens – women, men, indigenous peoples and local communities – participate in and benefit from such management (Ezirim, 2011).

Resource Conflict: Friction or opposition resulting from actual or perceived differences or incompatibilities consequent to exploitation, use and management of natural resource (Akacem & Cachanosky, 2017).

Oil Exploitation: Location, drilling, completion, and equipment of wells necessary to produce the commercially recoverable oil and gas in a field (Johannes, Zulu & Kalipeni, 2015).

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background to the Study

Governance has been argued as the most crucial challenge facing governments and politics in contemporary states. Governance therefore refers to the capacity in which it can develop and leverage its civic synergies in order to enforce values, enhance effectiveness, oversee its jurisdiction and implements its policies, regulate the population, together with harnessing and exploiting its resources for the advancement of the common good (Eli, 2014; Okoli & Orinya, 2014). Governance is a system of engendering regulation within the processes of interaction and decision-making among stakeholders to enhance viability and prosperity of the organization. According to Roba, Gibbons and Mahadi (2013), governance is the means by which society defines goals and priorities and advances cooperation including: policies, laws, decrees, norms, instruments and institutions.

On the other hand, natural resources can be categorized into two major classes, namely renewable and non-renewable resources. A renewable resource comprises of land, forests and water; non-renewable ones include diamonds, fossil fuels and minerals. To measure its effect on conflict, according to Bayramov (2018) classified the non-renewable resources as exact measures and attributes, such as non-fuel and fuel, lootable and non-lootable resources, and point and diffuse resources on the assumption that, resource requires less investment and unskilled labour, transport and resource extraction while market value then, it is a lootable resource (Samset, 2009). Diffuse resources meanwhile are spread over vast areas and can be extracted by a large number of groups while point resources are located in a small sized area and controlled by a limited group of producers.

Evidently, natural resource governance encompasses the rules and regulations that determine natural resources use and the way these rules and regulations are developed and enforced (Roba et al., 2013). It is the application of the governance concept and principles in determining how natural resources are exploited and utilized by relevant stakeholders. It involves norms, rules, institutions and mechanisms that regulate the decisions and conducts of governments, organizations and individual stakeholders in relation to natural resource access, control, allocation, exploitation and its utilization.

Despite natural resources potent of in contributing to economic prosperity especially in developing countries, they have turnout to be sources of conflicts and even nation collapse in what has been termed resource curse and a clear case of poor natural resource governance (Ezirim, 2010). For instance, notwithstanding oil endowment in developing countries such as Nigeria, Liberia, Gambia, Sierra Leone, Uganda and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are characterized by violent conflicts, ethno-national marginalization, militia insurgency as well as pro-oil violent reprisal by state security forces.

Auzer (2017) defines resource curse as the negative impact on an economy of anything that gives rise to a sharp inflow of foreign currency, such as the discovery of large oil reserves. This phenomenon was first experienced by the Netherlands in 1960 after the discovery of natural gas, which was previously unexploited. The foreign currency inflows led to currency appreciation, which made the country’s exports to the rest of the world less price competitive. Domestic industries and markets were ignored in favour of the export of natural gas. This new reliance on a natural resource caused inflation to rise. Investment fell and flowed out of the country while domestic industries lost their competitiveness in the global market.

The resource and curse nexus focus on oil-and-gas-related civil conflict. The high value and high utility of oil and gas make them points of contest among different social groups. In a weak government, the greedy elite may appropriate national patrimony to advance their personal fortunes, while frustrated civilians may use violence to gain control over oil and gas resources. In turn, the elite resort to outright repression to keep the civilians in check (Van der Ploeg, 2011). The subsequent escalation of the attack-and-defense cycle displaces human, built, and natural capital. It also generates political instability, which depresses investment and impedes economic growth. Therefore, despite years of oil extraction, a resource-rich country in civil conflict remains underdeveloped with an economy that is dangerously reliant on oil exports (Cai and Newth, 2013). This instability intensifies political competition for control over oil reserves and gives rise to a loop of causalities between resource dependence and conflict (Akacem and Cachanosky, 2017).

The theoretical literature on resource governance and conflicts can be divided into two main groups, resource abundancy and resource scarcity. Literatures falling in the first group argue that abundancy of natural resources (non-renewable) leads to violence, inequality and conflict, while those of the second group claims that scarcity (both renewable and non-renewable) of natural resources can in fact alternatively contribute to conflict and instability. In laying out their cases, each side utilizes different methods and theoretical frameworks to support their presented arguments.

1.1.1 Kenya’s Oil Industry

Kenya’s extractives industry is at its infancy stage. The ministry of mining was set up in 2013 and legislation to regulate the industry passed in 2016. The mining sector accounts for less than 1 percent of the country’s gross domestic product. There have, however, been low range disputes between communities and miners across Kenya’s mineral belt – stretching from the northwest to the southern coast – largely due to people feeling aggrieved over shares of revenues and access to jobs (Johannes, Zulu, and Kalipeni, 2014). Although Kenya’s mining legislation and Constitution provided enough regulation to ensure communities were given their fair share of mining revenues as well as other benefits, there has been poor enforcement of the laws; lack of governance and implementation of legislation (Muiruri, 2017).

Onshore and offshore oil exploration work started about 50 years with no significant results until 2012 (Deloitte, 2013). Kenya has a large onshore and offshore acreage of unexplored geological blocks These blocks are sub-divided 46 blocks for purposes of administration and licensing, 44 are already licensed to 24 operating exploration companies which either work individually or as a consortium with a single operator. Extractives East Africa, (October, 2014 Edition). There was increased interest of oil exploration in Kenya after the 2006 discovery of oil in Uganda, discovery of Gas in Tanzania coast and positive results in offshore Mozambique coast. Tullow Oil, the company that made the initial oil discovery, has so far confirmed the presence of 1.7 billion barrels in Turkana, but estimates suggest the final reserves could amount to approximately 20 billion barrels. This would make Kenya’s oil reserves second only to Nigeria’s 37 billion barrels should confirmation be made.

1.2 Statement of the Research Problem

Governance in developing state is in a very deplorable condition owing to weak government institutions characterized by self-aggrandizement. The state of affairs in Africa appears more precarious and hopeless. Over the years, management of natural resources has posed a huge challenge to many countries. Most resource-rich countries in Africa have no established and viable natural resources governance regime (UNEP, 2013). Where such a system exists, it has often been characterized by inefficiency and mismanagement (Darby, 2010). Despite these resources often being located in remote regions where the poorest live, few have reaped rewards from mining.

Natural resource extraction has concentrated wealth and power in the hands of a few, aggregating corruption and adverse inequalities, leading to massive environmental degradation and pollution (Okoli and Uhembe, 2015). Cases of displacement of communities, workers subjected to unsafe conditions, as well as soil, water and air pollution are rampant. While some countries may have an effective mechanism for natural resource governance, a good number of them operate natural resource system that are too grossly inefficient to guarantee peaceful, equitable and sustainable resource exploitation (Auzer, 2017). This has led to conflicts in countries such as Nigeria, South Sudan, DRC, Gambia, Yemen, Ukraine, Syria among others (Badeeb, Lean and Clark, 2017).

While Kenya’s oil deposits are being increasingly exploited, failure to implement proper governance laws and ensure local communities benefit from such oil exploitation. The County epitomizes the necessary predisposition to ‘oil curse’; oil rich yet the poorest and marginalized with 90% of inhabitants living below the poverty line (Muiruri, 2017). Since the discovery of oil, conflicts have intensified around the oil fields between Turkana’s. The local community and County Government are in conflict with the national government concerning oil revenue sharing. While the local community sought 10% of revenues raised from sale of oil, the Government insisted on 5% (Mbugua, 2017). There is high risk that unmet community expectations for benefits from oil such as social amenities, employment and development can lead to violent conflict between local communities and the oil companies (Okoth, 2017).

Studies on national oil governance and conflict have yielded mixed results. While some argue that the exploitation of natural resources is a pre-condition for economic ‘take-off’ within the developing world, others point towards a much more complex relationship that exists between resource endowment and development. In Kenya, however, no substantial academic or scientific research has been carried out on oil governance. Ogutu (2015) studied the effect of stakeholder management strategies on successful exploration among oil and gas companies. Tadeo (2016) compared oil resource management in Norway and Nigeria as a lesson for Kenya. This leaves a wide knowledge gap that this study seeks to fill. This paper explores the paradoxical ‘resource curse’, examining the effect of oil governance on conflicts.

1.3 Research Objectives

General objective

This study seeks to establish the effect of natural resource governance and conflict by taking a case of oil exploitation in Turkana County.

1.3.1 Specific Objectives

The study will be guided by the following specific objectives:

Effect of local community participation on oil conflicts in Turkana County;
Effect of oil revenue sharing on oil conflicts in Turkana County;
Effect of oil regulatory framework on oil conflicts in Turkana County; and,
Effect of conflict resolution mechanisms on oil conflicts in Turkana County.

1.4 Research Questions

The study will answer the following research questions:

What are the effects of local community participation on oil conflicts in Turkana County?
What are the effects of oil revenue sharing on oil conflicts in Turkana County?
What are the effect sof oil regulatory framework on oil conflicts in Turkana County?
What are the effects of conflict resolution mechanisms on oil conflicts in Turkana County?

1.5 Justification of the Study

This study is invaluable a number of persons. The study is important in as far as it tries to decipher how to govern oil exploitation in Turkana and Kenya at large without running the risk of emergence of conflict. This is precious being that oil – which is a source of conflict in other nations – is being exploited for the first time in Kenya. To this end, investors exploiting oil in Kenya will learn from the findings how to go about their business without with minimal conflict with local community. Proper use of the findings would be invaluable in safe guarding investors’ investments against the risk. The findings and recommendations will be invaluable to the Kenya’s Government as it will point on how the oil exploitation should be governed and not limited to revenue sharing, community participation, environmental concerns among others. By extrapolation, the study would also help the Kenyan government realize its dreams of making the country an investment hub. This is because should natural resource conflicts be mitigated, more foreign direct investment would be attracted.

The local community and Kenya’s populace shall benefit from implementation of the findings and recommendations as they too expect to benefit from not only the oil but also other natural resource exploitation. Moreover, the findings shall also encourage local community participation in the natural resource governance. The study would be an empirical reference for future students including researchers on similar topic. The study would also be an empirical source for future research. Further, students will find this paper useful in learning the natural resource governance. This knowledge will be invaluable for academic purposes.

1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study

The study’s scope is geared towards establishing the paradoxical ‘resource curse’ by examining the effect of oil governance on conflicts. It will be achieved by examining how local community participation, oil revenue sharing, oil regulatory framework and conflict resolution determine national resource conflicts in Turkana with specific reference to Turkana County. This cross-sectional study will be conducted in Turkana being the County where the oil extraction is domiciled. The study will target local community around the oil fields, Tullow Oil management, Ministry of Petroleum officials. Data will be collected from primary sources using semi-structured questionnaire to obtain robust and comprehensive information. Analysis will be conducted using descriptive statistics and inferential analysis to establish the relationship.

The study will face a number of limitations. First will be the ability to draw descriptive or inferential conclusions from sample data about a larger group. Second limitation would be reliability and adequacy of data to be collected. To mitigate this, the study will collect both primary and secondary data which would complement each other as both sources have their merits and demerits. Third, the study will be limited by the difficulty in gaining access to the sampled respondents. The targeted population consist of management staff from the Ministry of Mining and Petroleum and Tullow Oil that have strict information disclosure procedure with some disclosing absolutely no information to ‘outsiders’. The conservative nature of these entities and oaths of secrecy by personnel not to disclose information that is strategic in nature might be a challenge.

CHAPTER TWO

2.1 Literature Review

Literature on natural resource conflict is divided into three groups: there are those that argue that natural resources lead to ‘intra-state conflicts’ (Collier, Hoeffler & Rohner 2009; Cuvelier, 2013), ‘inter-state conflicts’ (Borgerson, 2009; Moyo, 2012), and finally, those that emphasize both intrastate and interstate conflicts (Ross, 2012; Colgan, 2014).

There are several suppositions about how oil fuels conflict that emerged out of large-number of quantitative studies that found strong correlations between oil dependency and various kinds of violence. Ezirim (2011) outlined six rival families of mechanisms that could explain the relationship between natural resources and conflicts: the greedy rebels mechanism; the greedy outsiders mechanism; the grievance mechanism; the feasibility mechanism; the weak states mechanism; and the sparse networks mechanism.

In the greedy rebels’ mechanism, the booty character of natural resources motivates rebels to take up arms and/or continue fighting. This mechanism has three variants. In the first variant, domestic groups may engage in quasi-criminal activities to benefit from resources independent of the state as exemplified by piracy, oil bunkering and kidnappings. In the second variant, natural resources increase the prize value of capturing the state. This means that either variant could lead to either situation happening. That is, weakening the state in order to make its capture possible.

The third variant states that if natural resources are concentrated in a particular region of the country, it makes for the possibility of that region thinking it could secede from the rest of the country, and that it would be possible to withstand the pressure and become prosperous. In the greedy outsiders’ mechanism, greedy outsiders might be ready to intervene militarily – either directly or through support for internal conflicting factions in order to gain or maintain control over lucrative resources. The existence of natural resources may be an incentive for third parties – state and corporations – to engage in or indeed foster civil conflicts. In the grievance mechanism, perceived deprivation of producing regions and social groups create grievances and trigger violent uprising, especially secessionism in producing regions. Natural resource dependence can be associated with grievance rather than greed. This is because countries that depend on resources may experience transitory inequity as part of the developing process; such economies may be vulnerable to terms of trade shocks, that is, they may likely be dependent on a small number of commodities for their export earnings; the process of extraction may produce grievances, either through forced migration or as a result of the environmental damage or loss of land rights; or natural resource wealth may be seen to be unjustly distributed.

In the feasibility mechanism, natural resources provide the means for rebel finance. Natural resources could provide a way to finance rebellions that have been started for other reasons, thereby increasing the prospects of success. This can be done either through control of production during the conflict or by raising revenues in advance to gain control of the resources “booty futures” (Ross, 2002).

In the weak states mechanism, resource abundance reduces the quality of state institutions, and makes internal violent conflict more likely. State structures may be weaker in natural-resource-dependent economies; and this argument focuses on the strength of the linkage between the state and society. This argument means that when citizens are not taxed by governments, they have less power over them as they would have less information about government activity, weaker incentives to monitor government behaviour, and fewer instruments at their disposal to withdraw support from governments.

Accordingly, resource-dependent states may have little compulsion to respond to the demands of their citizens or create structures that engage their citizens (Collier and Hoeffler, 2005: 512). Conversely, governments that rely on natural resources rather than on taxation have weakened incentives to create bureaucratic institutions. That is, such states are likely to have weak structures because they have less need for intrusive bureaucracies to raise revenue; and as such, the domestic economy is divorced from the State.

In the sparse networks mechanism, rentier economies have a one-sided integration in the world economy and hence cannot develop thick terms of exchange conducive for peace and stability. The importance of natural resources may lie in their impacts on the daily economic activities of the citizens of an economy and how these in turn affect attitudes of citizens or relations between citizens. Thus, natural-resource-dependent economies may have weak manufacturing sectors and correspondingly low levels of internal trade. This is because it is a given that trade is associated with relationship and cohesiveness among people. No one fights his trading partners as wherever there is commerce, manners are gentle. Moreover, through trade, partners understand one another’s cultures and this helps in reducing the risks of conflicts between them.

Poor management of resources, as noted by Freeman and Moutchnik (2013), has been responsible for the conflicts oil exploration regions. Most governments whose minerals are being exploited are usually on the side of the oil exploration companies that are Multinational Companies (MNCs) whom it collects rents from, such that decisions on oil and gas resources are made directly between government and the MNCs, shutting out the people, who feel alienated and want to show their grievance. This hobnobbing with government has always given the MNCs the opportunity of getting things done their way. According to Ross (2015), oil multinationals feed the government giving room for an unequal partnership formalized through three types of joint agreements in the oil industry – the joint venture agreements, production-sharing agreements, and risk-sharing contracts. Thus most of country’s oil is produced by oil companies as “operators or technical partners” of the state.

Ratner, Meinzen-Dick, Hellin, Mapedza, Unruh et al. (2017) contradict the long-held beliefs in the resource curse theory which has been linking the extraction of natural resources to corruption, authoritarianism, economic decline and conflicts, and state, however, that “resource-conflict link is more complex than conceptualized in the scientific mainstream.” They also note that the rentier state theory which identifies economic stagnation, corruption and authoritarianism as part of the political economy of resource-rich states goes contrary to the resource curse theory in the sense that “governments use abundant resources to buy off opposition or suppress armed rebellion, thereby contributing to political stability and preventing armed conflicts (Moyo, 2012). Their arguments are that very high per capita-revenues from oil allow governments of resource-rich countries to avoid conflict and maintain peace by a combination of large-scale distribution, high spending on the security apparatus, protection by outsiders and relatively more favourable state institutions.

Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) note that large rents are not intrinsically a curse; they obviously have the potential to accelerate peaceful development, and this potential has occasionally been realized, as in Botswana … clearly, in some circumstances resource rents induce or prolong conflict, and in others they do not. They go further to state that not only can resources finance conflict, but it can also induce patronage politics and motivate conflict, especially in the form of secessions.

According to Volman (2014), the possession of oil resources, and the revenues that accrue to governments from the exploitation of this resource, has had a decisive impact on the security and stability of nearly every African country that has significant amounts of oil. This has been true in the past and oil is certain to have a similar impact on those countries where it is only now being discovered and exploited. Countries without oil certainly can become militarized and experience conflict with their neighbors or serious internal violence, but the possession of oil resources has unique consequences for national security and internal stability. This is due to the special characteristics of oil production. On the one hand, oil production is capital intensive; it can only be undertaken only by companies willing to invest immense amounts of capital and, thus, requires the cooperation of central governments willing and able to protect these large foreign investments. On the other hand, oil production yields vast revenues for African governments. This allows them to make large arms purchases, to build up their military forces, and to strengthen internal security forces. However, it also can lead to internal political conflict and violence because it increases the stakes of political competition and encourages rival leaders and parties to resort to the use of force to gain control of the oil revenues.

Moreover, because oil revenues are managed by central governments that are often neither democratic nor financially transparent, the money generated by oil production often does not contribute to national economic development, but is instead diverted into the bank accounts of government officials or used to finance unnecessary prestige projects. The misuse of oil revenues exacerbates political discontent and can provoke internal political violence (Colgan, 2013). Finally, because oil production is often carried out with few, if any, environmental controls, it can have a devastating effect on people living in the oil-producing areas, thus further aggravating public unrest. As the following cases illustrate, oil production does not always cause militarization and violence, but it usually has a negative impact on the security and stability of those countries that have large oil resources.

Talking about institutional weaknesses of resource-rich states and the linkage with the performance of their governments, Cuvelier (2013) notes that countries with abundance of resource wealth exhibit problematic fiscal policies and small levels of domestic savings in which case the resource rents are wasted in financing ordinary governmental expenses.

The oft-observed positive association between natural resources and conflict is frequently attributed to the effect resource revenue has on governing bodies. Governments in resource-rich countries often rely on external rents, not citizen taxation, for economic viability (Chaudhry 1997; Karl 1997). They do so for politically expedient reasons—namely, establishing a bureaucratic tax-collecting system is difficult, and lowering taxes is generally popular. Similarly, resource wealth can hinder the development of an effective governing class (Fearon and Laitin 2013). Leaders in resource-rich countries often make the political calculation that building robust institutions that foster democracy and economic growth is not in their best interest (Isham et al. 2013). Doing so can undercut their drive to consolidate power because bureaucracies demand a measure of transparency and accountability (Auty 2011). The lack of tax revenue and an effective ruling class in resource-abundant nations can lead to institutional fragility, leaving them vulnerable to rebel challenges. As Humphreys (2015) explains, an untaxed citizenry has fewer levers at their disposal to bend the government to their collective will. In turn, the autonomy of rent-seeking governments can lead to festering discontent, and, at times, violence.

Other research emphasizes how insurgent groups can be spurred into violent action by the presence of natural resources. For instance, when resource wealth is sequestered in the hands of the ruling class the value of capturing the state increases. Consequently, this can incentivize civilian-led violence (Le Billon 2014). Conversely, when natural resources are located in an ethnically-marginalized region of a country, rebels might elect to seek independence in pursuit of sole control of the resources. “Lootable” natural resources can also be used by dissidents to finance their rebellion (Collier and Hoefflery 2009; Le Billon 2012). Short of looting the resources, violent civil actors can extort money from natural resource companies that operate in their territory (Collier et al. 2009; Dal Bó and Bó 2011; Ross 2012).

Further explanations linking natural resources to conflict purports that resources can induce a host of grievance that ultimately manifest in violence (Ross 2012). For instance, non-resource segments of a country’s economy can suffer when natural resources dominate (The Economist 2005), in turn leading to poor living standards. Alternatively, sharp economic downturns can occur in oil states, which are particularly susceptible to price shocks as the price of oil fluctuates on the world market (Humphreys 2015). Oil states are also frequently plagued by higher-than-average rates of unemployment, particularly in parts of the MENA region where foreign workers are preferred to local labor in the oil industry (Ross 2012). The process of natural resource extraction or the mal-distribution of resource revenue can likewise foster citizen discontent, or even violence (Fearon 2011; Ross, 2012).

It is critical to recognize, however, that not all research finds a positive link between natural resources and conflict. While the dominant view in the literature undoubtedly skews towards a “resource curse” orientation, contrary work that speaks to the possibility of a “rentier peace” (Luciani 1987; Mahdavy 1970) exists as well. Fjelde and De Soysa (2017) deftly outline the key tenets of this position, discussing how resource revenue can be harnessed to build state capacity, coerce or co-opt opposition, or simply goad would-be rebels into cooperating with the ruling regime.

Coercive force, usually in the form of military might or state police, can be used by governments to quash internal dissent (Cotet and Tsui 2013). Boulding (1989) contends that the threat of state power and fear of government retaliation for defection often facilitate peace. As Fearon and Laitin (2013) note, a state’s military and policing apparatus is key to monitoring, deterring, and suppressing any potential dissent. Resource wealth can be utilized to strengthen a country’s coercive capacity, especially if the resources are lucrative.

Coercion is not the only mechanism at the state’s disposal to generate civilian compliance; governments can also co-opt political opposition forces (Fjelde 2013). This can be accomplished through spending on public goods, like education and healthcare (Levi 2006), or other economic transfers (Gandhi and Przeworski 2016). This perspective is in line with Boulding (1989) concept of economic power, which states that compliance can be won by offering adversaries something that they value in return. Resource wealth can be and often is used to erect robust social safety nets and facilitate wealth transfers.

Citizen compliance can be acquired through cooperation. Cooperation necessitates trust—namely, citizen must trust that state institutions will uphold the social contract that bonds the governing class to the people (Tadeo, 2016). When people trust their government to effectively and fairly regulate social exchange and exercise authority equitably, coercion or co-optation are less necessary. Okoli and Uhembe (2015) argue that political order involves state capacity related to the creation of commitments that the populace trusts. Resource wealth can be used to build such capacity, thereby fostering stability and a lack of violent civilian unrest.

1.9 Theoretical Framework

Prominent theories explaining natural resource and conflict are resource curse theory, stakeholder theory, political economy model, and greed and grievance theory (Badeeb, Lean and Clark, 2017).

1.9.1 Resource Curse Theory

The resource curse refers to the failure of many resource-rich countries to benefit fully from their natural resource wealth, and for governments in these countries to respond effectively to public welfare needs (Ross, 2015). While one might expect to see better development outcomes after countries discover natural resources, resource-rich countries tend to have higher rates of conflict and authoritarianism, and lower rates of economic stability and economic growth, compared to their non-resource-rich neighbors (Venables, 2016).

The idea that resources might be more of an economic curse than a blessing began to emerge in debates in the 1950s and 1960s about the economic problems of low and middle-income countries. However, the term resource curse was first used by Richard Auty in 1993 to describe how countries rich in mineral resources were unable to use that wealth to boost their economies (Auty, 1993). Political scientists and economists argue that oil, mineral and gas wealth is distinct from other types of wealth because of its large upfront costs, long production timeline, site-specific nature, scale, price and production volatility, non-renewable nature, and the secrecy of the industry.

1.9.2 Stakeholder Theory

Stakeholder theory is credited to Edward Freeman in 1983. The theory of governance emphasize that firms owe corporate accountability to a broad-range of stakeholders; any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives (Freeman & Moutchnik, 2013). The crux of the stakeholder theory is that businesses should be responsible and responsive to competitive cooperate and extra-corporate interests and/or concerns (Hammond, 2011). The interests refer to the needs of the investors, shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers, partners, government, organized labour, host communities, and the general public. Stakeholder theory, thus, recommends a resource management paradigm that recognizes and serves the diverse needs and interests of relevant stakeholders in such a manner that makes for equitable, efficient and sustainable exploitation and utilization of natural resources (Okoli and Uhembe, 2015). This affirms the need for a strategic synergy between the government, the corporate sector, the local communities and the civil society in effectuating natural resource governance.

1.9.3 Political Economy Model

Political economy model of the resource curse centres on the decisions of politicians governing resource rich economies. The decision analyzed is the allocation of resources between activities of self-enrichment, and activities that increase the productive potential of the economy. According to Badeeb, Lean and Clark (2017), political economy models generally consider conflicts to be equilibrium behaviors of different interest groups. These models commonly assume that the opportunity costs of attack and defence, or equivalently the productive returns on resources and labor, are exogenously given. However, these conflict models are insufficient to address the resource curse. It is plausible that a resource-abundant country in conflict is worse off than it is in the absence of conflict. Nevertheless, it is implausible that a country is worse off than it would be without its natural resources, simply because it could neglect its resources and thereby escape from the curse (Balmaceda, 2018). Therefore, particular attention must be given to the underlying institutions that drive the economy into self-destruction where natural resource governance comes in.

1.9.4 Greed and Grievance Theory

Greed school of thought explains the role of natural resource abundance rather than scarcity in conflict. Le Billon and El Khatib (2004) argue that abundance (greed), not scarcity (grievance), is the main cause of natural resource conflict. Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009) assert that the specific characteristics of a resource, its location and its mode of exploitation can affect the balance of power between belligerents. Grievance school of thought, on the other hand, argues that scarcities of renewable resources do produce conflict and instability. However, the mechanisms by which this happens are complex and environmental scarcity essentially produces conflict by generating social effects, such as poverty and migrations (Nevins, 2005).

The greed and grievance theory has gained considerable credence in the literature on natural resources and state security. Governments control a variety of income- and resource-generating mechanisms. Tax revenues and funding from the international community often provide governments with large sums of money, the allocation of which has sometimes led to endemic corruption, polarization, weak institutions, human rights abuses, and inequitable distribution of resources in many war-torn countries in Africa (Colgan, 2013). In most cases, policy perspectives have been significantly shaped by the controversial “greed theory”, which posits that economic resources are pursued by rebels not simply to sustain war, but rather that war is pursued to obtain resources (Bayramov, 2018). Explanations on the political economy of civil wars or intrastate conflicts present greed rather than grievance as a driving force of many conflicts in Africa. They have linked the availability of lootable resources as one major triggers of military intervention in intrastate conflicts. Conflict is seen as driven more by rationally calculated action rather than by irrational grievance, particularly identifying state-level factors, such as the availability of natural resources

CHAPTER THREE

1.11 Research Methodology

The study shall adopt a descriptive research design whereby both the qualitative and quantitative approaches will be adopted. The methodological approach is based on the need to provide an in-depth analysis of the nexus between natural resource governance and conflict.

1.11.1 Area of Study

The study will be carried out in Lokichar area, Turkana County, where Amosing, Ngamia Ekale, Etuko and Twiga oil fields are located (Figure 1). Lokichar is located in Rift Valley region, Northwest of Kenya. Its geographical coordinates are 2° 23′ 0″ North, 35° 39′ 0″ East. The area is inhabited by pastoralists ; some of the poorest in the Country. In 2012, approximately 21,791 people inhabited the area.

Figure 1:Map Showing Lokichar Area and Oil Exploration Sites

1.11.2 Study Population and Sample

The study will target government institution dealing with oil exploitation such as Ministry of Mining and Petroleum and local communities in Turkana where oil exploitation is taking place. From these government institutions, interviews and policy document, both current and historical, will be considered and reviewed. Management of Tullow Oil in Kenya shall also be a target.

1.11.3 Data Collection Procedure

Data sources of the study will be both secondary and primary data sources. The study will review Kenya’s regulatory frameworks and policy guiding oil mining and natural resource exploitation from Ministries of Mining and Petroleum. Structured questionnaires shall be administered to the local community. About 100 community members will be targeted. Two focused group discussion shall also be held for a comprehensive qualitative data collection.

1.11.4 Data Analysis Technique

The researcher will analyze the qualitative data using content analysis. Nachamias and Nachamias (2010) describe content analysis as any technique used to make inferences by systematically and objectively identifying specific characteristics and messages. According to Nachamias and Nachamias, content analysis is used to analyze the data through describing phenomena, classifying it and seeing how the concepts interconnect as indicated by the responses or data. This approach of analysis will be preferred as it will gave results that are predictable, directed, or comprehensive. Content analysis will enable the researcher to shift through large volumes of responses with relative ease as it will analyze commonality of the themes presented.

The quantitative data from questionnaires will be analyzed using descriptive statistics. According to Kothari (2010), descriptive analysis is the transformation of raw data into a form that can be easily understood and interpreted and usually the first form of analysis where averages are calculated, frequency distributions given and percentage distributions provided. In this study, the descriptive statistics will be frequencies, percentages, means and standard deviations.

1.12 Proposed Chapter Outline

The study will consists of five chapters. Chapter one which is an introduction includes the introduction of study, problem statement, research objectives and questions, justification of the study, literature and theoretical review, definition of key concepts, research methodology and the chapter outline. Chapter two reviews natural resource governance and conflicts. Chapter three discusses the case study, that is Lokichar Basin, oil exploitation as a resource curse. It presents both the primary and secondary data sources. Chapter four will have a critical analysis of the study, discussing the findings of chapter three. Chapter five outlines conclusion drawn from the findings and recommendations, thereof. oo

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