Cooperative Conversation
The cooperative principle, in conversation analysis, is a concept that was introduced in 1975 by a philosopher, H Paul Grice. The underlying assumption under the principle is that the participants in a conversation typically attempt to be vivid, relevant, truthful, and informative. In his article titled Logic and Conversation, the philosopher posited that ”talk changes” are not just a ”succession of disconnected remarks” because if they were so, they would lose their rationality (Grice, 1975). Instead, he suggests that cooperation is a primary character in any meaningful dialogue when he states that “Each participant recognizes in them, to some extent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted direction” (Grice, 1975).
Consequently, he came up with four conversational maxims as the main components of any meaningful and persuasive conversation. Under the quantity maxim, Grice stated that one must say just exactly what the communication requires, neither more nor less. Under the quality maxim, he argued that one should only say things that they believe in and can support with evidence. Third, under the manner principle, he stated that one must neither be obscure nor ambiguous, but be brief and orderly. Last, he states that what one must only say what is relevant to a conversation.
Kecke (2014), however, maintains that cooperation is not solely about agreeableness, but it comes with the speaker’s expectation and intention that the audience will facilitate the effort. Thus, the speaker then assumes that the addresser makes the conversational implicatures on the contents. The conversational maxims can be broken through either flouting or violating the roles. For instance, in the relation maxim can be explained using the I and We language, as follows in the following conversation between A and B:
Conversation One
A: Where is my pencil?
B: I have to go to the market.
Conversation Two
A: Have you seen my pen
B: Yes, I think it is on the table
A1: What happened with our lunch?
A1: We haven’t served it yet. It is still cooking.
In the case of Conversation One, B’s answer is flatly irrelevant to the question. However, to some extent, A may understand such a remake as an explanation as to why B cannot answer the question. Under B, one can see that the results are directly relevant to the addresser’s anticipation. Both the addresser and addressee cooperate in the conversation and mutually anticipate that each should be understood in a specific fashion or manner.
References
Grice, H. P. (1975). Logic and Conversation. In P. Cole, & J. L. Morgan (Eds.), Studies in Syntax and Semantics III: Speech Acts (Vol. 3, pp. 183-198). New York: Academic Press. Retrieved from http://web.media.mit.edu/~cynthiab/Readings/grice-75.pdf
Kecskes, I. (2014). Intercultural Pragmatics. Oxford University Press. Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/36270240/Istvan_Kecskes_Intercultural_Pragmatics_Oxford_University_Press