Miranda warnings are given to suspected offenders to preserve their statements’ admissibility in the subsequent criminal trials. In Hand’s case, he was legally entitled to the warnings since he was being held in a custody-like situation. Still, since his interrogation was meant to produce intelligence information rather than evidence, his rights could be considered waived. Dershowitz (2008) argues that since the events of 9/11, the US has morphed into a preventive state. He further claims that several court decisions have allowed police to use even torturous means to extract information if that information can be used to prevent crime, especially terrorist attacks.
Hand’s case is different from Johnson versus Stephen 2015, where, after expressing the intention to remain silent until a counsel is available, the suspect continued to reveal the facts of the case to the police without being prompted to do so. In that case, the suspect is presumed to have waived any rights they may have invoked earlier (Minhas, 2016). While Johnson willingly reinitiated communication with the police, Hand spoke under the pressure of shotguns pointing at his head.
The Fifth Amendment accords every ‘person’ equal protection against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court in Malloy vs. Hogan determined that the Fifth Amendment guarantees protection against infringement of the right to remain silent without suffering a penalty. That right is implied from the privilege against self-incrimination (Oakley, 2015). In the US vs. Wong Kim Ark (1898), the Supreme Court ruled that the term ‘person’ in the wording of the law also applies to aliens living in the US (Thomas, 1998). Although Hand was a non-citizen, he was still entitled to the protection of the law since he resided in the US. Therefore, the question of Hand’s citizenship did not affect his right to silence.
Hand’s interrogation can be considered custodial. Custodial questioning refers to a case where a suspect linked to a crime is interrogated while their freedom of movement is restrained, even if they are not in legal custody. Several officers accosted hand with shotguns in his bedroom. The situation restrained his freedom of movement and qualified as custody under law. It is therefore conclusive that he was interrogated in custody.
Jaxon’s interrogation is also custodial. McFadden questions Jaxon after arresting him and restraining his movement significantly. The Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Arizona (1966) defined custodial interrogation as when the suspect is taken to custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. McFadden warns Jaxon about his family while the suspect is detained in the car. Therefore his statement qualifies as custodial.
Meanwhile, Hand’s statement cannot be used as evidence against him due to the provisions of the Fifth Amendment. He is under compulsion to speak and can use that as a ground to invalidate his statement. The Fifth Amendment offers protection against self-incrimination. Hand would invoke that article to suppress his self-incriminating speech. Moreover, during his arrest, the officers failed to read the Miranda warning to him, meaning he can pursue possible infringement of his rights.
Jaxon may not enjoy a similar advantage as his Miranda rights were read to him before he gave information about the bomb. Therefore, his chances of escaping prosecution based on his self-incrimination pale in comparison to Hand’s. Although both suspects were under considerable coercion, Hand’s situation was significantly worse. The Fifth Amendment provisions may still give him a chance of suppressing his statements. In Doyle vs. Ohio, the court recognized that people facing arrest might not feel free remaining silent if the silence can be used to impeach them. Jaxon may suppress his statement by making a similar argument.
Jaxon can testify against Hand. The British judicial system, for example, classifies the use of accomplice evidence as a ‘necessary evil.’ However, in cases of serious crimes like drug trafficking and terrorism, accomplice evidence is used in exchange for immunity from prosecution (Jackson, 2016). Section 133 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 states that “an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person and a conviction is not illegal merely because it proceeds upon the uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice.” Bibave (2020) contends that accomplices are competent witnesses, but their testimony is scrutinized since they may have the motive to shift guilt from themselves. Based on Bibave’s argument, Jaxon is competent to testify against Hand.
Miranda warnings advise the accused persons of the importance of remaining silent before prosecution. However, in some urgent, critical situations, law enforcers may bypass the reading of such warnings to save the situation. Terrorism threat is one such moments. The question of evidence admissibility depends on several factors, including the credibility and competence of the individual. Accomplices pass the credibility test since they have first-hand knowledge of the crime. Moreover, they are declared competent to testify despite their interest in shifting the guilt away. In the Hand case study, Jaxon can testify because, as an accomplice, he has information that can lead police to unravel the plot.
References
Bibave, R. (2020). Witnesses.
Thomas, B. (1998). China Men, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, and the Question of Citizenship. American Quarterly, 50(4), 689-717.
Dershowitz, A. M. (2008). Is There a Right to Remain Silent?: Coercive Interrogation and the Fifth Amendment After 9/11. Oxford University Press.
Jackson, M. I. (2016). Integrity, immunity, and accomplice witness testimony. The Integrity of Criminal Process: From Theory into Practice.
Minhas, H. M., & Westphal, A. (2016). Competency to Waive Fifth Amendment Rights During Custodial Interview. Journal of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law Online, 44(1), 122-124.
Oakley, C. (2015). You Might Have the Right to Remain Silent: An Erosion of the Fifth Amendment with the Use of Pre-Arrest Silence. Creighton L. Rev., 49, 589.
Chakraborty, S. (2019). A Short Comment on Evidentiary Value of “Accomplice” in the Light of Procedural Laws in India. National Journal of Criminal Law, 2(1), 22-25.