Failed and Fragile States
Following the Sept 11 attacks, global policy rhetoric turned its focus to ‘failed’ or weak states as the major security threat of the 21st century. It has emerged that the greatest security threats developed nations like the United States and the United Kingdom are currently facing is the transnational threats from poorly governed states. Traditionally, the greatest security threat that these countries faced was primarily military threats from rival superpowers, something that has changed since the end of the cold war. Ahram (2011), defined a failed state as a government body that is no longer functioning and the public have taken over the provision of the necessary services like security with an ineffective economic system. The major security concerns from failed states to global security include terrorism, organized crime, and global pandemics.
Terrorism
Failed states always become the hotbed for activities involving the transnational terrorist network. As stated by Andersen, Møller & Stepputat (2007), there are two factors that make failed or weak states a breeding ground for such activities. First, such states are always incapable of handling these groups given their limited capacity in relation to information collection and handling. Secondly, state sovereignty prevents other powerful nations from taking effective countermeasures that can help in the containment of such activities. Some relevant examples in light of this include the Al-Qaeda’s operations in Afghanistan and Al-Shabab operation in Somalia. Through this, failed states provide a safe haven for activities involved in these groups like training and necessary economic activities that can help them finance their ill-fated operations. Emerging information reveals that Al-Qaeda is involved in trade in gemstone and minerals from war-torn countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sierra Leon.
However, other studies also have different opinions. Ayoob (2007), observes that the idea for the September 11 attack in the United States was conceived in Afghanistan, but its planning and development were carried out in Germany in which contacts were made with other terrorists operating in developed nations like Spain. This presents the different activities involved in an effective and efficient terror-related group. These activities include recruitment, training, planning, supply chain framework, and access to a well-enhanced communication system. The existing complexity involved in some of these activities cannot be offered in a failed or weak state hence these groups always require support from the well-enhanced infrastructure from the developed nations. Ayoob (2007), concludes that the sovereignty element helps failed or weak states to provide security to terror-related groups without even being necessarily involved.
Organized crime and drug trafficking
There is a clear connection between failed or weak state and drug trafficking. This can be seen in Afghanistan which has emerged as the principal opium supply around the globe. A similar case can be seen in Colombia with its harboring of cocaine plantation and processing plants. The plantations and processing units are all located in areas beyond the reach of the Colombian government. Bates (2008), advances two reasons for the concentration of hard drugs operations in war-torn countries. The first of these is that civil war creates a territory out of reach of a recognized government in which such activities can be carried. Similarly, civil war also creates loopholes for opportunistic behaviors as a result of the ineffectiveness of policing institutions. Secondly, the convention economic activities are reduced in a well or failed state, which encourages the population to engage in illegal activities. This can be seen in Haiti in which the country has become a stopover for cocaine transportation into the United States.
Global pandemics
The existing ineffective institutional programs and policies among failed or weak states provide a breeding ground for deadly pandemics and without proper measurements taken such can become a threat to the existing global order (Bøas & Jennings, 2005; Lindborg, 2018). The ineffective institutional framework results in late identification of an existing pandemic within the region as well as the poor formulation of viable strategies that can be utilized in mitigating such pandemics from affecting a significant number of the country’s population. The underlying factor in this is the inadequate capacity and capability of these institutions relating to the required resources for ensuring timely identification and response mechanism (Lemay-Hébert & Mathieu, 2014). Consequently, the world can only realize this after the pandemic has affected a significant portion of the world’s population and has caused considerable disruption of the existing systems and procedures around the globe.
State response to a weak or failed state security threat
Nations are implementing different institutional and policy frameworks aimed at addressing the security concerns presented by failed states. In recent times the national defense strategy utilized by the United States has departed from the traditional focus on interstate wars to strengthening the sovereign capacity of weak or failed states (Lindborg, 2017). Through this, the US empowers weak or failed states to internally fight the insurgence of organized crime and terror-related activities. The different programs initiated by the country in realizing this goal include expanded training of foreign security forces and identification of ungoverned areas.
Expanding training of foreign security forces entails enhancing the capacities and capabilities of the security forces of individual nations who are considered weak or failed states. The specific activities involved in this program include the introduction of these security forces to emerging weapons and tactical maneuvers utilized in the contemporary world to ensure effective security operations (Lindborg, 2018). It also involves sponsoring the acquisition of emerging military equipment that can further enhance a country’s security operations. In relation to ungoverned areas, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has identified 50 zones that are considered as vulnerable to civil wars. It has also enhanced the information collection and handling within these areas to ensure to prevent the growth of terror-related activities as well as organized crime in these areas (Malejacq, 2016). Similarly, the national intelligence service is also working closely with the office the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization in the identification of vulnerable areas that are at risk of collapse and initiate conflict prevention and mitigation efforts.
Several other states are have also been involved in similar initiatives to contain the threat presented by weak or fragile states in the form of security challenges as well as a pandemic outbreak. Some of these states include Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and Germany. On the same note, global institutions are also involved in the rush for enhancing the capacity of failed or weak states to deal with the security threats presented by these nations (Mampilly, 2011). The United Nations identified that a threat to one nation is a threat to all nations whether the threat is terror-related or
Other impacts of weak or failed states to the global order like a pandemic outbreak. In light of this, the UN established the Development Assistant Committee (DAC), which is to cooperate with the Low-Income Countries Under Stress (LICUS) program at the World Bank in identifying fragile states and formulate viable strategies that can help these states purge the growth of terror-related activities and global pandemics (Mandel, 2013).
Definitions vary, but there is consensus among scholars and policymakers on the features and challenges posed by conflict-affected or post-conflict states. Features of failed or weak states focus on (a) development: poverty reduction, social inclusion and equity; (b) governance: service delivery and government efficacy; (c) security: human security. Others define it as the state’s ability or willingness to function in a manner conducive to the welfare of the majority of its citizens (Bøas and Jennings 2005). Failed states continue to have security risks such as armed groups, organized crime, weak governance, high rates of unemployment, and poor development (source). Though there, are several elements involved in state failure, Bøas and Jennings (2005), observe that the concept of state failure is only relevant in the form of human security. This takes into account the interests and incentives on the part of various local, national, and regional actors. These are the essential stakeholders who are directly or indirectly impacted by the failure or weakness of a specific state.
Marc, Willman, Aslam, Rebosio & Balasuriya (2013), identified four fundamental political goods from which a failed state can be measured. These include physical security, legitimate political institutions, social welfare, and economic management. Several states have capacity gaps that hinder them from effectively providing these political goods as required. As a result of the existing gaps in the provision of these goods, such nations possess legal sovereignty but not empirical sovereignty.
In relation to the provision of security such nations always fail to provide security from both internal and external threats. They are also incapable of maintaining a monopoly in regard to the use of force (Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall, 2017). Similarly, these nations can also struggle to ensure their populations are safe from crime as well as maintain the required public order for the effectiveness and efficiency of its institutional framework and policies. Lastly, they also have challenges in relation to ensuring effective border control measures. On the same note, in regards to political capacity, these nations lack well-recognized institutions that govern political institutions and provide a reality check on political decisions and political power use (McLoughlin, 2015). They also lack legitimate institutions that can ensure effective protection of basic human rights as well as freedom, and in most cases, there is no proper accountability of political leaders. There is also a lack of proper and efficient administration that can encourage diverse citizen participation in different government-related activities.
In relation to the economic realm, such countries cannot properly conduct the required macroeconomic and fiscal policies that always result in poor performance of the economy, which consequently triggers an uproar from the citizens (McLoughlin, 2015). Such counties also lack a well-structured regulatory and legal climate that can foster entrepreneurship, open trade, and effective management of the available scarce natural resources to create value to its population. These always deter foreign investment, which is always necessary for job creation and source of revenues for the proper operation of government activities. Lastly, these states cannot meet the basic requirements in relation to the provision of necessary social amenities and infrastructures like schools, hospitals, and recreational facilities. These further, initiate an uproar from the citizens, which is a recipe for civil war. McLoughlin (2015), concluded that failed states are far from participating in the millennium challenge which involves investment in people, promoting economic growth, and commitment to ruling justly.
Call (2011), also identifies state weakness to be more than just the question of capacity but also encompasses the aspect of will. Over the years, history has presented incompetent regimes marred with corruption that have hampered the development capacities among promising countries like Zimbabwe. Through differentiation of capacity and will Chandler (2009), advanced four categories of states. These include a) good performing states with well-enhanced capacity and will like the case of Senegal and Honduras; b) weak states who have the will like the case of Mozambique and East Timor; c) states with the required capacity but lack commitment like in the case of Zimbabwe and Burma; d) states with neither the capacity or the commitment like Haiti and Sudan.
Weak and failing states have also been identified to be far from realizing the agreed millennium development goals. Through this, a significant number of their population is always malnourished and poor with evidently poor living conditions except among the elite individuals who own the majority of the factors of production and structure the institutions and policy frameworks to suit their needs (Call, 2011). The country’s healthcare system is also quite ineffective which results in low life expectancy and high morbidity and mortality rate. Similarly, given the lack of necessary social amenities like schools, a significant number of the country’s population to a high number of illiteracy and vulnerability to the humanitarian crisis in the form of man-made or natural crises.
The scope of analysis predominately focuses on the state and its institutions (Brooks 2005), emphasizing state legitimacy. However, more recently scholars have criticized the failed state label and instead emphasize fragility risks or drivers that limit a state’s inability to function in a manner conducive to the welfare of its citizens. From this perspective, fragility is a source of instability and has to do with the ability of the state to manage risks, absorb shocks, and deliver services (Ikpe 2007). Many indices such as the Failed Stated Index, Fragility Index, comprise both low and middle-income countries with an understanding of a scale in vulnerability.
The fragile state index has been an essential tool in identifying and highlighting the normal pressure different states face while they try to offer public goods as expected. It also helps in identifying when such pressures are pushing states towards the brink of failure. For over 60 years the fragile state index has been an essential tool in reducing conflicts around the globe. It utilizes the efficiency and effectiveness of the provision of public goods among nations as the criteria for ranking nations. This has elicited several criticisms of the fragility index from different studies. Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall (2017), observed that there are several nations which are more prone to a coup and revolution like Bahrain ranked number 125 and Albania ranked number 118. The low rankings given to these states make them secure as developed countries. Similarly, there are some states that appear to be in danger of failing but have well-structured systems that ensure their security but are ranked to be among the nations with a high risk of failing. Examples of such nations include Uzbekistan ranked number 39 and Iran ranked number 34. Additionally, Marshall & Elzinga-Marshall (2017), identified that the majority of African states from the most fragile list in accordance to the fragility index, which illustrates that the almost the whole continent is on the verge of collapsing. Through all these, the study suggested a need to restructure this fragility index to track states that lack capabilities and not rogue states.
According to the current fragility index, the most worsened states since 2010 include Libya, Syria, mail, Yemen, Venezuela, Mozambique, Greece, Eritrea, Chile, and Bahrain. On the same note, the most improved nations include Kyrgyzstan, Malta, Turkmenistan, Indonesia, Belarus, Bhutan, Moldova, Uzbekistan, Georgia, and Cuba. Similarly, according to the report the most improved nations this year include Maldives, Kenya, Iraq, Sudan, and Malaysia while the most fragile nations this year include Chile, Mozambique, Libya, Bolivia, and Burkina Faso.
The Democratic Republic of Congo as a Failed State
Roitman contests the characterization of African states as ‘weak states,’ arguing that even within ‘illicit’ markets, the presence and power of the state is very much present. while the state may not condone or officially regulate such illicit activities, it still manages to enforce a significant level of order and security to the participants within such markets. This illustrates that there exists a different political approach to state functionality in practice among African states. The primary reason why the majority of African countries are considered as a failed or weak state is because of the silent approach utilized by African nations in exercising their control to illicit markets and groups. This approach does not match with the well-decorated open approach utilized by the western nations and has ever since been adopted as the standard approach in ensuring the effectiveness and efficiency of the provision of public goods (Boege, Brown & Clements, 2009).
The western approach utilizes democracy, rule of law, separation of powers, and strong civil service in gauging the efficiency of a state. Orientalism also plays an essential role in categorizing nations to be failed states. Since the majority of the world population have adopted the western approach of gauging a failed state. The silent approach utilized by the majority of the African nations in controlling illicit markets and groups within the continent through the use of considerable force that instills fear among the participants in such markets (Boege, Brown & Clements, 2009; Lemarchand, 2003). Additionally, African culture also plays a role in the proper functionality of the state in regard to the control of natural resources. For instance access to natural resources like land has been on a communal or customary basis mediated by the chief. However, there is still a well-structured organization in regard to the use of natural resources like mining and lumbering. Participants in these activities are required to seek permission from the government. The government grants permission for participants in such activities in exchange for royalties (Englebert & Tull, 2013).
On the same note, the majority of African states have well-recognized learning institutions that further illustrates the effectiveness of African governments in providing the necessary social amenities like schools necessary for empowering their population. Through all these Boege, Brown & Clements (2009), concludes that African leadership regimes ensure government stability in their own style that has never been recognized by the other scholars around the globe. There is a need for all institutional frameworks around the globe to recognize the improvised mechanism utilized by the African states in ensuring stability given their lack of necessary capacity required by the western culture (Eriksen, 2009).
In the case of DR Congo labels of ‘weak’ or ‘coercive’ state fails to capture the varied dynamics of local, provincial, and national state practices. Throughout the country there the government has maintained the provision of necessary public goods like education and healthcare. For instance, in Kivu province which is one of the war-torn areas in the country, the government provides necessary social amenities like schools and healthcare (Larmer, Laudati & Clark, 2013). Though the financing systems for such services are hampered, there is still a mechanism in place in which stakeholders like non-governmental organizations (NGOs), churches and donors participate in ensuring effective service delivery in collaboration with relevant government authorities. Moshonas (2013), observes that though public funding for the education sector in some parts of the country stopped in the mid-1980s the level of school enrolment in the majority of these regions is still above average.
Rackley (2006), also observes that the Democratic Republic of Congo is not a failed state but a nation with a legitimate government structure in which its leaders enjoy the political strife in the country, which helps them maintain power while amassing personal profits from the countries lucrative natural resources. Reno (2006), terms this as a Violent Kleptocracy system that has been in existence for over 130 years since the reign of King Leopold II to Mobutu Sese Seko and the Kabila’s. The violent kleptocracy system is a system in which commercial and ruling networks partner to hijack the country’s institutions and maintain the impunity to help them carry out their commercial enterprises at the expense of the safety and general wellbeing of the population.
There are several strategies applied to ensure this system work, one of these is to allow the armed forces to pay themselves while they ensure law and order in the country (Rackley, 2006). Secondly, the country’s leaders always ensure they personally benefit from the existing natural resources in the country and hijack reforms that may endanger their ill-gotten wealth. The third strategy is to stay in power at all costs by repressing pro-democracy movements.
However, Trefon (2009), observed that DRC is a failed state given the existing conditions in the country. The majority of the country’s population is hungry, poor, and under-informed. The government is also incapable of providing essential services like education and healthcare. Similarly, two-thirds of the country’s geographical location is a battleground. Reyntjens (2005), asserts that the country’s security is in a dire state primarily from the upspring of several rebel groups. These rebel groups sometimes stage wars among themselves or with the government forces. Some of the rebel groups in the country include Mai Mai rebels, M23 rebels, ADF-NALU, and FDLR (Reyntjens, 2005). TheM23 rebels are primarily the Tutsi community while the FDLR are mostly Hutu both with their origin from Rwanda. On the other hand, the Mai Mai rebels are primarily local forces claiming to act in self-defense while the ADF-NALU is an Islamic led group from Uganda (Young, 2006).
The majority of rebel groups within DRC are taking advantage of a lack of strong state to assume control of the mineral riches within the region. The country has more than 70% of the world’s Coltan that is used in making components of mobile phones (Reyntjens, 2005). It also has 30% of the world’s diamond reserves (Reyntjens, 2005). The level of infrastructural development in the country is still quite low, which also subjects the majority of the country’s population to poor living standards. Though the country has more than 153,000 km of roads only 2,794 km have been paved (Trefon, Van Hoyweghen & Smis, 2002). Similarly, the country has 4000kkm of a railway line, which is quite ineffective given its poor condition as a result of lack of maintenance. The country also has a population of 70 million with a life expectancy of 47.8 years, which is quite low compared to the world’s life expectancy of 69.4 years (Smith, 2009). Similarly, the country also has a gross national income of $320, which is significantly low compared to $11,081of in the world (Smith, 2009). Additionally, the world’s infant mortality rate is 41 while DRC’s infant mortality rate is 111.9. Further, the world’s literacy rate is 83.7% while the country has a literacy rate of 67% (Smith, 2009).
Through all these, Reyntjens (2005) and Trefon (2009), conclude that the DRC is a failed state by the virtue that it cannot offer the necessary public services as required. The lack of proper healthcare system and well-structured infrastructure network in the country demonstrates the inefficiency of the government apparatus. Trefon (2009), states that all these should not be the case in a country with immense natural resources like DRC. The country should be considered as the cradle for Africa given its positioning in the continent and the level of natural resources it enjoys. However, since its government structures and institutions are ineffective the country cannot rise and claim its superiority in the continent, which further classifies it as a failed state.
Non-State Provision of Goods
Much recent attention has gone into how processes of neo-liberalization have led to the proliferation of non-state actors providing goods and services. At the heart of neo-liberalization is the conciliation of state failure and fragility. Neoliberals’ primary concern are institutions that are always associated with the operations of the market like rule of law, property rights, and central banks and the emergence of the 21st century has seen the neoliberals expand this scope to social capital, social safety and social institutions (Wietzke, 2014). Similarly, the neoliberals assume an asymmetrical relationship between domestic and global risks. Through this, domestic conflicts are perceived to have global implications. However, domestic conflicts cannot change the patterns of capitalistic economic development both at the local and international levels. Rather it is viewed in regards to its impacts on the capacity of domestic institutions to provide favorable conditions that can ensure seamless integration into the global economy (Singh, 2016).
There are several institutions at the international level like the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID) among others, which are concerned about ensuring proper development of institutions among vulnerable states (Tsai, 2011). The world bank utilizes the term low-income countries under stress (LICUS) while DFID identifies fragile states as those whose governments lack the capacity to provide essential services to the majority of the country’s population. The spectrum of countries covered by LICUS includes those that are vulnerable to conflicts, countries with conflict history with unstable institutions, and those with poor governance records (Beisheim, Liese, Janetschek and Sarre, 2014). These international institutions are always concerned about boosting the capacities and capabilities of individual governments in relation to the effective provision of public goods and services.
Similarly, there are also other non-governmental institutions that have a keen interest in relation to the effective provision of goods and services to the required standards. These include churches and individual donors (Cammett & MacLean, 2011). Compared to international institutions these operate at the local level and their impacts are always felt in considerably less geographical locations compared with the efforts made by international institutions like DFID and LICUS.
Lesley Gill (2000) explains in her book how after more than a decade of neoliberal economic structuring, life is increasingly precarious for the majority in the developing world, having limited means to support themselves and diminishing the provision of social welfare services by the state. The concept of the free market that forms one of the building blocks within the neoliberal economy always promote capitalism in which a significant amount of the factors of production end up in the hands of a few individuals in the economy. As a result of this, the majority of the country’s population always has to depend on the few elites in the country who owns a significant portion of the factors of production (Cammett and MacLean, 2014).
Since in most cases the state institutions among the developing countries do not have the capacity to manage the pressure from these elites they always hijack and assume control of these institutions (Gough, Wood, Barrientos, Bevan, Davis & Room, 2004). The institutions always end up serving their interest and not that of the majority of the country. Similarly, these institutions also end up overlooking their state roles. The elites always have a massive amount of resources at their disposal and it is through the financing strategy that they gain control of public institutions within developing countries. They also gain control of these institutions by acquiring and retaining power. Through all these the elites always implement policies and development strategies that only serve their interest and that of the significant majority in the country (Krasner and Risse, 2014). Consequently, these developing nations lack effective healthcare and education systems, which always form the base for empowering a country’s population, and despite boasting of relatively strong economic grounds the majority of these nations’ populations are still struggling to master a decent life.
Non-State Provision of Goods in Africa
Structural adjustment policies on African states have extensively been cited as destructive, weakening state capacity and reinforcing neocolonial and patrimonial tendencies (Van de Walle 2001). Reform and austerity measures taken to make room for free market systems have led to “a noted increase in corruption and rent-seeking” (Van de Walle 2001) as well as what Hibou (2004) has termed the 1980s’ structural adjustment program (SAP) as “the privatization of the state.” The majority of the African population during this time still depended on the state for employment opportunities, provision of public goods, and maintenance of law and order. This was as a result of the poor development status that existed among African states. However, compared to the majority of western nations there existed well-structured institutional frameworks and development that encourage effective and responsible interaction among citizens and with the state.
Reducing the government’s role in the economy as a result of the SAP strategies dumped African nations into poverty abyss. This together with the privatization of public goods ensured the few privileged individuals in these countries restructured the existing weak institutions to serve their interests (Krishna, 2011). On the same note, they also ensured they privately owned the majority of public goods and controlled the level of services offered to the citizens. This ensured they only served their personal interest through various activities and programs.
For instance, price liberation as a result of structural adjustment programs has significantly impacted the agricultural sector, which is one of the mainstays of several African economies. The price liberation concept has resulted in private entities controlling the prices of several products among African countries (Kruks-Wisner & Gabrielle, 2018). The prices these private entities are offering to farmers are relatively low and since the government does not have significant authority in relation to controlling prices in the market. Through this, farmers are ever stuck in poverty as a result of their low level of income. Trade policy reforms have also lowered tariffs. Tariffs always form one of the major sources of revenue for the majority of African states. This move ensured a significant reduction in revenue for the African countries; hence has been hampering the effectiveness of state operations and the capacity of its institutions to deliver quality public goods and services.
Similarly, the structural adjustment program primarily concentrated on enhancing the economic growth of African countries in which it emphasized generating a lean budgetary framework among African states. The result of this was the neglect of other essential institutions like the judicial system. The judicial systems among several African states experienced a significant cut on their budgets to allow economic development policies and programs (MacLean, 2010). The result of this was the stalling of judicial development policies and programs. Almost forty years since the implementation of SAP the majority of African states have ended up with weak judicial systems that cannot ensure the protection of rights and freedom of citizens.
The healthcare sector has also been affected by these programs. Though it is relatively developed among some African states, still the level of access to healthcare within Africa remains inferior compared to other regions like Latin America (Van de Walle, 2001; MacLean, 2011). The ineffectiveness of government systems and procedures among renders the majority of African states ill-prepared to deal with pandemics like Ebola and HIV/AIDS. Through all these, the existing inefficiency exhibited by the majority of African states that has rendered most of them weak, fragile or failed states have resulted from the donor conditions that were laid out to strengthen their economic capacities while forgetting the essence of other government institutions. The majority of African states need to revise their institutional framework to generate viable and long term solutions to the problems their populations are facing as a result of ineffective government systems.
Some scholars have deemed the role of external donors and NGOs in Africa as “surrogate demos,” resulting in a “depoliticized mode of technocratic governance” (Gould and Ojanen 2003). The impacts of donor-related influence on African states are still being felt from the structural adjustment programs implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. MacLean, L (2017), observed that wealthy nations primarily western countries were heavily involved in pushing for such disastrous programs to justify their financial aid to these institutions. The result was that the majority of African nations were dumped into a debt crisis that has left most of the developed nations skeptical of the efficacy of African governments.
The emergence of the 21st century has seen a change in regards to donor funding style among developed nations to African countries. This tie rather than utilizing international institutions donor nations are utilizing NGOs and personal donations to African nations. Through this, they seek to help the struggling African nations offer essential services to their citizens with proper accountability since they view the majority of African states as corrupt and fragile states. Post, Bronsoler & Salman (2017), asserts that this move is a covert operation primarily channeled to help them have significant control on several proceedings among African nations through the use of their diplomatic envoys. The level of interference by the developed western nations to the activities among fragile African nations have not gone unnoticed. Some African states are restructuring their institutions and systems to limit the level of interference that western nations have to their operations through NGOs. For instance, the government of Zimbabwe, one of the fragile nations in the continent initiated a change of regulatory framework to limit the activities of NGOs within the country. MacLean, L (2017), also observed that though NGOs remain essential institutions in alleviating poverty and hunger among the majority of the African population, they are still part and parcel of western powers and an avenue utilized by the majority of African nations in colonizing African states.
The assumption utilized by the developed nations in channeling their donor efforts to help African states through the use of NGOs is that the majority of African leaderships are corrupt. The use of NGOs helps the developed nations administer their efforts in accordance with their specifications and can sometimes call for restructuring of existing systems and procedures among several sectors to accommodate their interests (MacLean, 2017). The underlying concept in this is that the restructuring calls deemed necessary for the effective administration of goods and services is primarily to create an avenue for these nations to control several proceedings among the African states. Though it can be viewed as a move to ensure a mutualistic symbiotic relationship the African nation involved always end up losing their sovereignty in the long run. Consequently, the donor western nation gets to have a say on the political structures and leadership regime that are suitable for these nations.
MacLean L. (2010), asserts that self-interest that exists among nations cannot allow individual states to donate public products and services without benefiting from such generosity. In return, these nations demand international backing for their agendas in the international platform, exploitative trade agreements that put them at the benefiting ends and control to a significant share of natural resources within the majority of African nations. In regards to international backing, these western nations always prepare and groom their preferred leaders for top political positions among the African states. They even go as far as influencing the election outcomes of these nations to ensure their preferred candidates emerge victorious (MacLean, 2017). There are no signs of eliminating the existing instability among several African nations. The developed western nations will still generate new ways of ensuring they control the African nations as their puppets even if the African nations manage to unweave themselves from the donor influence trap currently laid by the developed western nations (Krasner & Risse, 2014; MacLean, 2017).
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