Standards of Proof
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Introduction
For a defendant to be convicted or declared guilty, the Justice Systems have to measure the quality of the evidence presented before them in the court of law against certain standards. These standards of proof play a critical role in guiding truth finders on the verdicts to make in each case that is presented in their courtrooms. Currently, there are two common types of standards of proof; beyond reasonable doubt and preponderance of evidence. Truth finders apply each of these standards of proof depending on the nature of the case presented before them, that is, is it a civil case or a criminal case.
Definitions and Interpretation
The phrase, beyond a reasonable doubt is familiar in criminal matters. This is the proof or the standard that is required to implicate the defendant in criminal cases. “Beyond a reasonable doubt” is the highest standard level of proof that one truly committed the said crime. Prosecutors and the plaintiff have to work and find the standard proof that will support their case. The standard proof would, in turn, convince the juries and judges that there is “no doubt” that something is true. Teichman (2017) asserts that a “reasonable” doubt is that one that can argue with facts and not mere speculations. Merely possible doubts do not prevent the truth finders from making guilty verdicts against the defendants. The consequences for defendants proved to be guilty “beyond reasonable doubts” are usually more severe than the consequences for people found guilty in civil cases.
The US Federal Jury Practice and Instruction describes “preponderance of the evidence” as proof that shows “something is more likely so than not so”. This involves comparing two opposing types of evidence; those arguing that something is so, and those arguing that something is not so. The juries and judges are then left to decide the verdict of such cases using the more convincing force to their minds that proves that the thing “sought to be proved more likely to be true than not to be true.” (Estabrooks 2015). This implies that the prosecutors and the plaintiffs don’t need to prove with absolute certainty that the defendants are guilty of the charges labelled against them. This is so because it is rarely possible to find evidence that will prove with absolute certainty that of truly committed the crime. This is common in civil cases where the consequences for defendants proved to be guilty are relatively less severe compared to those in criminal cases.
History
Legal scholars and historians have attempted to trace the origin of standards of proof. Currently, there is a virtual consensus amongst them that first recorded standard of proof was beyond reasonable doubt was from American Colonies in the eighteenth century. Even so, there is no uniformity among the legal scholars and histories. For instance, some, such as Langbein John argue that the reasonable doubt standard originated from England in the mid-1780s. Professor Whiteman James asserts that the standards of proof emerged in the seventeenth century to enhance “moral certainty.” During that time, beyond reasonable doubt was instituted for the “souls of the jurors” rather than the protection of criminal accused (Schweizer 2016).
Current Situation and Future Prediction
In the case Miller v. Minister of Pensions, Lord Denning contends that the civil “balance of probabilities” occurs when the evidence presented in a trial before juries and judges is in such a way that the juries and judges can unanimously contend that they truly think that it is more probable than not that the defendant committed the said charges. This is when the defendant is declared guilty. Lord Denning added that in cases where the probabilities are equal, then the jury and judges must settle on not (Coyne & Bell 2015). Also, in case the truth finders, juries and judges, tend to find the plaintiff’s arguments to be truer than those of the defendant, even in the slightest degree, they can rule in favor of the plaintiff unlike in criminal cases. In criminal cases, the truth finders ought to be convinced “beyond any reasonable doubt” that the facts said by prosecutors and plaintiffs against the defendants are indeed true.
For centuries, hard facts and reference to the state of mind of juries and judges have been used in arriving at verdicts against defendants in criminal cases. For the truth finders to rule that the defendants are guilty, they have to be convinced “beyond any reasonable doubt” that indeed the defendants are guilty as charged (Rehaag 2017). On the hand, probabilities and references to evidence have been used as standards of proof in civil cases to determine whether the defendants are guilty of charges labelled against them or not (Coyne & Bell 2015). Additionally, in the civil cases, the beliefs or the state of minds of the truth finder also sides with probabilities and references to evidence in deciding the verdicts of the defendants. Schweizer (2016) argues that this is so because “Whatever the jury or judges’ mind believes is sought to be proved is more likely to be true than not true.” Unlike in civil cases where the degree of belief required to contend that the defendants are guilty is lighter, in criminal cases, the prosecutors bear heavy burdens of proving “beyond any reasonable doubt” that the indeed what is sought to be proved is true.
Considering that it is graver mistake to convict an innocent person than acquitting a guilty person wrongly, normative decision theory has long been suggested to help truth finders to minimize the expected costs of errors. The normative theory provides elegant explanations to truth finders on different standards of proof. That is, in case the standards of proof in criminal cases are a hundred percent that the defendants committed the charges labelled against them. On the other hand, the truth finders have to be 51 percent and above that the accused is committed the charges labelled against them (Coyne & Bell 2015). With this, I predict that these standards of proof will continue to hold water in humanity forever. These standards have been applied for a while now and will forever continue being used as standards of proof.
Conclusion
In criminal cases, for one to be convicted of the allegations labelled against them, the prosecutors and the plaintiff should prove to the truth finders that the accessed or the defendants are guilty beyond any reasonable doubts. Reasonable doubts are the traditional set of standards in criminal cases for one to be considered guilty of the charges against them. The pieces of evidence presented in courtrooms before the truth finders must establish that indeed the accused committed the allegations for them to be pronounced guilty. In civil cases, the standards of proof are relatively lower than in criminal cases, “preponderance of proof.” In such cases, the plaintiff is mandated to file complaints and state the facts on why he or she is suing the defendant. The plaintiff is required to give his or her submission of the legal grounds under which he or she is suing the defendant. The burden of proof for the plaintiff is to convince the jury and judges that they have stable legal grounds and hard facts that they need to prove the defendant is guilty of the allegations labelled against them.
References
Coyne, J., & Bell, P. (2015). International Case Study 1: Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC). In The Role of Strategic Intelligence in Law Enforcement: Policing Transnational Organized Crime in Canada, the United Kingdom and Australia (pp. 38-56). Palgrave Pivot, London.
Estabrooks, M. S. (2015). Criminal Appeals in the Supreme Court of Canada and Federal Criminal Law Amendments. Crim. LQ, 62, 4.
Rehaag, S. (2017). I Simply Do Not Believe A Case Study of Credibility Determinations in Canadian Refugee Adjudication. Windsor Rev. Legal & Soc. Issues, 38, 38.
Schweizer, M. (2016). The civil standard of proof—what is it, actually? The International Journal of Evidence & Proof, 20(3), 217-234.
Teichman, D. (2017). Convicting with Reasonable Doubt: An Evidentiary Theory of Criminal Law. Notre Dame L. Rev., 93, 757.