Citation: Scicchitano v. Mt. Carmel Area Sch. Dist.
Background: Markedly, the complainants in this particular case, Don Filippo Scicchitano and Caterina Anna Scicchitano, were scholars in respondent Mount Carmel Area School District. Precisely, at the commencement of 2000, the complainants decided to execute their legitimate privileges to dissent the dress code for the reason that they felt the dress code restricted their aptitude to depict their distinctiveness.
Besides, they also demurred to the dress code as it barred several liturgical colors of religious significance to them (N.T., 2/8/11 p. 105).
Procedural Posture: The plaintiffs presented their matter to the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. Initially, the presiding was done by the Chief judge Honorable Yvette Kane
Issue: Originally, the plaintiffs presented four precise legal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: The claims were as follows:
- A First Amendment reprisal prerogative
- A Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection claim
- A Fourteenth Amendment Substantive Due Process claim
- A claim for Monell obligation in contradiction of defendant Mount Carmel Area School District. (Trial Briefs (Docs. 48, 49); N.T., 2/8/11, p. 16, 33-34 (Doc. 67)).
The complainants unrestrained the Substantive Due Process claims in the period of the trial. (N.T., 2/9/11, p. 339 (Doc. 68)).
Ruling: Primarily, the court ruled that defendants Cheryl Latore, Mary Ann Krakowski, Bart McCollum, and Elaine Bartol were eligible to competent immunity, subsequently discovering that there wasn’t a visibly conventional legitimate privilege at the duration of the activities in question. Secondly, on February 10, 2011, the court ruled as a substance of decree that complainants’ act of wearing odd clothing was never a protected action (N.T., 2/10/11, p. 358, 363).
Rationale: In regards to the First Amendment claim, the complainants were never eligible to a directed verdict for the reason that there was contradictory authentication concerning what prompted the plaintiffs’ restraint. The bench eventually discovered that plaintiffs were not self-controlled for attiring complaint logos and liturgical colors. Fundamentally, the finding was entirely sustained by the evidence. A First Amendment reprisal prerogative under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 demands that complainants depict:
- They affianced in a protected action
- The respondents’ punitive deed was adequate to dissuade an individual of typical insistence from exercising their privileges
- There was a fundamental affiliation involving the protected action and the punitive deed
The court granted eligible imperviousness for the reason that it safeguards public officials from unwarranted intrusion with their responsibilities and from possibly incapacitating intimidations of liability.
Concerning the Equal Protection prerogative, the plaintiffs happened not to be enabled to a directed verdict also. Essentially, to fetch a fruitful claim in regards to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for renunciation of equivalent protection, plaintiffs ought to attest to the actuality of decisive discrimination. However, it was discovered that the plaintiffs failed to table any substantial evidence illustrating that they had been handled inversely from correspondingly positioned students.
Implications: Fundamentally, there are professional implications entrenched in this public school dress code violation case. This case, in particular, articulates the significances of following the laid down institutional laws in regards to the aspect of dressing. Deceptively, it is inconsequential for an individual to raise non-substantial evidence concerning violation of their dress code with the articulation that they have been denied freedom for expressing themselves. All individuals ought to adhere to the dress codes established in institutions, and in the event they are not contented with them, they ought to raise their issues understandably.