FIFA Governance Structure and Recommendations
FIFA was established in 1904, and it is the international body that governs football in the globe. The mission of the body is “Developing the Game, Touching the World, Building a Better Future.” The body is registered under the Swiss Commercial register. According to Swiss Law, the body ought not to focus on generating profit for other purposes other than investing in the promotion of football activities. The body has an extensive membership with effective democratic structures. However, one major challenge that FIFA has faced is fund management, as it has come under intense scrutiny over the years (Gill et al., 2019). The body is made up of various structures and one of the primary challenges that will influence FIFA in the future if cultivating democracy and good governance. This paper discusses the current governance structure and FIFA and suggests reforms that it should make to the structure.
The governing structure of FIFA is made up of several formal bodies. First is Congress, which is the most supreme and the ‘legislative’ FIFA unit. It is made up of 209 members, each from every country with a football association. The congress members meet once every year, where they take part in making decisions on amending statutes, regulations, and approving yearly reports. Most significantly, they meet to elect the FIFA president once in 4 years (Pieth, 2014). Constitutionally, every Congress member is obligated to vote. However, such rights of every Congress member is not the same as for individuals belonging to the Executive Committee but is founded on the social and economic significance of football for the region or continent that the member represents. Apart from their right to amend rules, Congress members’ rights are not primarily to legislate, but are comparable to the general assembly’s rights in a company; for example, approving financial statements, appointing auditors, and electing the President. This unit of governance structure has a minimal influence on the entire body with regard to control over the management, setting of agendas, and making decisions (Pieth, 2014). These leaves a significant responsibility to the Confederations in relation to the formulation of opinions in Congress and representing the interests of members. Thus, this suggests a body to effectively and independently oversee management.
Second is the Executive Committee, which is FIFA’s executive body that is elected by the Congress. The primary duties of the Executive Committee are appointing Judicial bodies and Committees, approval of the regulations on FIFA’s internal organization, appointing and dismissing the Secretary-General. The role of the Executive Committee as a delegate assembly is supported more by its increased size, which is made up of 24 members (Pieth, 2014). This body plays the capacity of a “reduced Congress,” which, in essence, is less of executive and more supervisory in nature. The members of this body are typically active soccer officials with a specific motivation or passion for developing soccer in their nations or continents. Such interests do not conflict with their governance role in FIFA; for example, on issues such as football rules, anti-doping, and medical guidelines (Pieth, 2014).
The governance structure is also made up of the President. Unlike the bodies discusses above (Executive Committee, Congress), the President is not outlined as a unit of FIFA. Notwithstanding, the President and the Secretary-General essentially form FIFA’s executive body. Also, the President has the power of appointing and dismissing the Secretary-General, but with approval from other FIFA units of governance. In relation to corporate governance, the President is the CEO of FIFA. Also, he/she oversees the Executive Committee and the Congress, which is responsible for managing the body. In corporate governance, this can be related to the monistic system, whereby the responsibilities of the CEO and the Board Chairman are integrated into one individual.
Also, there are standing committees. FIFA is made up of Standing Committees, which are around 22 in number and with over 300 members. These committees are of three types: those that are concerned with FIFA tournaments, those that are concerned with business administration and corporate governance, those relating the rules of football. The committees pertaining to business administration include the Finance Committee, the Legal Committee, the Strategic Committee, the Media Committee, among others. Each of these committees follows a set of rules. The committees are barely independent because they access resources on a limited basis (Pieth, 2014).
The governance structure is also made up of the General Secretariat, which is FIFA’s administrative body. This position is elected by the Executive Committee and the Congress. The General Secretariat appoints the next management level, such as his/her deputy, Line, and Advisory Directors, and approving their wages and salaries.
Finally, the Judicial Bodies also make up the governance structure of FIFA. It consists of committees such as the Disciplinary, Appeal, and Ethics Committees. The committees handle issues such as conflict of interest, integrity, and corruption (Pieth, 2014).
FIFA has often been compared to a public body because of its social, political, and economic significance. Just as global organizations, basic principles of governance ought to apply; for example, power separation, the rule of law, democracy, democracy, and transparency (Zeidan & Fauser, 2015). Regarding democracy and elections, one recommendation that ought to be considered by the body is the limitation of office terms of some of its officials; for example, the President who is currently allowed to rerun for the seat as many times as he/ she would like. On an organizational level, the body should consider electing independent members into the ExCo. Also, the roles of various Committees should be clearly distinguished; for example, the Audit Committee and the Financial Committee have to be distinguished clearly. The body has received a lot of scrutiny for corrupt practices, and one way of handling this is enabling central committees such as the Audit Committee to function as a genuine internal control body that is entirely independent of FIFA. Such independence may be practically realized by allowing it to have its own authority and access external resources. In this line, the tasks of the Disciplinary Committee and the Ethics Committee ought to be clearly defined by reforming the underlying codes, specifically the Disciplinary Code and the Ethics Code (Mandel, 2016). These committees have to be transformed into independent bodies with a combination of internal and external members and the capacity of initiating investigations depending on their assessment.
References
Gill, S., Adelus, E., & de Abreu Duarte, F. (2019). Whose Game? FIFA, Corruption, and the Challenge of Global Governance.
Mandel, A. (2016). Fixing Soccer: Changing FIFA’s Corporate Governance Structure in Response to the Current FIFA Corruption Scandal. Cardozo Arts & Ent. LJ, 35, 449.
Pieth, M. (Ed.). (2014). Reforming FIFA. St. Gallen: Dike Verlag.
Zeidan, O. S., & Fauser, S. G. (2015). Corporate governance and corporate social responsibility–the case of FIFA. Problems and perspectives in management, (13, Iss. 2 (contin.)), 183-192.