The Effect of the Electoral Systems of Russia and Germany on the Party System
Electoral or voting systems are sets of rules that regulate referendums and elections, and determine how the results of such processes might be decided. There are two types of electoral systems; political systems that are prepared by governments, and non-political systems held by informal organizations, businesses and not for profit organizations. The most popular electoral systems include proportional representation (PR), ranked voting, the runoff system, and first-past-the-post voting (FPTP). However, some countries opt for mixed systems that combine the advantages of both proportional and non-proportional systems. Whilst some systems may encourage the evolution of political parties, other systems may not. This paper will, therefore, assess the impact of Russia’s electoral system on its party system and compare it with that of Germany. The expected outcome is that Mixed Member systems will encourage a multiparty system as they are both PR and populist in nature.
An FPTP system is the simplest form of majority/plurality systems that allows voters to choose between two political parties, often alternating power by inclining towards a party on the right and another one on the left. FPTP typically leads to a government comprised of a single party and an articulate opposition. The advantage of such a system is that it fosters broad political outfits that encompass most societal elements while disadvantaging parties that focus on extremism and singular concerns (Tesfay, 2017). An FPTP system, however, denies minority groups and smaller parties fair representation.
On the contrary, PR systems foster the creation of many political outfits that embody the differences in leadership, ideology, and policy inherent within the society. PR systems also allow minorities to access representation easily and may, in some instances, result in the continuity and stability of decision-making on public policies and government (Patterson, 2017). Nevertheless, such systems may also result in the destabilization of the political system as a result of the formation of numerous parties (Mngomezulu, 2019). Such can happen in extreme pluralistic governments where extremist parties may gain disproportionately vast amounts of power when they join up with larger parties to form coalitions. Some voting systems may also affect the internal discipline and cohesion of political outfits by encouraging factionalism, which results in internal disputes within the party.
In 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, there were significant political reforms in Russia. The Soviet Union had been primarily comprised of the Russian Socialist Federation of Soviet Republics (RSFSR), which eventually succeeded the Union and took over the permanent position on the UN’s council for security. Prior to its collapse, the Soviet state had organized regular elections in which opposition parties were non-existent, and the voting outcomes were predictable (Bowring, 2011). Therefore, to most citizens of the Russian Federation, the idea of a free and fair election and competition among political parties was an alien concept.
Boris Yeltsin was the first president under the administration of the RSFSR in 1991. After his election, he established a convention tasked with the mandate of drafting a new constitution and electoral system after the existing one had been torn up and the White House had been stormed. The new law would allow citizens of the Russian Federation to elect a president through a popular vote for a maximum of two terms, previously four years each, but the term was revised to six years each in 2008. Citizens would also elect a legislature and 450 members of the State Duma through proportional representation (Turchenko & Shevchuk, 2016). The president would then appoint 166 Federation Council members, whereby there would be two delegates per region.
The new constitution was adopted in 1993 October under Yeltsin’s administration, with the first multiparty elections being held in December the same year. The dissolution of the Soviet Union had sparked the development of numerous political movements and parties, although many of them failed to reach voters due to lack of funds and a negative perception of political parties by members of the public. As a result, political outfits concentrated on people who had an immense public following. In that first multiparty election, half of the members of the State Duma were voted in through proportional representation while the rest were chosen locally. Thirteen parties participated in the polls, but they soon divided themselves into three factions; the faction that supported Yeltsin reforms, the centrist faction that proposed a reduction in the pace of implementing the improvements, and hard-liners who were opposed to the changes (Bowring, 2011). Centrists comprised of the Democratic Party of Russia and the Yabloko, while the extremists consisted of the Communist Party (KPRF), the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDPR) and the Agrarian Party.
Boris Yeltsin’s presidency that lasted from 1991-1999 was marked by initial political freedom later abridged by his manipulation of the system to remain in office. Although the KPRF was the largest party, smaller political parties proliferated not on the basis of the electoral system but by having charismatic leaders like Vladimir Zhirinovsky. The new parties could not reach citizens countrywide as they were funded by economic interests and due to widespread corruption and disrespect for the electoral reforms. Yeltsin heralded the tradition of selecting successors for the position of the president in the 1996 elections through a deceptive media campaign and an international loan, disrupting free and fair elections and denying minority parties access to representation.
Vladimir Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin on January 1st, 2000, and was elected five months later amid the second Chechen War. He made reforms within the electoral system in 2005 such that members of the Duma would now be elected under a mixed system of plurality and PR. He also increased the membership requirement for registration of political parties from 10,000 to 50,000 and the threshold for election to the Duma from 5% to 7%. Further, he forbade political outfits from forming coalitions and reduced the minimum representation number in the Duma to two parties from four (Bowring, 2011). It was during his presidential term that United Russia rose to prominence, comprising of institutions, political clubs, youth groups, and think tanks that support the president’s policies. Therefore, regional gubernatorial candidates had to join United Russia after the amendments to guarantee their selection by the Kremlin.
The reforms enforced by Putin in 2004 undermined the system that checks and balances the power of the president by encouraging the adoption of vertical reinforcement of authority. Further, it curtailed political competition and thus derailed the multiparty system through the legislative changes in political party organization and Duma elections. The increment of the threshold, the veto on the formation of coalitions during elections, the reduction of minimum party representation in the lower chamber, and restrictive laws for participants in Duma polls significantly favored dominant parties and barred new parties from entering parliament.
After the expiration of his term in 2007, Putin was succeeded by Dmitry Medvedev, who amended the 1993 constitution to extend the term for the presidential position for a further two years. He also allowed minor parties that did not have representation in the lower chamber and regional assemblies to participate in legislative committee meetings annually. Further, he suggested that the membership requirement for registration of political parties be reduced by 10,000, and the threshold be revised back to 5%. Still, no action has been taken towards the implementation of such suggestions.
The evolution of the party system in Russia has been unstable, caused by the continuous change of political parties and their labels. Russia does not have a traditional multiparty system but has instead developed a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system that incorporates both PR and plurality. The system has encouraged the proliferation of independent candidates through plurality by leveling the playing field between independents and partisans. However, the system has had a detrimental effect on party formation. Such is because unlike in contemporary multiparty democracies, in Russia, leaders are co-opted by those in superior positions of power, forming a system that is non-transparent and where the opposition is unable to criticize the shortcomings of the current administration openly.
Germany’s Mixed Member Proportional Representation (MMP) system has been in place since the end of the Second World War and was thought to be a bulwark against fragmentation within the party system. The system gives citizens the right to cast two votes whereby the first one selects SSD candidates, and the second one is founded on closed political party lists in each of Germany’s sixteen federal states (James, 2017). Half of the parliamentary seats are held by winners of the elections in the SSDs, while top candidates from the closed lists fill the rest.
Germany has reformed the laws on elections and party systems four times; in 1949, 1953, 1957, and 1990, changing the threshold on SSD seats. Studies have shown that the changes in the threshold are closely related to the number of political parties. In the 1949 elections, the number of parties was high, while the threshold was low. The 1953 reforms increased the threshold to a national figure of 5%, lowering the number of parties. In 1990, the limit was applied separately in the old and new states of the federation, resulting in a lower threshold and a subsequent increase in the number of parties (Zittel, 2017). In 1994, the law was reverted to the 1957 amendment that set the threshold at three SSD seats or a countrywide 5%.
The electoral reforms in Germany leading to an MMP system have promoted stability as the system supports fairness in group voter representation according to their numbers, facilitates the representation of minorities, and reflects the choices of voters in the formation of the government, owing to its two-and-a-half bipolar party system (Linhart & Statsch, 2016). However, Russia’s reforms have created an MMM system that is biased towards some parties, popularizing United Russia and making the electoral process unfair and non-representative of public opinion. Nations that wish to influence the development of party systems may, therefore, consider alternatives to changing the design of electoral systems. Such alternatives include the provision of incentives for the creation of national parties as opposed to regional political outfits. Moreover, countries may make funding accessible to new parties and loosen stringent funding and registration requirements.
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