the ramifications of U.S. peace deal between the Taliban
The United States remains a close Commonwealth ally but has now brought several of the other foreign intelligence agencies into the war against international terrorism. The U.S. was forced to establish ties with the Middle East and Central Asia, and also formed odd alliances with the start of military actions against Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. After almost 20 years of fighting, the U.S. and the Taliban signed a major peace deal that could lead to American forces leaving Afghanistan within 14 months. The Agreement paves the way for negotiations among Afghans to end one of the world’s most longstanding conflicts. The Taliban agreed to cut relations with Al-Qaeda and other foreign militant groups and to hold peace talks with other Afghans, including a government that they have repeatedly condemned as a American marionette. In addition, a phased withdrawal of troops will begin in Washington. This paper addresses the ramifications of U.S. peace deal between the Taliban.
The Agreement involves obligations for Both for the U.S. and Taliban. The Taliban first decided to prohibit al-or any other transnational terrorist organization from using Afghan territory. In order to ensure the stability of this situation, Taliban committed to the assurances and compliance procedures. Consequently, the U.S. and its allies agreed to a timetable for all troops to withdraw from Afghanistan. U.S. forces will be reduced to 8,600 within 135 days–nearly the number of troops in Afghanistan when Trump assumes office. There are currently approximately 13,000 U.S. soldiers. The presence of external powers would be proportionately reduced. Then the remaining U.S. and foreign forces will withdraw nine months and a half later if the U.S. assesses the Taliban as living up to its end of the deal.
Advocates believe the US-Taliban Agreement represents Afghanistan’s most potent opportunity for peace. However, critics argue that it marks America’s defeat for the Taliban and that the U.S. homeland has an unreasonable danger. In reality, either the conditions or the course of the potential outcomes in Afghanistan change nothing. The White House is being given a justification for withdrawing U.S. troops from Afghanistan, and move that was opposed nearly every time in the past 19 years by U.S. military forces as well as significant parts of the U.S. national security establishment. Technically, the deal represents one step along the way towards a potential peace agreement for the civil war in Afghanistan. However, the likelihood that the process will be efficient is not affected. With all the insurgency awareness since the 1960s, It is impossible for the war in Afghanistan to end soon.
During this precise moment, the US-Taliban Agreement was achieved because of alignment in Washington of the main forces of domestic politics and world developments. Secondly, with President Trump entering the presidential elections, he hoped that his 2016 campaign would fulfil the promise by ending an unpopular “endless” war, which both he and a broader cross-section of the population would draw from his electoral base.
Secondly, Washington’s involvement in the continuing global war on terror has been diminishing following the fall of the territorial caliphate and the significant successes against Al-Qaeda (AQAP), perhaps the most aggressive branch of the parent organization. The perceived threat of radical Islamic violence, now seen as safer and cheaper handled by “Outsourcing” or drone strikes instead of large and costly occupations, is now dominated by the primary power competition. The terms of the deal reflect patterns under which the U.S. has committed itself to take specific measures. At the same time, the Taliban is assigned the more ambiguous position of the U.S. mission of counter-terrorism under Afghanistan. The Republican Party seems to be at least torn by the US-deal in Washington at the same times. The deal must insure that Afghanistan never once again serves as a base for foreign terrorists but over 20 Republican Congressional representatives have called for guarantees that the administration does not surrender the safety of the American people to the Taliban.
If the Taliban can be trusted to meet U.S. obligations depends not just on their motives but on their capabilities as well. It is true that the Taliban will negotiate in bad faith in order to achieve their goal of restoring Afghanistan as a whole. But even if its leadership is pledging the U.S., there is good cause for questioning whether it will, as numerous experts find the Taliban high-decision-.
The “reduction of aggression” that started the week before the signing of the Agreement is likely to continue as it progresses. It is not a “case fire,” in fact, that stops all struggles but aims to stop major attacks or offensives. The Taliban are undoubtedly aware, as President Trump did in September when U.S./ Taliban peace talks were broken after a Taliban attack killed a U.S. soldier in Kabul, that the death of American citizens could result in a derailing process. However, they could challenge their limits in either case.
The U.S. inability to achieve a definitive victory over the Taliban in Afghanistan after 19 years of struggle in the more comprehensive strategic picture underlines the limits of military power. Even the new systems of arms are only constrained in terms of effectiveness and accomplish excessively aggressive or vague goals. Nonetheless, the consequences of this Agreement for the United States must be defined and depend, in large part, whether it serves as a fig leaf for withdrawing U.S. forces under fire or whether all parties follow the terms of the Agreement.
The former will relate to America’s perception that America is withdrawing from global involvement and accountability among its allies and enemies alike. If the latter is valid, it can accomplish what President Trump called its “realistic” foreign-policy strategy, which uses a more limited definition of protecting the U.S. homeland.
The government of Afghanistan will be under a significant period of pressure to strengthen its current position and negotiate an agreement with the Taliban and other parties because it is unlikely that the United States will base its withdrawal on the results of the intra-negotiation. Regardless of the intra-negotiations, when American troops withdraw, the Taliban will still have an increasing impact in Afghanistan.
The relevance and actual presentation of these ideals, which the United States tried to promote during its occupation of Afghanistan, is expected to diminish given the anti-Taliban stance towards human rights-in particular women’s rights and democracy.
In view of the Taliban’s hostile human rights orientation-particularly women overall, Iran is seen to benefit from the U.S. withdrawal, as the removal from its neighbourhood of the U.S. forces was the main objective of its foreign policy. Moreover, the Agreement supports the assessment by Iran that President Trump seeks to avoid another war in the Middle East.
. Nonetheless, if the Agreement were enforced in the post-Afghanistan destabilizing power jockeys, Iran will have to face several problems, including threats to national security by the emergence of militant Sunni groups hostile to Iran and the influx of Afghan refugees fleeing from instability (except for the three million already living in Iran).
Such problems, although manageable, will emerge at a period of severe crises. Predicted crisis includes the unregulated proliferation of the coronavirus, global economic decline following a reimposition of U.S. nuclear sanctions in 2018, and decreasing government support for the regime, which is evident from low electoral participation in recent elections.
Finally, Israel will do well to recognize the effect on its interests of changes arising from the Agreement between the U.S. and the Taliban. Firstly, Jerusalem should be prepared for this operational climate to alter as the U.S. departs, if rumors from the media about Israel’s use of Afghanistan to gather intelligence from Iran are right. Firstly, in the sense of the Iranian nuclear issue, the precedent laid behind an American ally’s back in Israel by Washington to negotiate Agreement with an enemy in the USA that includes inadequate compliance mechanisms.
But the very signing of the Agreement between the USA and the Taliban could relieve the White House’s pressure to make more deals quickly to demonstrate foreign policy progress before the 2020 elections. Third, and more wide-ranging, the ending of Afghanistan’s war which has deviated many resources from realistic targets gives the U.S. the chance to boost the efficiency of its global strategic policy and to provide Israel with major divisions, despite the national security benefits that Israel derives from U.S. global hegemony.