Divorce planning
You are now divorce planning at this point, the reason no longer matters. Communication may have been the issue. Years of consistently attending marriage counseling may have failed to bear fruits. At this stage, the only struggle you have is whether or not to stay together for the kids. Finally, however, you have made your decision, and even if there could be a bit of second-guessing, you know you have to divorce for the sake of your sanity. The question Brake poses is “is divorce promise-breaking”. The customary understanding of marriage, for most individuals, is based on the emotional aspect. However, Brake argues against basing promises on emotional concepts such as love, and this is based on the premise that we cannot control our love, and one cannot promise what they cannot control (30). I intend to provide a critique of Brake’s argument, providing an opposing view on the arguments she has set forth.
Brake essentially tries to resolve an inconsistent triad:
- Wedding vows are promises. 2. Promise-breaking is morally impermissible in the absence of morally overriding circumstances or release by the promisee. 3. Unilateral divorce (an unreciprocated decision by one spouse to leave a marriage) is generally morally permissible (23).
To do so, she refutes the third premise based on the hardline view, which provides that “unilaterally willed divorce is generally impermissible promise-breaking” (25). This premise requires that a promise can only be broken under exceptional circumstances, one of which is when the promise releases the promiser, and in situations where there is an overriding moral obligation. She provides an excellent example of a moral obligation that would override a promise, and that is in the case of an abusive relationship where one’s life and that of their kids is at risk. This view, however, does not imply that marriage will be indissoluble from a legal perspective, and this makes this view problematic. She strengthens her argument against the third premise based on the hardship view, which champions for one’s happiness as proposed by Kant. By choosing happiness, one is allowed to break a promise made. However, she quickly discards this line of thinking because she supposes that there could be morally overriding duties such as preventing the unhappiness of another person. Up to this point, both the hardship view and the hardline view have failed to resolve the triad justifiably.
Brake’s main argument centers around rethinking the content of the promises that are made in wedding vows. Typically, these promises are usually meant to protect the marriage against threats to love. She, however, believes that one cannot make a promise to love; they can only have the intention to do so. The reason why is that promising entails an obligation, and to be obligated to do something, there ought to be a feasible process of doing so. Love, however, is something beyond our control the same way we cannot magically wish feelings like hate, anger, or excitement. Promises are based on reliable outcomes, but when it comes to love, it is unpredictable; hence promising love will, in essence, undermine the value of promising (31). The underlying point is that while one cannot promise love, they can promise to take on the role of a spouse, and this can be broken following divorce. However, there are conditions. Concerning role, for instance, if it involves an emotional component, then we cannot say that a promise has been broken following divorce.
Brake provides a sound view concerning how emotional aspects are unpredictable hence cannot be reliably used to make promises. However, I want to reject this view using two justifications. For one, in the marriage context, it is plausible that we promise things in both our direct and indirect control. When people get married, for example, they pledge to bring about a particular emotional state or make an unconditional commitment to a person. The second and perhaps more important thing I believe we have to look at is that during a wedding, for example, in addition to emotional components, there are behavioral components as well. Traditional vows mention the emotional components, but they even emphasize more on actions like support, honor, and respect for one’s partner. Emotional components are also better understood in a behavioral sense. For example, to be faithful to one’s partner through sickness and health describes the behavioral aspect. Suppose, for example, a guy named Peter makes the aforementioned promise to his partner Linda. He could have a deep love for her, but behaves in a very erratic manner, cheating on her and fails to take care of her when she is sick. I don’t think that we can surely say he has fulfilled his marriage vows. This demonstrates that marriage vows are not primarily about feeling a certain way but rather behaving in a certain way.
I do agree with Brake on the respect that marriage does create moral obligations. I should mention that we also have to consider that the strength of a moral obligation that comes as a result of a promise made depends on how serious the promise-making was, the clarity of the promise made, and the consequences of breaking such a promise. On these three criteria, the marital obligations score highly. Wedding vows represent one of the most serious promises people ever make in their lives. Therefore, such obligations have to be considered very carefully, well-articulated, and the couples ought to agree on them explicitly. People need to spend time talking about what they can and what they cannot promise each other because, at the end of the day, someone’s happiness depends on this. Breaking such a promise has devastating consequences on numerous people. I, however, have to insist that we do make promises regarding emotional aspects, contrary to Brake’s opinion, and emotion does go hand in hand with behavior. Brake views emotion and behavior separately, but I believe how one feels to be reflected in their behavior.