- Defense of Necessity: Queen v. Dudley and Stephens
In Queen v. Dudley and Stephens (1884), Stephens, Dudley, and Parker were crew members on a yacht who were cast adrift 1600 miles in the sea. They were out of food after twelve days, and Stephens and Dudley suggested to Brooks that one person among them should be sacrificed to save others’ lives. Brooks did not agree. On day 20, without consulting, Brooks, Stephens, and Dudley killed Parker (Queen v. Dudley and Stephens, 1884). After four days, all of them were rescued. All of them would have died if they never fed off of Parker’s remains. Since all four would have died, I believe Dudley and Stephens should be able to assert that they did not commit murder because their actions saved three lives out of four.
Under the necessity defense (Choice of Evils), Section 35.05(2) of the New York Penal Law, some actions are justifiable and not criminal when such conducts are “necessary as an emergency measure to avoid an imminent public or private injury which is about to occur by reason of a situation occasioned or developed through no fault of the actor.” Based on ordinary standards of intelligence and morality, the defendants’ conduct was desirable given the urgency of avoiding the death of four people, which clearly outweighed the overall desirability of avoiding murder as prevented by the statute. For certainty, they talked with Brooks about their intentions, although he did not agree. The conduct of Dudley and Stephens should be justifiable. It was not the defendants’ fault to be cast 1600 miles from the land.
The defendants could argue that they reasonably believed that their conducts were necessary to avoid evil to themselves and Brooks. Conduct is considered to be necessary and justifiable to avoid harm under Section 3.02(1)(a) of the Model Penal Code if the harm sought to be prevented by individuals’ action is more significant compared to the evil/harm sought to be restricted by the law defining the felony or offense charged (Dressler, 2013). The defendants could successfully assert that if they did not kill Parker, all four of them would have died, which could cause greater harm than that sought to be avoided by the law (Boyle, 2001). They could have argued that the murder of one person prevented the deaths of three others.
Certainty about the outcome of the defendants’ murder is not a reasonable element because of disagreements. The certainty requirement could be replaced by their intentions of the outcomes, primarily because of inherent disagreements. Generally, certainty would require the defendants to explicitly address the objection that the defense of necessity lacks substantive clarification of the values needed to inform its application (Boyle, 2001). The lack of clarity about the relevant values may only be desirable when preventing inappropriate restrictions. The necessity defense entails “a balancing of values and uncertainty” under Section 3.02 of the Model Penal Code. As a result, submitting such question to adjudication might have much strategic value. If greater clarity on certainty regarding the applicable values might be required under the perspective of law, it would make it impossible for them to reach any consensus based on the disagreement about the nature of relevant values at issue (Arthur & Shaw, 2010). In most cases, strong disagreements typically exist over moral issues based on the extent to which specific conduct or values are relative or absolute and “how far desirable ends might justify otherwise felonious methods” (Dressler, 2013). Therefore, even though Justice Coleridge’s certainty requirement might be theoretically possible, it could be quite unattainable and unreasonable in practice.
However, I believe that the outcome of a similar case would favor the defendants if they agree to draw lots to determine who will be killed. By deciding on their actions, defendants could reasonably foresee the results of their conduct with substantial certainty or establish the objection of their conduct by intending the results (Arthur & Shaw, 2010). The Court could find defendants’ knowledge or substantial certainty, and their conduct could be justifiable.
References
Arthur, J. & Shaw, W. H. (2010). Readings in the philosophy of law (5th edn.) New York, NY: Temple University Law Library.
Boyle, J. M. (2001). The doctrine of double effect: Philosophers debate a controversial moral principle. United States: P. A. Woodward.
Dressler, J. (2013). Reflections on Dudley and Stephens and Killing the Innocent: Taking a Wrong Conceptual Path, in THE SANCTITY OF LIFE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW: THE LEGACY OF GLANVILLE WILLIAMS. New York, NY: Dennis J. Baker & Jeremy Holder.
The Queen v. Dudley and Stephens 264 F. 3d 344 (1884).