Aviation Safety, Security and Emergency Planning

Aviation Safety, Security and Emergency Planning

Aviation Security Rules and Technology

Nowadays, most airports have security checks at various stages beginning from when the passenger enters the airport to when he boards his plane. Security begins at the check-in locations with traveler identification and answering of security questions. These questions seek to ascertain luggage contents and if other individuals have accessed the contents. Notably, passengers may carry light or heavy luggage (Michael 45). The passenger is allowed to go on to the plane with the light luggage with specified weights, but the heavy luggage stays at the check-in point and is later taken to the luggage compartment. As the passenger goes onto the plane, there is another checkpoint that takes the passenger’s photograph using x-ray beams (Almazroui et al. 14). However, luggage contents such as liquids and laptops undergo separate x-ray scanning to produce clearer images.

Notably, this imaging checkpoint gives two-dimensional images. Therefore, different security officers have to check the luggage manually if the need arises. The next checkpoint is for metal detection. The sounding of an alarm dictates a pat-down for better checking, as well as another round of x-ray scanning to point out the alarm’s location for enhanced scrutiny. If the alarm does not sound, then the passenger takes his light luggage to the duty-free and then to the plane. The heavy luggage that remains at the check-in is analyzed for weight allowance. After that, the luggage has to under screening in Explosive Detection System (EDS), whose operation uses the aid of computed axial tomography (CAT), as noted by Almazroui et al. (14). The image that this luggage produces then has to go through one last screening analysis or review by the security personnel before it finally goes onto the plane.  Should there be any cause for alarm, different security personnel searches the luggage as per the image analysis.

This procedure shows two eminent aviation security rules, namely luggage screening, and passenger screening. Both of these screening processes use various forms of technology.

Baggage Screening

A majority of airports in the western world screen both the light and heavy luggage using x-ray systems of dual-energy. The purpose of x-ray imaging is to enhance the clarity of the visual image of the scanned objects. As such, x-ray systems have pseudo colors that categorize colors. Some airports try to get a three-dimension image of the objects undergoing scanning (Yeun et al. 175). Therefore, they have computed tomography (CT) systems to give a 360-degree rotation of the luggage. Both the dual and multi-dimensional systems of x-ray have various sophisticated software such as Image Storage (IS), Image Enhancement Function (IEFs), and Threat Image Projection (TIP). The screening processes see these functions going on and off (Almazroui et al. 15). Specifically, IEFs aid in the recognition and better analysis of images. It could entail processes such as scanning for organic only, metal only, the pronunciation of edges, and color inversion. IS systems store information only when needed. It is worth noting that different nations store data differently, owing to different data storage laws that cause different software operations. TIP is the best for flashing out threats. This function utilizes stored threat visuals in counterchecking both the light and heavy luggage. Computers pick out the Fictional Threat Images (FTIs) to compare to the image of the scanned objects. In the case of the light luggage, the computer also picks out the Combined Threat Images (CTI) and Combined Non-Threat Images (CNTIs) for cross-checking with real luggage images. It has emerged that TIP technology minimizes the chances of overlooking a threat during scanning (Yeun et al. 181). When detecting signals, prevalence best comes off using alteration measures rather than sensitivity modification.

The x-ray machines change accordingly to limit prevalence periods, whether there is an evaluation or not. This change comes from machines with low retraining periods as well as a comprehensive evaluation at a raised prevalence. As such, security personnel can address any previous scanning mistakes. However, this second chance only applies to heavy luggage. Screeners cannot pick out previous errors in light luggage (Michael 59). There have been cases of decreased vigilance (keen observation and physical readiness to react during visual searches) as a catastrophic occurrence fades with time. Therefore, a threat can go unnoticed even during the second chance to fix earlier mistakes.

As screening goes on, TIP shows the efficiency of the machines. Notably, it is still difficult for x-ray scanners to penetrate highly dense objects for visualization. These problems mainly occur when travelers have various technological gadgets in their luggage. For instance, a cellphone with its charger and other cables could present a complex image that is hard to identify (Almazroui et al. 15). Besides, these gadgets prevent the x-ray beams from passing through to reach other objects in the luggage. The case is worse when the gadget has a large surface area, such as in the case of a laptop. It follows that such gadgets require separate screening, which can be more challenging for the security detail. The challenge arises from the images that the gadgets may give because their batteries could give the impression of an improvised explosive device (IEDs). In such a scenario, manual inspection becomes necessary. X-rays help to shorten the time that passengers take during security checkpoints (Almazroui et al. 15). However, factors such as the machine belt movement, as well as the human factor (time-taken by security officers to analyze an image), also contribute to the time taken at checkpoints.

Passenger Screening

There are two variations of image scanners when it comes to human bodies or passengers. One is ionizing, and the other is the non-ionizing form of radiation, also referred to as active and passive systems. An example of these systems is the x-ray system for the former method and the millimeter and terahertz waves for the latter method. (Yeun et al. 189, Michael 75) Active systems pick out human body radiation emissions to create an image. On the other hand, passive systems are utilized in viewing the travelers’ x-ray images. Such images portray various detailed information that could help in establishing the existence of an illegal object on the human. Millimeter-wave (MMW) scanners come up with Automated Target Recognition (ATR) for controlling the millimeter waves. This ATR presents dummy photo images for the traveler, with interest points, without actually depicting the passenger’s body (Almazroui et al. 16). If there are any concealed objects, they appear on the imaging screen for the security officers to verify that the concealed object is not illegal or a threat. If the need arises, a pat-down search becomes initiated.

Evaluation

As earlier mentioned, the changing of x-ray machines to limit prevalence periods resents the chance to correct an earlier error in scanning. Still, this change only applies to heavy luggage. The light luggage that passengers carry with them to the plane cannot have error correction as scanners are unable to pick out any possible previous errors (Katsakiori 1010). The implication here is that a passenger can board a plane with an illegal object if an error occurs in screening the light luggage during the earlier stages of security checks.

Additionally, studies have indicated that there could be a gradual decrease in vigilance by security personnel as a catastrophic occurrence fades with time. By definition, vigilance is the keen observation and physical readiness to react during visual searches. This finding means that even during the instances where there are red flags from the scanning systems that require the security personnel to conduct manual checks either in the luggage or on a passenger body, it is possible that they may not be thorough enough to find the threat. Their thoroughness influences the existence or non-existence of recent threats in the sector (Endsley 15). As such, passengers can get away with an illegal object nan board a plane of there has not been any recent incidents to put the security personnel on high alert.

When it comes to the types of scanning systems, ionizing scanners are preferable to non-ionizing scanners due to improved image resolution. However, there have been concerns of the ionizing scanners posing health risks to humans, due to the radiation. Other concerns have to do with the invasion of privacy when the x-ray scanners give the image of the passenger’s body (Endsley 27). Such concerns have caused some countries such as the EU to prefer the non-ionizing systems over the ionizing systems. The implication here is that there are higher chances for the security checks to miss a possible threat with lower image resolution and dummy photos of passengers rather than an actual body image. Suffice to say, the rules and technologies of aviation security are not sufficient to ensure safety.

Accident Scenario

Flight IRC3704 was registered as ATR72-212, and belonged to Iran Aseman Airlines. This flight was a scheduled domestic flight at 07:55 local time to Yasou from Tehran. Take off was at 04:35 UTC from Tehran Mehrabad International Airport (OIII). This flight was the first flight that the crew members and the aircraft were taking on that day (Aviation Accidents). This flight’s cruse flight was performed on airway W144 at FL210 with no reports of an abnormal situation. Therefore, the flight proceeded on a frequency of Tehran ACC up until the destination’s latest weather information update request by the first officer. This FO contacted the Yasouj tower for this request. The pilot then requested to switch to FL170 from FL210 from the Tehran ACC.

During the aircraft descent to FL170, the crew called the Yasouj tower, and the descend went on to a 15000ft altitude. There was approval for the plane to on the airport overhead and co a “circling NDB approach’ and make a landing on the destination aerodrome of RWY 31. In the end, this airplane collided with a Dena Mountains peak roughly 8.5 miles to the North of the airport, causing an accident at 06:01 UTC. The crew had sought metrological information at 05:49 from the Yasou tower, while also still in touch with Teheran ACC (Aviation Accidents). The tower gave the requested information at 05:50 and stated that the final path for the approach was clear. Teheran ACC cleared aircraft descent to FL170 at 05:52 when the flight’s crew reported anOBTUX position. The aircraft’s delivery to Yasouj tower was at 05:53, with the plane’s release to join the approach as per the approach chart. The reply from the crew was “continues to overhead on FL150, and we will get out from clouds.”

The aircraft fell off the radar coverage of Tehran ACC at 05:55, owing to the mountainous region’s limited coverage. FL186 was the last radar altitude that was reported, after which the pilot started communicating about navigational aids and the weather with the new controller, who was the (Aeronautical Deputy of Airport). The pilot said that the NDB was not functional as per NOTAM. There was a continued DME situation description on the NCD and DVOR systems by ATC. The crew cited 25NM from the final destination at 05:55:30. Wind conditions were at 130°, 10kt as per the Yasouj tower, where the crew responded with “continue to overhead” (Aviation Accidents). Report from the crew at 05:59 was “14 NM Yasouj DME and not receiving DME from NDB”. The indication from the controller at Yasouj tower was that the LH downwind, as well as the base leg, were mainly clear of any clouds. The captain acknowledged a corrected QNH 1021 communication from Yasouj tower at 06:00, which made the last communication between the tower and the flight.

Contingency Plan

It is considered that the accident’s primary cause was the Cockpit Crew action that created dangerous conditions for the flight. As per the evidence, some of the cockpit crew errors include:

1. Going against the company’s operational manual and proceeding for landing to the Yasouj airport, following the clouds’ and associated cloud mass low altitude ceiling. The situation required diversion to a different airport.
2. Unauthorized altitude descent, below the MSA, and route minimum.
3. Insufficient CRM during the flight.
4. Stall recovery completion failure (setting flap max RPM).
5. Using autopilot inappropriately following stall condition.
6. Inadequate bad weather anticipation as per OM (such as icing, clouds, and turbulence)
7. Acting quickly to turn off the AOA and anti-ice system.
8. Both pilots’ failure to adhere to standard call out and checklists (Aviation Accidents).

Some contributing factors were the airline’s incapability to detect defects in the system regarding:

1. Crew training effectiveness on SOP, OM, and meteorology among other things
2. Sufficient pilot behavior operational supervision
3. Lacking SIGMET on Severe Mountain Wave or Mountain Wave
4. Unclear FCOM stall recovery procedure
5. Lacking aircraft manufacturer warnings in aircraft manuals about mountain wave for the awareness of the flight crew.
6. Lacking the APM system for performance degradation alerts to the team (Aviation Accidents).

Some explanations for aviation accidents include presented in fig 1.

Fig 1: Aviation Accident Reasons; Source: Roelen and Wever, 2005, p.15

These reasons can result in various types of accidents, as shown in Fig 2.

Fig 2: Aviation Accident Types; Source: Roelen and Wever, 2005, p.22

These accidents can occur at different stages of a flight. Fig 3 shows these phases.

Fig 3: Flight Phases; Source: Roelen and Wever, 2005, p.23

Therefore, based on account of the accident, it can be classified as a controlled flight into terrain type of accident that occurred en route (Roelen and Wever 24). It is possible to draw a scenario matrix (See Fig 4) from these classifications to help in coming up with security and safety measures to avoid similar accidents in the future.

Fig 4: Accident Scenario Matrix; Source: Roelen and Wever, 2005, p.24

Studies indicate that few accidents happen en route (See Fig 5).

Fig 5: Prevalence of Aviation Accidents in Different Phases, Source: Roelen and Wever, 2005, p.23

Therefore, it is safe to conclude that this was a rare occurrence that has a slim chance of reoccurring with the right measures in place. Most of the leading causes stemmed from human error. Some of the steps to implement after the accident would be:

1. Proper training of the flight crew on anticipating weather conditions, sticking to requirements such as minimum altitude, and observing standard operating procedures in different circumstances (Hudson 750).
2. Ensuring the aircraft has all the proper equipment sufficiently, such as the APM system and SIGMET
3. Requesting aircraft manufacturers to include mountain wave warnings and any other necessary warnings in the aircraft manuals in the future (Hudson 754)

Works Cited

Almazroui, Sultan, et al. “Imaging Technologies in Aviation Security.” Advances in Image and Video Processing, vol. 3, no. 4, 2015, doi:10.14738/aivp.34.1433.

Aviation Accidents. Iran Aseman Airlines ATR72-212 (EP-ATS) Flight IRC3704. Web. April 2, 2020. https://www.aviation-accidents.net/iran-aseman-airlines-atr-atr72-212-ep-ats-flight-irc3704/

Endsley, Mica. R. Human factors and aviation safety. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 2019.

Hudson, Patrick. “Accident Causation Models, Management, and the Law.” Journal of Risk Research, vol. 17, no. June 6, 2014, pp. 749–764., doi:10.1080/13669877.2014.889202.

Katsakiori, Panagiota, et al. “Towards an Evaluation of Accident Investigation Methods in Terms of Their Alignment with Accident Causation Models.” Safety Science, vol. 47, no. 7, 2009, pp. 1007–1015., doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2008.11.002.

Michael, Alfhonce. Aviation Safety. Regulatory Framework, Technology, Contingency Plan. GRIN Publishing, 2017.

Roelen, A.L.C., and Wever, R. Accident Scenarios for an integrated aviation safety model. National Aerospace Laboratory. http://www.nlr-atsi.nl/fast/downloads/CATS/App%203%20NLR%201%20-%202005-560-cr.pdf

Yeun, Richard, et al. “Aviation Safety Management Systems.” World Review of Intermodal Transportation Research, vol. 5, no. 2, 2014, pp. 168–196., doi:10.1504/writr.2014.067234.