International Militarized Conflict
Disputes between states arise as a result of conflicting interests and different norms. Democratic governance influences the high probability of resolving interstate militarized conflicts through compromise. Democracy fosters economic development and consequently brings satisfaction to the status quo. Therefore, democratic nations are economically developed, and security is prioritized over violence and conflicts. On the other hand, non –democratic states are more interested in using force to acquire political power and win political competitions. Thus, two democratic nations with similar interests of maintaining peace and preventing conflict behavior are more likely to resolve militarized conflicts between them more comfortable than others.
In autocratic regimes, political leaders prefer imposing decisions rather than compromising when dealing with opposition. The political leaders in authoritarian societies socialize in a competing environment for governance power (Boulding, 1990). Losing a political battle means loss of political power and exclusion from the political competition in the future. Non- democratic nations, therefore, encourage coercion and conflicts as a means of resolving disputes at the expense of the nation’s peace. Non- democratic regimes are likely to engage in intense battles with both other non- democratic nations and democratic ones because they always perceive political competition (Sayrs,1990). Democratic leaders exercise peaceful practices if they expect the other party they are dealing with will also do the same. Meaning if two democratic states are involved in a militarized conflict, their shared social identity will facilitate resolution.
However, the counterargument is that interstate relations status cannot be explained by economic development. World politics are bigger than the financial stability of a state. During interstate disputes, the like hood of a nation deciding to compromise because of its economic status is very minimal. Mostly states shun away from violence after considering the political benefit they will gain from the action. Even in democratic regimes, political leaders serve their political interests before the nations. Most of the times to achieve desired political benefits, influence leaders to use violence and power (Bonta,1996). In conclusion, democratic societies engage in conflict behavior as well, especially if the conflict will benefit the nation politically. Hence, the claim that the economic development impacts in states the high probability of avoiding conflicts can be argued as weak.
On the contrary, the claim that shared social and political identity ease and resolves conflicts is valid. The shared sense of identity is responsible for reducing threat perceptions that may arise between states. According to Mintz and Geva 1990, shared norms and experiences lessen the perception of intersubjective threat. Democracies have similar political systems and political actions taken the result to the same repercussions. Any decisions to use political force involves consideration of the internal consequences a political leader can face for it (Gleditsch,1992). Therefore, two states with related governmental procedures negotiate peacefully and smoothly. The faster negotiation is because they are aware of the costs of their political decisions are similar. The peace practice by democracies is a demonstration of the benefits of shared norms and social identity. An increase in democratic governance can decrease international militarized conflicts.
Reference
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