Political Inquiry and Analysis

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Research Questions

The study by Maoz & Russett (1993) addresses the following questions;

Does the level of democratization in a dyadic group, combined with other factors, minimize the possibility of conflict?
What distinct political and normative elements in democratic societies reduce the prevalence of conflict?
Why do the same elements that curb democracies from attacking each other not prevent democratic states from indulging in war?

Theoretical Arguments

One assumption of the normative model is that states develop norms from within, representing the institutions and domestic political makeup. Second, the theory also assumes that the norms of non-democracy are more dominant in international politics compared to those of democracy. The firsts assumption suggests that conflicts in democratic states are typically resolved through compromise rather than destroying rivals. Contrary, non-democratic states solve their issues through violence, creating an environment of mistrust and panic. The second assumption proposes that states place survival before all other considerations they seek to promote. In this context, if the application of domestic democratic norms would be a threat to survival, states would adopt rivals’ norms. Non-democratic norms are quickly adopted, and thus, democratic states are more likely to shift their strategies than vice versa.

On the other hand, the structural model assumes that international hurdles demand leaders to rally domestic reinforcement for various policies. Second, shortcuts to marshaling political support can only be successful in situations technically proven as emergencies. Very few objectives can be used to justify the need for war in democracies, given that international action requires the mobilization of institutions, public opinion, and interest parties. National mobilization is indeed challenging and cumbersome, explaining why democratic societies indulge less in war. Contrary, non-democracies can implement policies quickly without public opinion, provided legitimizing groups are satisfied.

Hypotheses

Maoz & Russett (1993) hypothesized that a high level of democratization between two states inherently reduces the risk of military disputes, and they would also not escalate in case of emergence. The consequence would also function independently of other dyadic aspects like economic development, alliances, and national wealth. From a normative approach, the researchers hypothesized that deep-rooted democratic norms reduce states’ likelihood of indulging in militarized disputes. Further, from the structural model, more profound political constraints from leaders reduce the occurrence of conflict between states.

Theory evaluations

Identifying Causal Relationship

Both models try to prove that democracy and complicated political mobilization processes (X) reduce the occurrence of conflicts (Y). In the first hurdle of causal relationships, the normative model proves that there is a causal mechanism that links higher levels of democratic norms (X) build a “let and live” environment that enhances stability across different jurisdictions (Y). Likewise, the structural theory manifests that strict institutional constraints (X) complicate public opinion and interest parties’ mobilization, reducing the justification for violence (Y). Therefore, both theories provide a credible causal mechanism.

In the second hurdle, none of the theories rule out the possibility of Y causing X. For instance, in the structural model, increased justifications for war can’t reduce the complexity of mobilization processes. However, as stated in the theory of “identifying a causal relationship,” this hurdle can be cleared logically. In the third hurdle, both theoretical models demonstrate a covariance between X and Y. There is also a measurable connection between X and Y, where more of X causes more of Y. For instance, in the normative theory, higher degrees of domestic democratic norms (X) create a fundamental atmosphere of stability (Y). There are bivariate connections of X and Y in both theories, proving a causal relationship. Finally, both theories have supportive control variables (Z), which cannot be controlled in both X and Y, making the association authentic. For instance, in the normative theory, the is no proven connection between the control variable, military capability (Z), and complicated mobilization of public opinion (Y). Therefore, the theories satisfy the final hurdle, “confounding variables Z that could disapprove the association between X and Y,” demonstrating a well-founded “credible causal mechanism.”

Plausibility

Both models depict a credible causal mechanism, supported efficiently by data and logic. However, the normative model’s reinforcement in more robust and stable, making the approach more plausible. The variables supporting the approach have a more consistent causal relationship. For instance, the connection between institutional restrictions and violence isn’t as profound as democratic behavior and dependent variables. In this context, the normative approach accounts for the connection between democracy and peace, making the theory more plausible.

Research Design

Sample

Between 1946 and 1986, the international realm averaged 110 nations annually, providing roughly 265,000 dyad-years. However, Maoz & Russett (1993) limited the sample to contiguous interactions and those with a major power, setting the figure to 36,162 dyad-years, with military violence occurring in 714 states.

Unit of Analysis

The dyad year forms the unit of analysis, where Maoz & Russett (1993) analyzed different pairs of states annually to identify patterns of militarized war.

Independent Variables and Normative Theory

The first independent variable is democracy, inclusive of rivalry in political participation, control over participation, opposition in executive recruitment, the viability of executive recruitment, and restrictions on the chief executive. However, as states can have varied characteristics, democratic and non-democratic, Maoz & Russett (1993) implemented a continuous index to assess specific levels of control on constituents. In the second variable, democratic norms, the researchers assessed inconsistencies in accepting democratic norms in different states. The notion is that accepting norms in a political regime doesn’t have to mirror a nation’s political structure. Thus, Maoz & Russett (1993) had to compute the pervasiveness of political behaviors in a society in association with a political regime’s long-term identity.

Independent Variables and Structural Theory

In the variable, degree of institutional constraints, Maoz & Russett (1993) analyzed several attributes to assess the occurrence of conflict between democracies. For instance, the element of “one-man rule” evaluates the degree to which executives must conform with institutionalized constraints when implementing policy decisions.

Control Variables

The study’s control variables are wealth, economic growth, alliance, contiguity, and military capability ratio. Technically, the factors are independent variables, but they don’t play a significant part in the hypotheses’ outcomes.

Dependent Variables

The first dependent variable is MID data that includes military violence threats, displaying military power, or launching military attacks. MID data provides insight into the progress of disputes and lists all participants. The second dependent variable is data in the ICB project that highlights international crisis and conflictual interactions that threaten the typical structure of the global realm.

Conclusion

The study’s results suggest a stronger correlation between domestic norms and dependent variables, trumping that between institutional constraints and acts of violence and war. In this context, the normative model can be identified as more plausible in accounting for the phenomenon of democracy-peace. Nonetheless, it’s worth noting that political restrictions and democratic norms significantly account for the lower occurrence of militarized violence between democratic states.

Critical Evaluation

Maoz & Russett (1993) seek to prove the theory that democratic states rarely go to war due to laws of nature in international relations. Their study demonstrates the utmost proficiency, from the sample, unit of measurements, measuring variables, and addressing inconsistencies. The researchers also expertly considered all possible factors for assessing nations’ participation in military disputes in sample selection. Further, the inclusion of contiguity and superpower involvement eradicated various biases in identifying the likelihood of militarized war. The final sample was 36,162 dyad-years, in which 718 nations actively participated in violence, as indicated by ICB and MID data sets. Therefore, the study’s sample and unit of analysis eliminated all potential biases that could favor hypotheses, founding an ethical and theoretical accurate experiment.

Likewise, the selection and measurement of the dependent and independent variables were accurately designed to address both the study’s hypotheses and theoretical models. Maoz & Russett (1993) analyze each variable’s elements extensively and its relation to each of the models. Further, the researchers identify inconsistencies like linearity in each variable and apply appropriate adjustments to obtain accurate data. For instance, the team applied a continuous index in the democracy variable to assess state authorities’ democratic and autocratic aspects. Maoz & Russett (1993) ensured that all the variable-related data characterized regime types in a dyadic approach.

Maoz & Russett (1993) encountered autocorrelation when measuring variables due to the skewed trait of dependent variables. They addressed the hurdle by running several tests, including categorizing dyad data by years. The researchers also implemented a dichotomous rivalry variable, logistics regression, with and without lagged war variable. In the end, the team discovered that the autocorrelation issue didn’t affect results much, further enhancing the study’s accuracy.

References

Maoz, Z., & Russett, B. (1993). Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986. The American Political Science Review, 87(3), 624-638.