Secret Protection
Throughout the operation, secrecy was a significant policy that was followed by the senior officials in the Soviet. The first Russian delegation to propose the plan to Fidel Castrol and other Cuban leaders was laced by secrecy. When the officials arrive in Havana, there was a little celebration, and agricultural experts received them. The persons involved in the visit included several missile construction specialists whose main task was to determine the probability of deploying the missile secretly. The ambassador at that time insisted one of the generals must meet with the president, and it took only three hours for the Cuban government to be on board with the operation. The maritime policy of the Soviets began to shift gradually after the trip. The USSR started to use western ships to transport general cargo from the Soviet Union to Cuba. The Soviets used their boats to carry military-related load. Officers and specialists were dispatched gradually under the disguise of irrigation and agricultural specialists and machine operators. The officers had to consult with a few genuine officials to acquire basic knowledge of their assigned cover stories.
Havana later announced that the USSR and Cuba had signed an agreement that involved the establishment of a Moscow-Havana civil air route. The United States speculated that the new way was used to transport Soviet military officers and sensitive electronic and signal-monitoring equipment to Cuba.
The military officials and the equipment being transported for Cuba was assembled, loaded, and transported during the night. The persons and items were transported via railway to Cuba, and they were heavily guarded. Information concerning the routes and destination of the trains remained confidential, and those in convoy were not allowed to send any mail or telegram.
The secret was further protected by having the shipment leave from eight different ports where four were in the north and the other four on the Black sea. Russia tended to close ports during the loading of munitions. During the operation, the posts being used for shipment were closed and could not be accessed by any unauthorized persons. The missiles were loaded on ships under tight security, and it would only occur during the night. The loading of each ship took two to three days, where the troops involved were housed in military facilities that were near the ports. Everyone involved in this part of the operation was not allowed to leave the area or communicate with outsiders. They were, therefore, not allowed to make any phone calls, write letters or telegrams. The ship and crew members were forbidden shore leave and correspondence. Messages that needed to be relayed to the defense ministry from the ports were only transported through couriers to ensure the confidentiality of the process.
Maskirovka measures were applied onboard the ships. Individual shipping containers were concealed, and protected weapons carried as deck cargo. Some of the equipment was disguised to look like the ship’s superstructure. The field kitchens on deck were also disguised, while missiles and launchers were shielded with the use of metal sheets to prevent infrared photography. Combat and specialized equipment were stored out of sight. The operation was then disguised by the placement of ordinary automobiles, trucks, tractors, and harvesters at the top deck. The motors created the illusion that the ships were being used to transports agricultural equipment and civilians.
Captains of the ships were not informed about their destination. The captain and the troop were handed a large sealed envelope. Within the contents of the envelope was a smaller one, which was only to be opened at precise coordinates within the Atlantic Ocean. At the set coordinates a KBG’s special department officer joined them to open the envelope. The crew was then instructed to travel to a Cuban port and inform the ship’s company about the destination. They were then required to destroy the contents of the envelope after they understood the instructions.
In each ship involved in the ANADYR operation, there were thick folders that contained background information on different countries. Officers in the ministry of defense prepared the envelopes, and the countries involved had good relations with the USSR. The report involving Cuba was among the folders, but the compilers would not pinpoint the real focus of the mission.
The Russian ships made false declarations where they exited the ports. The tonnage declared was below the weight being carried, and the cargo records were also altered. All the ships claimed to have originated from Odessa despite being loaded at other ports. Their destinations were listed as Conakry, Guinea. Some of the vessels did not provide information on their destinations and would only state that they were awaiting orders. The cargo in most of the ship was loaded as general cargo.
The ships, however, encountered various challenges in transit primarily through the Bosporus and Dardanelles. The soldiers were kept below deck, and the captains were ordered to prevent any individual from loading. The ships even prevented the pilots who guided civilian vessels in these areas from boarding their ships by presenting them with gifts. The captains had clear instructions to employ all evasive actions in case of an attack or an effort to board their boat. Besides, they had clear instructions to destroy all documents with state and military secrets, protect the personnel and sink the ships in case the evasive actions failed. Also, in case of a mechanical failure the captains were to explain they were exporting automobiles to anyone who offered to help.
Additionally, Russia sorted to employ diplomatic measures to reduce the surveillance of the ships by the US. The country described the US reconnaissance in international waters as harassment and requested the missions to be stopped to improve bilateral relations. The request was a diplomatic measure that was aimed at creating an impression of the need for good relations. However, the real mission was delaying the discovery of the ANADYR operation for as long as possible.
Secrecy throughout the voyage was enhanced. The troops were kept below deck and were only allowed a few minutes to exercise and get fresh air during the night. Food was issued twice a day and only in darkness, and the air circulation in the lower decks was little since heavy tarpaulins covered the hatches. Despite the conditions being unfavorable for the troops, the deception was successful. The US did not discover the real significance of the increased Russian shipping to Cuba or the existence of the mission. Despite the speculation of the changes, the US was unable to understand the true mission of the Soviet in Cuba. Most of the troops had already been transported into Cuba and deployed to their assigned positions before the speculations began.
The secret protection involved both the application of denial and deception strategies. The method was successful since the US did not collect enough intelligence concerning the information. The various processes employed by both the Russians and Cuba helped ensure the transit of the troops and equipment was successful. The equipment and troops were transported during the night, and access to the loading areas was restricted. Denial was achieved through restricting communication methods and the delivery of information to even the captains of the ships. The evasion strategies were applied to ensure that foreigners could not gather information for the voyages. The mission was well protected such that the captains were instructed to sink the ships and destroy any confidential information in case evasive methods failed. The deception was also successful where the troops were provided with false identities and occupations, which were consistent with the information being provided by the Soviet to the press.
Facilitating Movements in the Field
When the Soviet troops arrive in Cuba, Cuban officials took measures to support the D&D strategies being employed by Russia. Cuba exerted controls over the movement of foreigners, news reports, and foreign embassy personnel where they were not permitted to travel outside Havana. Foreigners were surveilled and harassed by Cuban agents. Even before the ships approached Cuban ports, further measures had been put in place. Local inhabitants within a mile from the waterfront had been evacuated from their homes. A larger cider block wall was constructed around the unloading area, and all Cubans, even those in the military, were barred from accessing the port areas. The KBG officers kept watching on the decks when the ships lay in port.
The deception activities and strict security measures during transit prevented US intelligence from collecting substantial information about the ANADYR mission. The plan effective, and by late October 1962, the number of Soviet troops in Cuba was 41,900, which was quadruple the estimated size by the US intelligence agencies.
Throughout the process of transit and the loading and unloading of the numerous ships, Moscow radio provided an almost convincing cover story. The broadcast claimed that the USSR was only providing machine tools, wheat and agricultural machinery in addition to fertilizer to Cuba. The story was in sync with the cover identities of the troop officials and the unloading activities taking place during the day at the ports.
As expected, the D&D strategies were not entirely confidential, and the US received reports from various sources indicating the existence of Russian troops in Havana and endless convoys along the main highways of Cuba. The information also included information on the many Russian young men who had been observed to be sightseeing in the Cuban capital. Despite the measures taken by the Soviet and Cuba to secretly move the cargoes away from the port under keep gawkers away, the chatty Cubans provided a steady stream of clues to US spies.
The Soviets and Cubans, however, countered the occurrences through a significant campaign that employed HUMINT channels to bolster the overall deception. The planners leaked accurate information concerning the operation to mask it. The news was passed through counterrevolutionary organizations and the press in the US. The US then discounted the info since the sources were considered not credible. The strategy was hugely successful and supported the operation. The Cuban intelligence intercepted about 17,000 letters, which contained information about the deployment of the Soviet troops and missiles in Cuba. They later permitted the letters to arrive in Miami as part of the deception campaign, and as expected, the CIA did not pay attention to the messages. The overwhelming level of false information to the US intelligence analysts worked in favor of the Cubans and the Soviets. Some of the sources of information offered incorrect information that was laughable, which further confused the US officials. The accounts on the troops included far-fetched tales, including Africans, Mongolians, and Chinese soldiers, and these followed erroneous reports of the Soviet military equipment. These reports created doubts concerning the credibility of sources, which made it easier for the US intelligence to dismiss the stories of the Soviet Missiles.
The missiles were covered in canvas and transported in night convoys under tight security from the ports to the interior of the Island. The troops disembarked dressed as civilians, and the Soviet personnel who acted as the escorts were required to be covered in Cuban military uniforms and issue all instruction using Spanish. The Soviet army officials were forbidden to mention their military destination or the ranks of their commanders, and they were dressed in civilian clothing. All forms of communication between the field units and the Soviet Military headquarters had to be made in person. Brief hookups and equipment tests were permitted over the radio, but the Russian troops maintained complete radio silence to mask their identity, location, and troop strength from the US intelligence.
The strategy was successful that the operation remained confidential for a full month after the missiles arrived in Cuba. The missile carriers were too big to stay unnoticed for long since they left a trail of dropped telephone poles. On a few occasions, a shack had to be moved or knocked down for the missile carriers to turn a tight corner, and the persons who witnessed these happenings were bound to leak the information. However, the Russian and Cubans worked together to discredit the anecdotal informational, which was successful in keeping the operation secret.
The spokespersons from the soviet ensured they continued providing a steady flow of denial and disinformation. The Ambassador of Russia in the US at the time assured Robert Kennedy that Khrushchev had promised that there would be no surface-to-surface missiles or offensive weapons placed in Cuba. He also confirmed that the Russian military buildup was not significant. The ambassador later assured that the Russian military assistance to Cuba was just defensive and was not a representation of a threat to the security of the United States. He further assured the United Nations that the USSR was only supplying defensive weapons to Cuba. The Soviets later announced that the USSR did not need or intend to introduce offensive nuclear weapons into Cuba.
As a method to further strengthen the strategy, Khrushchev embarked on a barnstorming tour in Turkmen and Uzbek. The trip was high profile and placed great emphasis on agricultural themes. During this time, the president did not give any indications or references that showed aggression to the United States. The entire operation was painted to be aimed at contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba and contribute to its development as a peaceful economy.
Facilitating movement in the field was the most challenging task for the Russian since the missiles and nuclear weapons were plentiful, and transporting them within Cuba was a challenge that left a trail of evidence. Both governments employed D&D strategies through the use of both false and accurate information concerning the mission. The information offered by the locals was mainly exaggerated, which was challenging for the US intelligence, and the confusion caused helped ensure their mission was successful for well over a month since the missiles docked into Cuba.
Conclusion
The D&D strategy applied by the Russian was comprehensive, but it was also coupled with various shortcomings. The overly optimistic assessments given by the soviet were entirely accurate, and the initial stages of the operation were successful. Many of the deficiencies occurred in Cuba and not in the USSR. The challenge was in unloading and transporting the weapons to the field in Cuba. The operation was quite successful in Cuba due to the presence of a D&D specialist in all Russian troops. The ANADYR operation in Cuba can be termed as a near-total intelligence surprise since it was well organized for spies to collect substantial information for analysis of the threat in its early stages.
D&D is beneficial in providing an element of surprise, which harms intelligence. Deception and denial providers a team with a strategic blow, which increases their chances of success, such as the Soviet Union, in this case. Intelligent assessments may fail to decipher the real purpose of a mission based on the information provided and withheld by the strategy. The soviet union was successful in ensuring the United States intelligence did not collect substantial evidence through providing them with a lot of information, which was a mixture of both false and relevant information. D&D causes confusion during intelligence assessment since the information provided is misrepresented and therefore offers the element of surprise. D&D is, however, an effective strategy for survival, especially in military operations, and can be supported by intelligence assessment to ensure operation in successful. Despite the efforts made by the soviet in the ANADYR operation to conceal their activities, conditions in Cuba were unfavorable. The vegetation in the forests of Cuba is scarse and was therefore not adequate to cover the size of the equipment, which led to an aerial photograph that aided the discovery of the operation. The D&D strategy influenced the intelligence assessment conducted by the US, and without the photos, Moscow would have been successful in the process. Therefore, the D&D policy negatively affects the intelligence operations by making it difficult for intelligence teams to collect the correct information concerning the operation and use it to their advantage.