Gottlob Frege: The Distinction between Sense and Reference

Gottlob Frege: The Distinction between Sense and Reference

Introduction

Philosophy of language was first used by Gottlob Frege (1892) in his work in philosophy. Gottlob was the first philosopher to formulate the issues of meaning by organizing the theory of sense for the part of natural language. Gottlob stated that the meaning of a sentence is directly subjected to the meaning of its parts. Therefore, to get the meaning of a sentence, one has to dissect the internal structure of a complex expression or sentence offered by a logical arrangement. In contrast, the value of the truth of such sentences can be shown logical semantics, which may be suggested by considering such sentences as a whole. This essay discusses Gottlob Frege’s evaluation of meaning and references in his philosophy of language works, On Sense and Reference (1892). Frege outlines that the reference of a sentence is its value of truth while the sense of a sentence is its thought, which it articulates. Language influences thought in several ways, and examination of this aspect reveals many suggestions and insights through the assessment of the philosophy of language and philosophy of mind.

Difference between Sense and Reference

It should be noted that wh Frege refers to as sense is also known as the meaning of a sentence or an expression. Other thinkers like Putnam primarily use the term meaning in place of sense. On the other hand, the difference between reference and meaning is simple: Sense or meaning is the intension of a word, a name, or a sentence while a reference represents the thing to which the intension corresponds in the sentence or expression (Sikander, 2010). That is, the reference represents the object to which one is referring. Frege illustrated the difference in several ways: He states that sense is something that is possessed by a name, whether it has a reference or not.

Simply put, the reference of a name is the bearer of the name. For instance, the reference of the name “Gottlob Frege” is himself. Conversely, names and references have sense, and there is a possibility of two words or names to have the same reference but different meanings or senses.

Frege is one of the authors of analytic philosophy, whose research on language and logic created the philosophical, linguistic turn. Frege’s influence on the philosophy of language comprises several works, including; argument analysis and function of the preposition, the difference between object and concept, the principle of compositionality, context principle, as well as the difference between sense and reference of names and other expressions. However, some thinkers like Putnam (1973) differed with Frege in the location of reference and meaning. Putnam pursued his argument through his work, twin Earth Thought Experiment which he published in 1973. To such authors, the sense is a social, communicable symbol or sign, while reference is in the world. Additionally, both reference and meaning are in the world since reference impacts the names and symbols used for sense.

Sense

The difference between reference and sense of signs in language was first mentioned in the equations of mathematics. During Frege’s time, several mathematicians engaged in public disputes on the use and the application of the “equal” sign in understanding logic. The subject of philosophy of language that has received the most consideration is the subject of the nature of meaning or sense, to describe what meaning/sense is, and what it means when one talks about meaning. According to Frege (1892), the issues that are taken into consideration in this area comprise; the nature of synonymy, the quality of the composition, the understanding of meaning, as well as the origins of meaning itself. There are several typical justifications of linguistic “meaning,” each of which has been linked to its form of literature.

First, several authors, like John Locke, are associated with the concept of ideational theory of meaning. Antoniou and Slaney (1998) posit that this theory suggests that definitions are mental representations that are triggered by signs. Even though several complications from its initial usage have surrounded this perception of senses, interest in its adoption has been reintroduced by some modern authors through the use of semantic internalism. Second, theorists like Donald Davidson and Alfred Tarski are associated with the truth-conditional theory of meaning, which states that meanings are conditions under which expressions may be true or false. Third, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Robert Brandom, and John Searle are linked to the use theory of meaning, which assisted the initiation of the communitarian view of language as well as the concept of “meaning as use.”  Wittgenstein (1958) underscores that he was interested in the ways through which communities used words and how far the use could be taken.

Four, J.L. Austin developed the constructivist theory of meaning, which states that speech does not only passively define a particular reality, but it can alter the fact that it describes through the acts of expression. The discovery of these acts of speech were revolutionary discoveries in the field of philosophy of language. Five, there is the reference theory of meaning, which is also referred to as semantic externalism and perceives meaning as being corresponding to the things in the world that are intrinsically linked to signs. Subsequently, there are two general categories of externalism: environmental and social. Environmental externalism is associated with Saul Kripke, Hilary Putnam, and others, while social externalism is associated with Tyler Burge.

Six, there is the verification theory of meaning, which is linked to the early 20^th-century association of logical positivism. Consequently, the initial designing of this theory illustrates that the sense of a sentence is its verification method or falsification. However, the proposition of this initial theory was halted after the recognition of the Duhem-Quine thesis of confirmation holism after the publication of the Two Dogmas of Empiricism. Nonetheless, a modified version of the verification theory was advocated by Michael Dummett, where the meaning of a sentence comprises the capability of the listener to identify the establishment of the truth of the sentence.

Seven, there is the pragmatic theory of meaning whereby the implication of its presentation establishes the meaning of a sentence. According to Dummett (1991), The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, the theory is linked to Charles Sanders Peirce and other theorists. Lastly, we have the contrast theory of meaning, which proposes that knowledge acknowledgements have a ternary arrangement of the form ‘S recognizes that p rather q.’ However, this theory is divergent with the conventional perception whereby knowledge designations have dualistic structures of the way ‘S knows that p.’ On the other hand, other approaches discuss the non-linguistic meaning in language.

Frege’s Perception of Sense/Meaning

In his work, Frege initiates his illustration by presenting a puzzle concerning identity statements like “Hesperus is the same thing as Phosphorous.” According to Frege (1892), this statement is true since Hesperus and Phosphorous are both Venus. As a result, the dilemma is caused by the fact that such a sentence can be informative and, specifically, that such sentences do not have to be a priori or analytical but maybe often containing valuable postponements of knowledge. Nevertheless, the problem is that if identity is a correlation between objects, then it appears as if “Hesperus is Phosphorous” and “Hesperus is Hesperus” emphasize that precisely the same relation obtains, specifically, a correlation between Venus and itself. But then again, we need to ask ourselves how the first can be informative while the second is an illustration of the law of self-identity. Therefore, it is crucial to determine why and how the two correlations can have differing cognitive values.

Frege underpins that, for such explanations, he once asserted in his work of Conceptual Notation that identity was not a correlation between objects but rather a correlation between names. Hence, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” was meant to mean: The words “Hesperus and Phosphorous” have the same sense. And somewhere in the middle of the statement, starting with the words. “But this correlation would hold…,” Frege claims that this view is not right. However, the claim Frege is presenting, in this case, is not apparent. The crucial aspect appears to be Frege’s opinion that the correlation between a name and its holder is subjective or, possibly unoriginal.

Nonetheless, Frege’s primary thought appears to be the argument that “Hesperus” and “Phosphorous” have the same sense is an argument concerning linguistic practice. At the same time, “Hesperus is Phosphorus” is meant to denote celestial bodies. Therefore, the identity view of the name gets the subject-matter of such sentences wrong.

At that juncture, Frege, shifts without explicit declaration, into developing his own opinion. He states that the small variance of shape between “Phosphorous” and “Hesperus” cannot be what explains the disparity in their cognitive values. Instead, there is a distinction between the cognitive benefits only if there exists a distinction in the “presentation mode,” which Frege demonstrates through the use of an example in geometry. Subsequently, Frege asserts that each name has a meaning that contains a presentation mode that is linked to the title. However, many critics argue that the sense is the presentation mode. Therefore, the consequence is that given that “Hesperus is Hesperus” and “Hesperus is Phosphorous” have different cognitive values is illustrated by the fact that the two names have various senses.

The puzzle that is found in this case is not fundamentally about identity. Consequently, the two statements “Hesperus is a planet” and “Phosphorous is a planet” also have different cognitive values. Additionally, Frege posits that this distinction in cognitive values is demonstrated by the fact that the two names have differing senses. However, Frege fails to indicate this extension of the point.

Reference

Frege illustrates the distinction between sense and reference of a whole sentence and not just a name or word. Moreover, Frege declares that a declarative sentence has a thought that represents a particular objective content, which can be the common property of numerous scholars. However, Frege asserts that the idea that is contained in a sentence is not its reference. Subsequently, he deduces that the thought has to be the sense of the sentence and continues by asserting that the reference of a sentence is just its value of truth. In this case, we should think through the details of this claim, but I believe Frege’s argument is logical in personality. Consequently, from the illustration, the basis of this argument lies in the role of the connectives between truth and functions of the formal logic.

The analysis of how language interrelates with the world is known as theories of reference. Frege was a believer of a mediated theory of reference where he categorized the semantic components of each expression, such as sentence, into two parts: sense and reference. As discussed earlier, the sense of a sentence refers to the thought that such a sentence articulates. Consequently, such an idea is objective, universal, and abstract. Therefore, the sense of any particular sub sentential expression entails in its influence on the general thought expressed in the embedded sentence.

Additionally, a sense determines a reference as well as the presentation mode of the object to which the expression mentions. Thus, a referent is an object in the world that words or names choose. Therefore, the sense of a sentence is its thought, whereas its referent is its value of truth. Also, the referent of a sentence that is rooted in propositional attitude attributions and other unclear perspectives are the common senses.

Bertrand Russell, in his epistemology’s theory of acquaintance, emphasized that the only expressions that are directly referential are the “logically proper names.” And “logically proper names” comprise of phrases such as “I,” “now,” “here,” as well as other indexical terms (Stanley, 2006). Stanley observed proper names of the ones defined above as “abbreviated definite descriptions.” For instance, Barack H. Obama may be an abbreviation for “the 44^th President of the United States of America and husband of Michelle Obama.” Russell, in his work, “On Denoting.” (1905), underscores that definite descriptions refer to denoting phrases scrutinized into existentially enumerated logical compositions.  The denoting phrases symbolize in the sense that there is an object that gratifies the narrative. Nonetheless, such purposes cannot be deemed meaningful on their own. Instead, they have sense only in the propositions that are articulated by the sentences of which they are part o. Thus, such objects are not as directly referential as logically proper names (Russell, 1905).

Frege clarifies that any denoting statement has a reference and a sense. Therefore, such mediated reference views have specific theoretical significance over other aspects. For instance, two referential names, like John Willice and Samuel Jackson, cause challenges for a directly referential perspective since a person can hear “Samual Jackson is John Willice” and, therefore, the cognitive contents of these co-referential names are distinctive. Regardless of the variation between Russell and Frege’s perspectives, they are usually grouped as unobstructed views concerning proper names. However, this description was criticized by Saul Krinke in his work Naming and Necessity (1972).

Kripke (1972) proposed the concept of the argument from rigidity, which is also known as the modal argument. When we consider the name Aristotle and his narratives, such as; “Plato’s greatest student,” “the founder of logic,” and “Alexander’s teacher.” Aristotle meets all these narratives and others that are typically linked to him. However, it is not substantially accurate to state that supposes Aristotle was present; therefore, Aristotle could have been any one or all of these narratives. Hence, Aristotle could have been present in the world without doing any of all those achievements he is universally credited for doing. That is to say, Aristotle may have been present but not have been recognized generations globally to come, or he may have died in the early stages of his life.

Supposing that Aristotle is linked to Mary with the narrative, “the last greatest philosopher of antiquity” and the real Aristotle died in infancy. Additionally, Mary’s narrative would have appeared to describe Plato. However, this aspect is counterintuitive. Thus, according to Kripke (1972), the names are “rigid designators” since they represent the same person in every probable world in which that particular person is present. Furthermore, Kripke expresses other numerous opinions against the descriptions of Frege and Russell through his causal theory of references.

Frege’s Propositions about Sense concerning Reference

Frege outlines several themes that summarize the distinctions between sense and reference in his work. But before describing the distinction, it is vital to appreciate that sense must be “distinguished from the related concept,” through the utilization of something like a mental image. Therefore, determine if a sense is subjective is critical in this case.

1. The sense of a name is a linguistic attribute of that name, and any individual who comprehends the name has to know.
2. Names that possess the same sense have to maintain the same reference, but names with similar references may possess different senses.

• There is a possibility of a given name to possess a sense without possessing a reference.

1. Generally, when individuals use a name, they use it to talk about its reference.
2. On the other hand, when an individual uses words in “indirect speech,” the individual uses the words to speak about their sense. Therefore, suppose a person says, “John said that superman could fly,” therefore, an individual is speaking about the sense of John’s comments, as is clear that there are two issues in this statement: John believes that Superman can fly and Superman can fly. In the sentence, “John believes Superman can fly,” the speaker is saying that the sense of the name Superman determines John’s belief since John believes that Superman can fly.

Conclusion

Gottlob Frege’s seminal work On Sense and Reference illustrates the distinction between sense/meaning and reference. While uses the term sense, other scholars such as Putnam use the term meaning in place of Frege’s thought. Simply put, the difference between meaning and reference is well articulated in this discussion: sense/meaning represents the intention of the word, name, or symbolic representation of an object; on the other hand, reference is the thing to which the purpose matches in the world. Additionally, the reference is the object to which one is referring. For example, thinking of a battery as an abstract object, there is the word battery as well as the symbol for an assault. However, there is also the physical battery as an object, which represents an extension. Therefore, what matters is what a sentence means and the way of indicating it. Moreover, the symbol and the reference to refer to it present a new parallel between continental and analytic philosophy, which subsequently is Frege’s variation between reference and sense. Additionally, the distinction is recognized in semiotics as the variation between signified and the signifier.

References

Antoniou, G. and Slaney, J. (Eds.). (1998). Advanced Topics in Artificial Intelligence, Springer, p. 9.

Dummett, M. (1991). The Logical Basis of Metaphysics. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 88-15-05669-6.

Frege, G. (1892). “On Sense and Reference”. In Frege: Senso, Funzione e Concetto. Eds. Eva Picardi and Carlo Penco. Bari: Editori Laterza. 2001. ISBN 88-420-6347-9.

Kripke, S. (1972). Naming and Necessity. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. First published in Semantics of Natural Languages. Edited by Donald Davidson and Gilbert Harman. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.

Putnam, H. (1973). Meaning and Reference. The Journal of Philosophy, 70(19), 699-711. Doi: 10.2307/2025079.

Russell, B. (1905). “On Denoting.” Mind 14: 479-93.

Sikander, J. (2010). Frege: The Theory of Meaning Concerning Proper Names. Kritik: an Online Journal of Philosophy. 4. 10.3860/krit.v4i1.1841.

Stanley, J. (2006). Philosophy of Language in the Twentieth Century Archived 2006-04-24 at the Wayback Machine. Forthcoming in the Routledge Guide to Twentieth-Century Philosophy.

Wittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical Investigations. Third edition. Trans. G. E. M. Anscombe. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co.