Anscombe: Intention
II
In intention § 19, Anscombe classifies actions done under intentions to be in the intentional class and therefore, the importance of considering the question “Why?” so an act can only be described as intentional if it’s assigned the level of deliberate actions. In the same intention § 19, the main argument presented by Anscombe is that an action can be intentional under one description but remains unintentional under another explanation. He gives examples that a man in no doubts contracts certain muscles when picking up a hammer, but it is generally false to say that the contraction of the muscles the intentional act he performed. This does not also imply that the contraction of his muscles was unintentional.
Nevertheless, in intention § 46, things seem to have changed in Anscombe. In intention §19, she leaves the question of the reason why the “why?” question is only applicable in some cases but not others. In her redemption later, she discovers that the description of something as perpetrated by a human could not occur before the description of the question “Why?” in intention § 46, she acknowledges many changes and movements without giving any comparable account of them. She mentions that the type of actions and what describes them would not exist if the question “Why?” never existed (Anscombe, 83). Additionally, she asserts that certain things, such as the movement of the human body or the molecules, are for some undiscovered reasons that could only be answered by the “Why?” question. In this regard, Anscombe could easily provide answers to questions regarding the human actions subject to the “Why?” questions. She mentions that the question of “Why” is simply an utterance by which we obscurely promote to address the question, thus making her comeback from intention § 19. She says if a person moving a pump ceases to move the pump by relaxing the muscles, the pump will stop operating in an attempt of justifying why the question “Why?” exists because of what describes the intention. Thus, Anscombe says that upon answering the question “Why?” certain acts can be classified in the class of intention and consequently be described as intentional.
IV: Distinction between Intention and Motive
Anscombe asserts that motive and intention are treated not to be so distinct in meaning. However, she identifies the difference based on gain. The intention must result from the gain, but the desire to gain results into motive. If the motive is called good, the gain may possibly be good as well. But if the purpose is wrong, there comes the distinction between intention and motive. From intention §12, Anscombe mentions that the motive for action may have a diverse application than the intentions with which the action was conducted (Anscombe, 19). Motives may explain actions, but they possibly do not “determine” the same actions. In intention §13, Anscombe classifies revenge and attitude as motives. In an example of killing, she mentions that a man kills out of pity, love, or hatred so that he may be released from the awful sufferings or get rid of the swine (Anscombe, 18). Therefore, if a person kills because of revenge as an object but not intimately obtained as the main reason for killing, then the actual killing is revenge. But on the side of the intention, it is the basic element, which makes a person to be held liable for a crime committed.
Intention may refer to the purpose of performing an act of killing while motives define the principal reason for committing the act. Anscombe labels intention as the answer to “why?” questions. In this way, Anscombe treats motive not to be mentally caused and that every motive has an application behind it other the applications of the intention for which an act is committed by man. We can develop a broader understanding by looking at intention from the aspect of willingness. Anscombe teats intention to be based on the power of the will and the act of man being described as an intention is never a mistake. In this regard, Anscombe treats the consequential effects of intentions to be known before the performance of the act. Therefore, in simpler terms, intention underpins the primary element to affix culpability even if the act was committed by a bad intent or a good one (Anscombe, 21). The same treatment Anscombe gives intention is that such acts are performed purposefully and consciously. For the same reason, Anscombe demonstrates that the question “why?” lacks application if the answer gives a cause. Therefore, the notion of ‘cause’ is overreaching in most questions seeking to distinguish intention from motive.
VI
The modern philosophy according to Anscombe has some existing gaps in the development of practical knowledge and practical reasoning. The modern philosophy has misconceptions that practical knowledge must be judged based on facts and that facts and reality dictate what should be said if it is knowledge. According to Anscombe, practical knowledge is based on that gained by observation and the other by intention. Therefore, according to her, knowledge appears to be modal of two objects which cannot be similar (Anscombe, 57). Practical knowledge can be best understood by first understanding practical reasoning. The modern philosophy largely gave credit to ordinary reasoning that could only be considered as reasoning towards truth propositions sewn to be true by premises (Anscombe, 58). On this basis, the general belief is similar to that of reasoning like “Everyone with money ought to give it to a beggar, and that the person asking for money is a beggar; I have money so I ought to give this man some cash” (Anscombe, 58). Such reasoning, according to Anscombe, is pegged on premises while such praises can never be certain.
For Anscombe, practical reasoning is a form of thought that sequentially proceed form a general type of action to a particular body movement. This proceeds to identify means to a given end. Nevertheless, Anscombe insists that the talk of practical reasoning should never be read as identifying an interior mental process that results from the bodily movements. For Anscombe, the concept developed by Aristotle of the practical syllogism is just a formal a way of formally making explicit what is less represented formally by answers a person may have in a series of questions (Anscombe, 59). For Anscombe, the knowledge that informs one’s actions is a necessary component of personal, intentional activities. Without knowledge, there is no activity to speak of, and the difficulty lies with the description of the agential knowledge. According to Anscombe, the inception of ancient knowledge is fundamental in finding our way out the darkness in which the modern philosophers have immersed us.
Work cited
Anscombe, Gertrude Elizabeth Margaret. Intention. Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. 10-70.