President Bush Invasion of Iraq.
Introduction.
The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the beginning of the war between Iraq and the U.S which lasted for over a month. It began on 19 th of March with just air invasion and the next day was a ground invasion. The war was a combined troop effort of not just the U.S but also the United Kingdom, portland and Australia. The act of war over the years has been explained by the different states and they have given different reasons as to why they invaded Iraq in 2003. The Bush Administration has run up statements that claim the invasion was out of fear of what happened in 9/11 and that Iraq had Weapons of Mass Destructions in (WMD) their possession (Jamieson, 2007). On September 11, 2001, four airplanes were hijacked and Al Qaeda, which is an Islamic extremist group, was responsible for the deaths of over 3,000 people.
This attack somewhat defined the Presidency of George W Bush and the decisions till 2003. There was a suspected link between Saddam Hussein’s Government (Iraq’s president) and the Al Qaeda terrorist organization and it was used as a reason for the attack on Iraq. This is because aside from the claims that Iraq had Potential WMD was just a cover-up for the neoconservatives to carry out an unrelated war with Iraq. This paper analyses the decisions made by President Bush and how the warranted the events of 2003 in Iraq.
This decision by The Bush government has been the most controversial action of foreign policy decisions since the explanations for the war created so much division among the analysts. After the war happened the Bush Administration has been criticized and it was put out in the open by the ex weapons inspectors and Iraq specialists that Saddam had no resources to develop serious WMD that can cause threats to the U.S (Woods & Stout 2010, p 5). Robert Jervis even discredited the claims that the weapons of Iraq could not be contained thus had to be taken out by a preventive war. The only conclusion he came up with was that Iraq posed little threat and the Bush Administration wanted to dominate and take out any regime it disliked. The attack of Iraq is more of an assault that was planned by the U.S and the 9/11 attack provided the perfect opportunity
Iraq and the U.S had relations before 9/11 and even before the invasion in 2003 and the Neoconservatives had been on a quest to change the regime in Iraq. Saddam Hussein had gotten the support of arms during the time he wa at war with Iran in 1980 even though he had been oppression the people of Iraq (Dunne, 2003 p, 257) This relationship changed when Saddam chose to invade Kuwait which was not in the interest of U.S and hence the status was changed from a regional ally to a potential threat especially for the Israeli’s. The US tried its best to establishing Legitimacy in power by making International rules be habitually obeyed by Nation-states even without a sovereign (Thomas, 1991). United Nations Security Council Resolution 678 was adopted on November 29, 1990, to authorize the use of force on Iraq after they invaded and occupied Kuwait on August 2 1990 (Weston, 1991 p, 516). This was after the Council reaffirmed that all the resolutions given to Iraq had been rejected and they had refused to leave Kuwait thus defying the Security Council in the process.
The senior Bush Administration still chose to maintain a Saddam as the leader in Iraq even after the Gulf war since Bush had promised a new world order however the neoconservatives saw it as a waste of opportunity and opposed the move as shown in the Document Defence Planning Guidance in 1992 (Dolan and Cohen 2006 p43). The Insiders talk of a silent coup that was facilitated by these opposers. Things got worse when the extremists succeeded in ensnaring the US foreign policy and set it down a path which was at loggerheads with the national interests. The document suggested that the clique Bush had brought to power wanted the US to take advantage of the collapsed USSR then impose dominance by spending more on their defence forces that any regime that tried to counter them would be destroyed. This would just leave the other regimes with no option but join them and not change their agenda (Dolan and Cohen 2006). This document was a clear indication that the neoconservatives were advocating for a preventive war.
In 2001 Bush administration had indicated that Iraq was not a threat to them Had there been a different administration and balanced systems then there wouldn’t have been a war. The absence of opposition and the corporate world vaguely accepting the war brought to the table was no one’s agenda other than the Clique Bush had brought in power. The administration avoided opposition of its plan by secrecy and deception, and holding the war plan as a partitioned concept thus any information to their allies was restricted. This was meant to create a facade that their president was not reviewing a war plan. The president and his senior administration were so bent on executing the war that even the refusal of their allies such as Turkey, France, German, Sudi Arabia and Egypt never deterred them.
On September 17, 2001, Bush secretly signed an order to invade Afghanistan and the order had included a subsequent invasion of Iraq (Dolan and Cohen 2006). The Operation Desert Storm under the Un banner was strengthening Saddam’s position and the Iraqi people were the ones getting hit by the effects of the imposed sanctions. The United Nations had to deploy its forces as member Condoleezza Rice made her fears known. She was afraid that the WMD would be used by Saddam or be sold to countries who were in a position of using it (Hans 2004,p 58). This made the UN have the responsibility of handling the military force that was deployed but in the real sense, the coordination was controlled by the United States. This shifted the mission of the united nations whose purpose and principle was to be a peaceful humanitarian organization. As a result, the action made the UN to be known as a dubious precedent to this very day.
In a Memoir, Tommy Franks who was the Commander in Chief of the Central Command (CENTCOM) and responsible for the U.S military stated that on December 28, 2001, he presented the Iraq Invasion concept to President Bush and the government at the time ti=ook it into consideration. They perfected the plan and even started preparing the needed forces and basing arrangements. President Bush even suggested the ultimatum in a conference that in case they failed to disarm the regime (Iraq who had WMD), then they will have to have other options. He even went ahead to ask Franks to create an elaborate plan and instructed Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell to work together so that they would be able to acquire the support of the enlisted allies and Middle Eastern nations in case they decided to invade Iraq (Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 65)
On March 8, 2002, one of the declassified documents showed how the Bush government admitted that they had failed to reintegrate a law-abiding (Doc 1). Their plan for Iraq could not happen with Saddam in power. They admitted that Iraq had been developing WMD and they had also failed to contain the country. They were left with the option of regime change through a coup or a ground campaign which was to deploy the military and destroy Saddam’s machines and remove him from power. The other option was to toughen the containment which would give Saddam a hard time and at the same time make him accept some of the INternational resolutions the UN had offered. This, however, was not a decision to be made overnight as many factors had to be considered and one major factor was the power Saddam had internally which made his removal from power not easy. The Iraqi military was weaker therefore the US military needed fewer troops compared to the 9/11 if they were to go with the ground campaign option.
Any form of invasion at this time would pose a threat to Baghdad and thus persuade the Sumi Military to desert the coalition to survive rather than stay loyal to Saddam. Air assets required only three months to gather up whereas the ground forces needed four to five months to assemble (Doc 1). All options meant that a decision had to be made six months prior and for the US to have greater control over future Iraq then a great investment on the western forces had to be made. The only option that gave a regime change result was the last option for Ground Campaign and bringing back Iraq to the International Community. Saddam had already been declared a threat (Doc 3) to the U.S and all regional states by Vice President Cheney during his meeting with King Abdullah. They were, therefore, looking for a way of dealing with the issue but still keep in mind Jordan’s Vulnerability and concerns. The state department, however, had different interests that insisted on the return of UN weapons inspectors.
Ambassador Christopher Meyer of the United Kingdom gave his report on how his lunch with Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz had turned out. It was evident that they needed a regime change however war was a tough sell to the Blair government (Doc 6). Wolfowitz was however not focused on Saddam’s WMD but still considered the issue important. His take was focused on the squabbles in the Administrative government and dismissed a military coup. The most important thing was to use the Kurdish model to focus on forming a functional democracy and use it to replace Saddam. President Bush also had a meeting with the Vice president to discuss the guidelines that would guide the British diplomatic missions generally (Doc 7). It was evident that the WMD program could not continue nonetheless be left in the hands of Saddam, the president also promised to act in a calm, sensible but firm way when handling the issue.
On April 12, 2002, a cover was presented from Peter W Rodman who was the Assistant Secretary of Defence that clearly stated that pentagon had completed a decision package that contained materials that provided a full range of military training to the Iraqi opposition and had included mortal combat in the package (Doc 10). It was also stated that the choice made was to be forwarded to the National Security Council Principals Committee. IT was argued by the Defence department that combat training was the President’s first guide in implementing the package. This combat training will help build trust with the Iraqi exiles and eventually increase the effectiveness of the plan since the possibility of a fratricide will have been reduced in a collaborative Military operation. The opinion polls from the state departments also recorded significant support in western Europe that was for the Military action against Iraq.
The strongest support originated from France, Spain and the United Kingdom (Doc 12). This is because the public was advocating for actions to be talked about so as to eliminate the ability of any nation to produce mass destruction weapons and also support the US in removing terrorists and shutting down training camps even if it means by forceful means. Germany and Italy, however, did not support the action against terrorists, His supposedly one of the main reasons the Bush government chose the WMD reason as their main justification for an invasion on Iraq. It was evident that Franks’ CENTCOM plan was a subject being discussed by many officials in power and in different states. Document 13 was a confirmation of Blair’s Agreement to Military action at the Crawford Summit The Objective of the military action was to ensure a law-abiding Iraqi that is stable and abiding by the international laws. The Iraqi should also not be posing any danger to its neighbours or international security.
The Military plan was to remove the regime of Saddam Hussein and eliminate Iraqi WMD. Kofi Annan had tried to have talks with the Iraqi so that they could admit the UN weapons inspectors but his attempts failed three times. He even downgraded to dialogues but the talks are considered pointless. Even though they already had a plan they still had to ensure the benefits outweigh the risks. It was however evident that they wanted a regime change and military action was now inevitable (Doc 14). Bush wanted to remove Saddam from power as he had gotten a justifiable reason which was the Conjunction of terrorism and possession of Weapons of Mass Destruction. In order to successfully do so via military action, he had to fix acts intelligently and thus his chief of defence staff was able to present a briefing of the actual plan for the invasion which was very developed at this time compared to what Frank had presented back in 2001where UN inspections had not been accepted.
Even though the Foreign Secretary Jack Straw tried to argue that the president should back up with Un inspections he did not fail to warn the person going to intercede (Colin Powell) that The President had made up his mind on military action. Powel went ahead to persuade Bush not to impose a war without Un inspections since it will put the US at a disadvantage as it will receive an overwhelming international opposition to the war ( Kellner, 2004,p 417) Most of the documents do not clearly show when and how the president made the decision or if the decision was made at all but Bush and his faction coalition was able to carry the Us to a war that no one wanted. A month before the attack happened there was a major anti-war rally in Roe that was against the war on Iraq. Close to 36 million people took part in the protest against the war in Iraq. However, the Bush government still marched on with their Military army troops to Iraq.
The war happened in March 2003 with an airstrike on Baghdad presidential palace and coalitions closing the Iraq Kuwait border via Basra province Through joining forces with the Kurdish forces they were able to secure the northern part of Iraq. Through the joined forces between the US and UK, the several allies that joined them helped them from a bombing campaign that overwhelmed the Iraqi coalition as the troops swept across the country. Saddam was captured in December of the same year and was executed three years later. After the demise of Saddam, a power vacuum was left and the US had a hard time getting the Iraq they wanted. The Us had a naive assumption that once they killed Saddam they would come in Iraq as saviours and be welcomed with open arms (Chesterfield 2004, p 101). This was however not the case, close to half a million of Iraqis died during the war and three years after and the US failed to provide enough troops to stabilise the country after the invasion. When Bush accepted the need for more troops and sent them the mission was considered a success.
The buildup of troops gave them an upper hand in restoring the country however that did not stop the opposition from building up and also more states considered the US an unreliable ally and even considered them enemies for invading Iraq. The US gained more enemies after the decision to invade Iraq that even after Bush was out of office the incoming presidents were to fix messes he had created. The bush administration was obsessed with control and when the death tolls increased during the invasion the relationship it had with the International Community was soured. The fact that they went on with the invasion despite the global opposition and without authority from the SecurityCouncil meant that they had no ground to convince the international community for help when the subsequent invasion became problematic (Diamond 2004, p 39). Their chances to get help was further reduced when Dergio Mello was killed during an attack on the UN headquarters in Iraq. This just got to show how this whole operation was not supposed to happen.
The war had a major negative impact on the foreign policy and relations of the US. It had to be more cautious when handling radical actions they have not learnt from their mistakes, therefore, they have mastered the art of drifting past the issues until a major crisis forces them to take action (Diamond, 2004 p. 34). The incoming president had to show that he was different from the Bush administration by having ways that are very distinct from Bush doctrine and aim at fixing the Iraq situation and mending the damaged relations between the US and the international community. The US had been forced to use International forums when dealing with other threats that are similar to Iran so that the threat is dealt collectively with allies and make decisions that are away from being influenced by neoconservatives.
The documents that have been made available after being declassified show that the Bush administration had other motives when they decided to invade Iraq. The fact that they did not want UN weapon inspections as backup raised questions of whether there were any WMD in Iraq. They went to war in Iraq without clear considerations whether the war was a proper form of action. Bush had clearly said many times that he wanted Saddam out of the office and the fact that he had neoconservatives as advisers after his father left office meant that he was being advised to take action to remove Sadaam’s regime. All in all, he made a personal choice to go to war regardless of the advice he had been given. Maybe he wanted to do what his father failed to do, or he wanted revenge for the assassination attempt on his father in 1993. The reason for the decision he made is only known to him.
It is also a possibility that he was a pawn in the game his conservatives were playing to push on their long-held agenda and ensure that any nation that does not fall in line with the international communities rules is taken out. Iraq fits both the bill since it was more powerful and had a leader they disliked and who did not care about the international rules. They saw 9/11 as a perfect opportunity and connecting Iraq to Al Qaeda gave them a reason to go ahead with their own agendas. The president after getting all the advice still went to war, Colin Powell had his chance to explain the risks involved and the alternatives but the President had decided to go to war and his decision was to be respected regardless of the loopholes it had. He had already made up his mind on Military action so the country had to go by his decision.
Works Cited.
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Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004, pp. 54-66, especially 63-65.
CHESTERMAN, S. 2004. Bush, the United Nations, and nation-building. Survival, 46(1), pp101-116.
DIAMOND, L. 2004. What went wrong in Iraq. Foreign Affairs. Pp34-56.
Document 1: United Kingdom, Cabinet Office, Overseas and Defense Secretariat, “Iraq: Options Paper,” March 8, 2002
Document 3: Department of State, “Jordan: Talking Points for Restricted Meeting with King Abdullah,” February 24, 2002 SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive
Document 6: United Kingdom, Washington Embassy, Memorandum, Christopher Meyer-David Manning, “Iraq and Afghanistan, Conversation with Wolfowitz,” March 18, 2002
Document 7: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Circular Cable Diptel 73, 101727Z April 10, 2002 SOURCE: Iraq Inquiry (Chilcot Committee) release
Document 10:DOD/OUSD Memorandum, “Read Ahead for Secretary Rumsfeld RC Meeting, Tuesday, April 16, 2002: ‘Necessity for Full Range of Training for Iraqi Opposition,'” April 12, 200
Document 12:Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Intelligence Assessment, “Western Europe: Public’s Support Action Against Iraq,” April 10, 2002 SOURCE: FOIA release to the National Security Archive
Document 13: the United Kingdom, Cabinet Office Options Paper (with legal annexe), “Iraq: Conditions for Military Action (A Note by Officials).” July 21, 2002 SOURCE: Printed in The Sunday Times, June 12/19, 2005; Downing Street Documents
Document 14:United Kingdom, Matthew Rycroft, Private Secretary to the Prime Minister, Cabinet Minutes of Discussion, S 195/02, July 23, 2002 SOURCE: Printed in The Sunday Times, May 1, 2005, Downing Street Documents
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