PHIL 160: Philosophy of G. E. M. Anscombe
Spring Term, 2019
Study Questions: Final Examination
The final examination for PHIL 160 will consist in three short essays—each of approximately 500–650 words (or 2–2½ double-spaced pages in 12-point type)—chosen by lot from among the eight topics given below. Answer directly and assertively; eschew introductory matter; do not quote the text extensively, but cite the text in support of your accounts. The proposed topics occur below in no particular order (as should be apparent upon perusal), and they are (intentionally) designed to be addressed individually and independently one from the others.
The three questions that will constitute the Final Examination will be drawn by lot at the designated Final Examination period for this class: Monday, May 22, 1:00PM, at Dante Hall, Rm. 214. Completed examinations should be returned via e-mail only, and as MSWord attachments only, to <<scortrig@stmarys-ca.edu>> no later than 5:00PM, Thursday, May 25, 2019.
I.
Distinguish between intentional action, intention with which an action is done, and expression of intention for the future [these expressions are taken from Intention §50, p. 90; all are used passim[1] in the work]. Illustrate with examples.
II.
At Intention §19 (p. 28) Anscombe writes:
We do not add anything attaching to the action at the time it is done by describing it as intentional. To call it intentional is to assign it to the class of intentional actions and so to indicate that we should consider the question ‘Why?’ relevant to it in the sense I have described. For the moment, I will not ask why this question ‘Why?’ should be applicable to some events and not to others [emphasis added].
Much later, at Intention §46 (p. 83), she writes:
So the description of something as a human action could not occur prior to the existence of the question ‘Why?’, simply as a kind of utterance by which we were then obscurely propmpted to address the question. This was why I did not attempt in §19 to say why certain things should be subject to this question [emphases original].
Explicate and evaluate Anscombe’s ‘redemption’ of her §19 ‘IOU’ at §46: how exactly does she justify here having deferred what seemed a natural and urgent question? is her justification satisfactory [e.g., how would you answer a critic’s claim that there’s something suspiciously circular in Anscombe’s account: her proposed criterion of ‘human action’ (= intentional action?) presupposes the class distinction for which it is taken].
III.
With particular reference to Intention §27: Is there ever a place for an interior act of intention? Explain yourself, that is, give both your view and its relation to Anscombe’s account [e.g., Why is this question urgent (for Anscombe or in itself or both)?].
IV.
At Intention §12 (p. 18f.), Anscombe notes:
In philosophy a distinction has sometimes been drawn between our motives and our intentions in acting as if they were quite different things.[2] [According to this distinction] [a] man’s intention is what he aims at or chooses; his motive is what determines the aim or choice; and I suppose that ‘determines’ must here be another word for ‘causes’.
Explain Anscombe’s treatment of the (putative) strongly-drawn distinction between ‘intention’ and ‘motive,’ with special attention to Intention §§12–13.
V.
At Intention, §§28–29, in the course of looking “more closely into the formula which has so constantly occurred in this investigation: ‘known without observation’” [§28, p. 29], Anscombe asks [as it appears, non-rhetorically] in connection with the act of “opening the window”:
What can opening the window be except making such-and-such movements with such-and-such a result? And in that case what can knowing one is opening the window be except knowing that that is taking place? Now, if there are two[3]
ways of knowing here, one of which I call knowedge of one’s intentional action and the other of which I call klnowledge by observation of what takes place, then must there not be two objects of knowledge? How can one speak of two different knowledges of exactly the same thing? [emphases original].
Explain how Anscombe resolves these questions, and evaluate her resolution(s).
VI.
At Intention, §32 (p. 57), Anscombe asks (perhaps rhetorically): “Can it be that there is something modern philosophy has blankly misunderstood: namely what ancient and medieval philosophers understood by practical knowledge?” Explicate Anscombe’s notion of practical knowledge in light (as she would insist is necessary) of her account of practical reasoning.
VII.
Although Anscombe does not often coin terms of art, one such would seem to be ‘desirability criterion’ (cf., e.g., Intention, §37, pp. 71–72). Characterize Anscombe’s use of this term and its role in Anscombe’s account of practical reasoning and practical knowledge.
VIII.
Explain in detail the following assertion and its more important implications (Intention §47, p. 85):
[W]e can speak of the form of description ‘intentional actions’, and of the descriptions which can occur in this form, and note that some are and some are not dependent on the existence of this form for their own sense.
[1] Latin: “here and there,” that is, at whiles throughout the text.
[2] For comparison to the assignment’s guideline, the text here reaches 500 words.
[3] For comparison to the assignment’s guideline, the text here reaches 650 words.